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Preface   
My scholarly interest in Sino-American policy and Cross-Strait issues during the 
Nixon era stems, in the first instance, from my personal familiarity with the 
significant political and social changes within the Asian Pacific region. My personal 
background (understanding the national language) also allows me a better 
comprehension of data collected concerning foreign relations between China and the 
United States together with its effect on Taiwan Strait issues, and Taiwan and US 
relationships. Nonetheless, my research rests mainly on recently declassified State 
Department materials, particularly foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976, 
Vol XVII, China, 1969-1972. The Nixon – Kissinger détente with the Soviet Union 
and China led to a significant shift in the international power structure during the 
1970s and has affected international affairs to the present day. The One-China policy 
acknowledged by the United States in the 1970s, was a strategy for the United States 
to form a decades-long positive relationship with the People’s Republic of China.  
 
This thesis is essentially about the origin, course, and impact of “Sino – American” 
relations, under the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, with his National 
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. My argument is simple: Nixon’s policy of détente 
in China marked a turning point in world history, that is, the US accommodation with 
the People’s Republic of China provides a lesson in international diplomacy that has 
as much relevance today as it did during the Cold War. There is no doubt that despite 
several criticisms it has proven to be a most significant and successful policy. 
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However, while everyone focuses solely on China and US and pays little attention to 
Taiwan’s point of view, in this thesis I will also include the Taiwan factor in the 
evaluation of Nixon’s One-China Policy. The fact that the “Taiwan issue” remains 
indicates that it is the flaw in Nixon’s One-China Policy that many have suggested. 
True enough, Nixon and Kissinger should be criticised on how they handled the issue 
of Taiwan; however, Taiwan mustn’t be portrayed as a victim in its policy with the 
Chinese. Although the One-China Policy may have worked against Taiwan in many 
ways, it has also benefited Taiwan on several occasions. In this thesis I also aim to 
explain why it is in Taiwan’s best interests to work with the PRC.      
 
Following the literature review chapter where Nixon and Kissinger’s papers, memoirs 
and official documents will come under review, I will spend most of the thesis 
discussing events in China –US relations together with a background study on China 
– US relations before President Nixon came to power. I will also tackle the issue of 
Taiwan – the One-China policy and the aftermath of the Nixon – Kissinger China 
policy, also known as the “China Card”. Taiwan took an enormous hit with the One-
China policy which not only cost it its seat on the United Nations Security Council, 
but also left it feeling emotionally betrayed by their old friend and protector Richard 
Nixon. 
 
I intend to take an essentially qualitative approach in conducting this research. For 
example, the primary source of information will be a content analysis of the recently 
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declassified documents on Nixon – China relations, minutes of meetings between 
Beijing and Washington, and official announcements. The recently declassified 
materials will provide a documentary update on US – China relations during the 
Nixon era while promoting a clearer perspective of these events. The Nixon era 
memoirs, speeches and similar sources will also be described and examined. 
Likewise, various sources from the literature about Sino-Relations will be utilised, 
examined, and presented to demonstrate how the policy of détente became a major 
factor in Sino-US relations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - Understanding Nixon’s policy of détente, 
Nixon’s One-China policy and the issue of Taiwan   
 
During the 1950s, the Soviet Union and China were communist allies, and the United 
States was alarmed by the threat of a monolithic Sino – Soviet bloc. The Cuban 
Missile Crisis in the 1960s lead the way for to detente between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and China began to worry about a possible image of Soviet – 
American rapprochement. In the 1970s, Soviet leaders began to fear the strength of 
Sino – American relations because of the fact that the Chinese and Americans were 
getting along too well (Stiles, 1999).  
 
According to Stiles (1999) there were several options for superpowers like the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China, in seeking security in international affairs: the 
first was to increase military capability to a level exceeding that of impending 
adversaries; the second was to declare neutrality; and the third option was to align 
with other countries in order to combine military strength. Both China and the United 
States saw that the last option was the best option in order to maintain the balance of 
power, because as nations seek security by forming alliances, so the international 
community will be composed of coalitions which will balance each other. The 
purpose of President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 was not to wipe away the China – 
US tensions of the past, but to lessen these tensions and to put extra pressure upon the 
Soviet Union in order to further advance the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to 
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terminate the Vietnam War. (SALT) talks (CNN interactive n.d.).  
 
On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the administration 
of Chairman Mao Zedong, proclaimed its unfriendly relations with the United States 
based on the fact that Mao Zedong was suspicious of America’s intentions, and thus 
ordered an anti – American campaign. For several years the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China considered each other as adversaries. Chairman Mao 
together with his colleagues continued to denounce American Imperialism and 
rejected discussions on any issues unless the United States put an end to its aid and 
protection to Taiwan (Cohen, 2006).  
 
The internationally recognised government of all China_ including the territory 
controlled by the People’s Republic of China - was the Republic of China (ROC) 
under the administration of Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Taiwan (Wertz, 2006). 
According to Cohen (2006), the Sino – Soviet split and the discontent over the war 
with Vietnam which resulted in reduced anti–communist pressure during the mid 
1960s, led to the alteration of American opinion towards relations with China. 
According to Wertz (2006), the catalyst for the significant change of opinion by the 
United States in its relations with China was the fact that during the end of 1971, the 
People’s Republic of China developed and tested a nuclear weapon, making China the 
third party to the Cold War. The United States needed a productive working 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China due to the fact that China was now 
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the third largest country and most populous nation in the world, with growing military 
power and nuclear weapons. The Nixon administration saw China as the key in 
establishing regional stability, thus giving China a major role in the post Cold War 
world.  
 
In his speech accepting the Republican Party nomination for the presidency, Nixon 
justified his interests in creating a new relationship with the People’s Republic of 
China. He stated the need for a new internationalism, establishing an open world, with 
open minds, open cities and open skies and, mentioned the probability of negotiations 
with the leaders of the Communist world through alternative peaceful negotiations 
and extending the hand of friendship to China and Russia (Watergate Info n.d.).   
 
During the Sino – Soviet split, academic and government leaders during the Nixon 
Administration aimed at a more realistic policy of accepting Mao Zedong’s regime as 
the legitimate government of China. President Nixon agreed with senior State 
Department officials’ assessment that the People’s Republic of China might play an 
important role in helping the United States to end the war in Vietnam and assist the 
United States’ efforts in opposing the growing power of the Soviet Union. In his State 
of the Nation Address in 1971, President Nixon reiterated the necessity of establishing 
a dialogue with the People’s Republic of China and called for a possible place for the 
government of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations (Cohen, 2006). 
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Only days after the visit of the United States ping – pong team to China on the 14th of 
April 1971, President Nixon publicised his determination to liberalise trade and travel 
restrictions affecting the People’s Republic of China. President Nixon and his 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger had already previously discussed the 
possible repercussions on United States relations with Chiang Kai – Shek's Republic 
of China on Taiwan, of establishing a new China policy(Burr, 2004).   
 
Henry Kissinger, a proponent of “Realpolitik”, played a major role in United States 
foreign policy from 1969 to 1977. Under the Nixon administration, Kissinger 
pioneered the policy of detente that led to a significant moderation in Soviet – 
American tensions; he also played a critical role in establishing the 1972 talks with 
the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, by making two secret trips to China and meeting 
with Chairman Mao, the leader of the Communist Party of China. Kissinger discussed 
with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong the normalisation of relations between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China, ending 23 years of diplomatic isolation, 
resulting with the opening of China and the creation of a new strategic anti – Soviet, 
Sino – American alliance. 
 
Upon assuming office President Nixon began indicating the need to change the United 
States, attitude towards establishing friendly relations with the People’s Republic of 
China. He had Secretary of State William Rogers publicise that the United States 
favoured the increase of cultural and scientific exchange with the People’s Republic 
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of China, and loosening trade and visa restrictions. On the 17th of February 1972, 
Nixon made a historical trip to Beijing, making him the first president of the United 
States to visit China.  Nixon, along with his National Security Advisor, furthered the 
United States’ foreign policy interests by establishing a more stable triangular balance 
of power with China and the Soviet Union (PBS Online 1999). In 1973 the People’s 
Republic of China and the United States opened embassies and liaison offices in 
Washington and Beijing, respectively (Cohen, 2006). 
 
In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué (Appendix 1) that was signed during President 
Nixon’s visit to China, the United States acknowledged the One-China Policy, 
recognising that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is 
only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China”. The United States welcomed and 
encouraged dialogue between Taipei and Beijing as a process that would contribute to 
the reduction of tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United 
States administration under Nixon and Kissinger believed that the differences between 
Taipei and Beijing could best be resolved by the people on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait themselves and consistently reiterated that the United States’ interest was to 
establish peaceful negotiations between the two (Wertz, 2006).  
 
The major shift of American recognition and support from Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime 
to that of Mao Zedong was a major obstacle, because the United States was bound by 
a 1954 treaty to defend Taiwan, and American businesses had multi-billion dollar 
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investments on the island of Taiwan. But the Nixon administration was firm on the 
decision and was nonetheless prepared to annul and or abolish the defence treaty with 
Taiwan, justifying it by saying that peaceful resolution could be established in the 
long run. Under the Chinese – American Joint Communiqué, both the United States 
and the People’s Republic of China stated the two countries’ similarities. The United 
States acknowledged the People’s Republic of China’s claim that Taiwan was part of 
China, but reiterated the United States’ interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
issue. President Nixon removed all American forces in Taiwan in response to Chinese 
demands (Cohen 2006). 
 
In 1970s, the United States, together with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and most of the member states of the United Nations changed 
their diplomatic recognition of China from the Republic of China government under 
Chiang Kai – Shek on Taiwan, to the People’s Republic of China government under 
Mao Zedong. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly under resolution 2758, 
ousted the ROC representatives of Chiang Kai – Shek and replaced its representatives 
on the China seat on the Security Council with those of the PRC. Under resolution 
2758, the representatives of the government of the People’s Republic of China, were 
considered the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and the 
UN rejected the Republic of China on Taiwan as legitimately representing the whole 
of China (Wertz, 2006).     
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According to Jue (2006) the competing interests of both the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China in establishing the One-China Policy have had important 
implications on the balance of power and establishing world order. Given the fear of 
another World War or the eruption of World War III, involving the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China with the latter’s gigantic economic 
power, one party political system and nuclear weapons, it was the best possible 
strategic option at that time for the United States to conclude an agreement with the 
People’s Republic of China without getting directly involved in the negotiation and 
mediation of the Taipei – Beijing issue. Nixon and Kissinger further reassured 
Chinese leaders that the United States would not support independence for Taiwan 
and guaranteed to take further steps as requested by the People’s Republic of China 
(Wertz, 2006). 
 
The normalisation of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China was held back by the Watergate Scandal that eventually forced Nixon to resign. 
But Nixon’s successors continued the normalisation process between the People’s 
Republic of China and the United States that was finally achieved in 1979, and even 
before then the secret exchange of military intelligence between the United States and 
the People’s Republic of China that was pioneered by the National Security Advisor 
Kissinger was never interrupted (Cohen, 2006). 
 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger were noted for their diplomatic accomplishments in 
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foreign policy and for the policy of detente with the People’s Republic of China and 
the Soviet Union. Both of them were equally responsible for the dramatic change in 
the structure power relations between the Eastern and Western blocs in the early 
1970s. During the Sino – Soviet split in the 1960s, Nixon, with the aid of Kissinger, 
planned a significant strategy to use the conflict between the two Communist nations 
– China and the Soviet Union, to shift the Cold War balance of power to the West. 
The deliberate improvement in friendly relations between the People’s Republic of 
China and the United States during the Nixon administration was purposefully 
established in order to gain a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and to open 
possibilities of improving relations with the Soviet Union.   
 
The China Policy brought about an immensely significant shift in the balance of 
power during the Cold War. The established relationship between the Washington and 
Beijing was directed against the clearly growing power of the Soviet Union. The Sino 
– American relationship relieved the People’s Republic of China’s fear of a possible 
Soviet attack, and the United States was able to concentrate its military power in 
Europe, while the Soviet Union was being confronted by adversaries from both the 
Eastern and Western blocs. The China Policy was, in the long run, a major turning 
point in world history, because it played a major role in bringing about the weakening 
of the Soviet Union and perhaps the end of the Cold War itself (Cohen, 2006), 
pushing the Taiwan issue into the future. 
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The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China after 
the PRC was established in 1949 was extraordinarily complicated but today the 
People’s Republic of China represents a key focus of the United States foreign policy 
and international economic policy (Rickelson, 1999). China is now undergoing 
astounding economic growth of 10% per year with an economic output of $10 trillion. 
With China’s rapid economic expansion, United States commercial interests' find 
China’s markets significantly important (Wertz, 2006). 
 
To gain a better understanding of the importance of Nixon’s international diplomatic 
policy with China we must also look into China – US relations before the Nixon era.  
 
China and U.S. Relations before Nixon 
Post-revolutionary America had its first contact with the Chinese through the voyage 
of the trader ship Empress of China, which arrived in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1784. 
The voyage of the Empress of China marked the beginning of the lucrative Sino-
American relations known as the Old China Trade. During this period, large quantities 
of spices, ginseng, and furs were exported to China, while a larger influx of tea, 
cotton, silk, lacquer ware, porcelain and furniture was brought to the United States. 
The trade was lucrative on both sides. American merchants who served as middle men 
between the Chinese and American traders made fortunes and became the first 
generation of US millionaires, while Chinese artisans capitalised on the Western 
consumer market by adjusting their practices and by manufacturing goods suited to 
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the demands of the American consumers.  
 
In the late 19th century, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Russia started carving out their own niche of influence in China. Perceiving this as 
threat to their potential market for goods, the US sent diplomatic notes to these 
powers and asked them to guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of 
China by not interfering with the free use of treaty ports within their respective 
spheres of influence. Although the major powers evaded answering the US proposal, 
the US took this evasion of response as acceptance of the proposal which came to be 
known as the Open Door Policy. 
 
While the Open Door Policy was generally respected internationally, it did cause 
serious setbacks for China. A war erupted between Japan and Russia because of the 
latter’s encroachment in Manchuria in 1904. Then in 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria 
and established the puppet state of “Manchukuo”. While the US and other countries 
condemned the Japanese invasion, they did little to stop it. However, when the second 
Sino-Japanese War erupted in 1937, the US sent aid to the Republic of China (ROC) 
which was led by Chiang Kai-Shek. The sympathy of the American public for the 
Chinese was further aroused by reports of Japanese brutality in China. Protestant 
missionaries, novelists such as Pearl Buck, and Time magazine reported the cruelties 
and abuses of the Japanese. 
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In 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, China officially declared 
war against Japan. The US government sent massive amounts of aid to the Chiang 
administration. However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable or 
incapable of effectively resisting the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on 
defeating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong. The two factions 
had been in conflict for years, and the same has been argued of the CCP. After World 
War II ended in 1945, the obvious hostility between the ROC and the CCP exploded 
into open civil war. In 1949, the Communists defeated the Nationalists. Consequently, 
Mao established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland driving the 
Nationalists to retreat to Taiwan and some other small islands around it. Hence, the 
ROC led by Chiang was established in Taiwan and has remained there up to the 
present day.  
 
With the People's Liberation Army (PLA) completing the communist conquest of 
mainland China in 1949, the American embassy followed the ROC government of 
Chiang to Taipei. The US though, retained some of its consular officials on the 
Chinese mainland; however, the new communist government of China did not 
approve of the US presence. Mao proclaimed the PRC's unfriendly relations with the 
US and denounced American imperialism. Thus, by the end of 1950 all Americans 
were withdrawn from the PRC. 
 
The relations between China and US worsened during the Korean War in 1950 as they 
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fought directly against each other until a cease-fire was agreed to in 1953.  
Meanwhile, the US continued to work to prevent the PRC from taking China's seat in 
the United Nations and encouraged its allies not to deal with the PRC. In addition, the 
US placed an embargo on trading with the PRC and encouraged it allies to follow suit.  
 
For 30 years after its founding, the United States did not formally recognize the 
People's Republic of China. Instead, it maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC 
government on Taiwan, and recognized the ROC as the sole legitimate government of 
all China. Despite this official non-recognition and cool relations between the two 
countries, from 1954 until 1970 the US and the PRC conducted 136 meetings at the 
ambassadorial level in Geneva and in Warsaw. During this period, both sides were 
sending feelers to try to improve relations. 
 
Hence, communications between China and US were established through various 
intermediaries including Pakistan, Romania, and American journalist Edgar Snow. 
Nixon, who had long been interested in Asia, pursued the negotiations through his 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. In 1969, the US initiated measures to 
relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact.  
 
The emerging friendliness of Mao and his communist party was reciprocated by the 
US' positive response to conducting high-level talks. Both parties engaged in 
intensive yet secret communications discussing a possible meeting between the top 
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leaders of China and the US. 
 
Moreover, political developments around the world became a major causal factor in 
the pursuance of negotiations between China and US. During that time, China was 
having problems with the Soviet Union while US was facing discontent with its 
ongoing war in Vietnam.  
 
According to Wertz (2006), the US was in need of a productive working relationship 
with the PRC due to the fact that China was the world's third largest country and most 
populous nation, with growing military power and nuclear weapons. On the other 
hand, China needed the US to counteract the brewing hostilities between China and 
the Soviet Union. Hence, after almost 30 years of non-recognition and non-
communication, China and the US started to renew their diplomatic ties. 
 
The Policy of Détente 
Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as both countries 
realised the importance of easing tensions for economic purposes. The Soviet 
leadership felt that the economic burden of the nuclear arms race was unsustainable 
while the American economy was also faced with financial woes as the Vietnam War 
drained government coffers. Moreover, both countries deemed it necessary to lessen 
the tensions between them as the political landscape in Western Europe and in China 
was slowly changing.  
 23
 
For the Soviets, détente with the US would enable them to establish better ties with 
Western Europe. In addition, with the worsening relations between the Soviet Union 
and the People’s Republic of China, the Soviets feared the potential of a Sino-US 
alliance against them; thus, it was necessary for the Soviets to improve relations with 
the US. On the other hand, the US, in part due to the effects of Vietnam, was not 
prepared to militarily confront the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, the US believed that 
through detente the country would be able to reduce its expenses in developing new 
weapons and defensive systems. For the Americans, containment represented 
significant economic costs for the country, thus, it was necessary to adopt the policy 
of détente (Penna, n.d.).   
 
Penna (n.d) argues that as there are many explanations for détente, most of which are 
very convincing. He explains that détente occurred between the Soviets and the 
Americans because the superpowers began to realize that policies that promoted 
constant confrontation were dangerous in a nuclear world. While in the 1950s, due to 
the limited nature of the kinds and numbers of nuclear weapons, leaders could 
somewhat realistically believe in a winnable or limited nuclear war, by the late 1960s, 
although there were still some adherents to that belief, most policymakers came to 
realise that winning a nuclear war was not realistic—there would only be losers--that 
is if there were any survivors at all. The foreign policy choice was not between 
rollback, containment and coexistence as it had been in the1950s, but was now 
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between coexistence and non existence. The system had changed simply because the 
players realized that the technology had become so destructive that their objectives 
needed to be altered (Penna, n.d.). 
 
The series of summits held between the US and the USSR and resulting treaties were 
indications that the superpowers had begun to recognize their destructive capability 
and started to establish ways to improve communications during crises. As early as 
the 1960s, there had been summits and treaties between the two superpowers on 
testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons. These earlier treaties, though, “did little 
to curb the superpowers' abilities, and served primarily to limit the nuclear ambitions 
of third parties that could endanger both superpowers”. It was during the time of 
Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that the policy of 
détente began in earnest. (Penna, n.d) 
 
According to Penna (n.d), the policy of détente adopted by Nixon was basically “to 
create an incentive for the Soviets to cooperate with the US.” During that time, the 
Soviets and the Americans were considered to be the two world superpowers and thus 
in contention about who was more powerful. Therefore, with the policy of détente the 
covert competition between the two world superpowers cooled down. Penna (n.d.) 
explained that: “as long as the US and USSR were both powerful, yet did not 
cooperate, it was easy for each side to view the world in 'zero-sum' terms--a Soviet 
gain was a US loss and a US gain was a Soviet loss. However, if the two sides 
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cooperated, perhaps they could work together and find situations where the results 
would be profitable for both countries….Kissinger [and] Nixon believed that through 
a process of linkage each side could get something it wanted. For example, if the 
Soviets wanted to buy something from the US, such as grain, the US would allow the 
sale if the Soviets cooperated in some other area, such as allowing increased 
emigration of Soviet Jews.” (Penna, n.d.) 
 
Among the achievements of Nixon’s policy of détente were the 1972 SALT I treaty 
which limits the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow, and the opening of diplomatic relations with China. 
During the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki 
Accords, consisting of a wide ranging series of agreements on economic, political, 
and human rights issues, were signed. Furthermore, trade relations between the US 
and the USSR improved during the era of détente.  
 
However, historians such as Walter Lefeber (cited in Penna, n.d) believed that the 
policy of détente was a failure. Among the reasons cited was the loss of domestic 
support for Nixon, Kissinger, and détente itself due to the following reasons: 1) 
Weariness of the American public with the Vietnam war; 2) lingering distrust of the 
Soviets which was fed by the eventual communist victory in Vietnam and Soviet 
actions in Angola; 3) the Watergate scandal and, 4) the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo which focused American attention on its 
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own economic vulnerability (Penna, n.d.). Such accusation is unjust.  
 
Penna (n.d) argues that the policy of détente “succeeded partially. It succeeded in 
changing the rules of the game of superpower competition: the Chinese were in, the 
Soviets could be negotiated with directly, and there was more freedom for the US's 
NATO and other allies to develop their own independent relations with Communist 
states.” Moreover, while détente may not have ended the military expenditures of the 
US, it definitely reduced it. While the disengagement from the Vietnam War 
contributed to the reduction in total defence spending as a percentage of the US gross 
domestic product (GDP) during the détente era, Penna (n.d.) asserted that had the US 
developed an ABM system during that period, the defence spending would not have 
been cut. Thus, détente contributed significantly to the slashing of defence 
expenditure by the US. Furthermore, détente established the unwritten rule and 
expectation that the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world must 
regularly consult each other. Also, détente resulted in the Helsinki accords which 
attempted to monitor human rights within the Communist countries (Penna, n.d.). 
Above all, the US policy of détente with the Soviet Union paved the way for the 
opening of a communication line between China and the US which had become at 
odds with each other since the communist takeover of mainland China. 
 
Implications of the Policy of Détente on Sino-US Relations 
When Richard Nixon assumed the US presidency in January 1969, his administration 
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simultaneously pursued three major diplomatic agendas: the withdrawal from 
Vietnam, the building of détente with the Soviet Union, and rapprochement with 
China (Soeya, n.d.).  Nixon intended to build a positive relationship with the People’s 
Republic of China. In February 1969, only one month in office, Nixon ordered a study 
from the secretary of state, the secretary of defence and the director of central 
intelligence on US – China Relations. The order was written by Henry Kissinger on 
Nixon’s behalf: “The president has directed that a study be prepared on US Policy 
towards China, on US policies. The study should incorporate alternative views and 
interpretations of the issues involved. It should include summary statements of the 
conceptions and policy lines of the previous administration. The study should include 
the following: The current status of the US relations with Communist China and the 
Republic of China (Taiwan); The nature of the Chinese Communist threat and 
intentions in Asia; The interaction between US policy and the policies of other major 
interested countries towards China; Alternative US approaches on China and their 
costs and risks”. (Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1976, Volume XVII) 
 
The growing rift between China and the Soviet Union was the crucial turning point in 
the US’s rapprochement with China. When China and the Soviet Union clashed along 
their border in March 1969, “Nixon and Kissinger did not fully appreciate its strategic 
implications” (Soeya, n.d.). However, “hypersensitive reactions by the Soviet Union 
and North Vietnam made them realise its significance” (Soeya, n.d.). Kissinger (1979) 
wrote in his memoirs that on March 11, the Russian ambassador to the United States 
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Anatoly Dobrynin "insisted passionately that China was everybody's problem," and 
on March 22, North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy "volunteered the surprising outburst that 
the United States had nothing to gain by seeking to take advantage of the divisions 
between the Soviet Union and China." (Kissinger, 1979: 172). According to Garthoff, 
the intensifying Sino-Soviet rift became an important impetus for both China and the 
Soviet Union to improve relations with the US over Vietnam. China needed the US to 
cope with the Soviet threat while the Soviet Union needed to restructure its diplomacy 
with the US. 
 
Realising that China might help the US end the war in Vietnam and assist US efforts 
to counter growing Soviet power, Nixon started to signal American desire to improve 
relations with China (Cohen, n.d.). Moreover, Nixon recognised that the “changed 
mood of the American public, plus his own anti-communist credentials, would allow 
him to seek an accommodation with China” (Cohen, n.d.) Thus, in a slow, cautious 
manner without risking the security of the US, Nixon conveyed a message in August 
1969 through Pakistani channels “to the effect that the United States would not isolate 
China in the intensifying Sino-Soviet confrontation” (Soeya, citing Kissinger, 1979: 
180-181).   
 
China responded through Pakistani channels that "the possibility of expansion of the 
Vietnam war is seen as having lessened. A war between China and the US is seen 
now as a very remote possibility" (Kissinger, 1979: 689). Kissinger interpreted this 
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message as China’s positive response to the US message: “Zhou En-lai had 
understood us. He had even grasped by early 1970 what so many domestic critics had 
failed to acknowledge: that we were on the way out of Vietnam. And he coupled this 
with an unmistakable hint that China had no intention of entering the Vietnam War, 
or, for that matter, of attacking any other vital American interest”. (cited from Soeya, 
n.d.) 
  
By early December 1970, the Chinese government, through Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan, conveyed a message to Kissinger welcoming Nixon's special envoy to China. 
Kissinger replied by indicating US readiness to hold high level talks in Beijing 
(Kissinger, 1979: 701-702 cited in Soeya, n.d.). In late April, the Chinese reply 
reaffirmed the country’s "willingness to receive publicly in Beijing a special envoy of 
the President of the US (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the US Secy. of State or even 
the President of the US himself for a direct meeting and discussions” (Kissinger, 
1979: 713-714 qtd. in Soeya, n.d.). 
 
In July of 1971 Henry Kissinger, while on a trip to Pakistan, was announced to the 
media to be ill and he did not appear in public for a day. Actually, Kissinger was 
secretly visiting China and was finalizing an arrangement for Nixon to visit China 
(Soeya, n.d.; “1972 Nixon visit to China”, 2006; Cohen, n.d.). On July 15, Nixon 
disclosed Kissinger's secret trip to China and announced that he would visit the 
country before May 1972. When the Soviets heard of Nixon’s announcement of an 
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impending visit to China, they asked Nixon to visit Moscow before his trip to China, 
which Washington declined. The Soviets then requested that Nixon visit Moscow in 
May or June, after his planned trip to China (Soeya, n.d.). 
 
Nixon travelled to China in February 1972 and visited Beijing, Hangzhou, and 
Shanghai. At the conclusion of his visit, Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué 
declaring a historic US-China rapprochement (Soeya, n.d.). “With this prospect in 
mind, it [the US] affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and 
military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its 
forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes" (qtd 
in Soeya, n.d.). 
  
Thus, after three decades of mutual hostility, a new era in US-China relations was 
forged with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué which also “marked the end of 
US policies of hostile containment toward China and reached an initial compromise 
on the Taiwan issue, modifying US interference in the unfinished Chinese civil war 
since the Korean War” (Soeya, n.d.). 
 
As part of Chinese and American efforts to establish formal diplomatic relations, the 
US and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a 
counterpart PRC office in Washington, DC in May 1973. However, it was only after 
the visits of US Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter that the two countries were 
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able to establish formal diplomatic relations. China and US formally established their 
respective embassies in Washington, D.C. and Beijing on March 1, 1979.  
 
With the establishment of their respective embassies, China and the US were able to 
engage in both high-level and working-level dialogues covering a wide range of 
issues such as global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, 
United Nations and other multilateral organisation affairs, and international narcotics 
matters. Both countries have also participated in joint research projects and 
cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology.    
 
However, the expanding relationship between China and US was threatened in 1981 
when the PRC expressed objections to the level of arms that the US was selling the 
Republic of China on Taiwan. The US acted immediately to resolve this issue. 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig travelled to China in June 1981 and discussed 
matters with the Chinese leadership. After eight months of intense negotiation, the US 
and PRC issued a joint communiqué where “the US stated its intention to gradually 
reduce the level of arms sales to the Republic of China, and the PRC described as a 
fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan 
question” (817 Joint Communiqué; Appendix 2).   
 
With the third China-US communiqué, the high-level exchanges continued to be a 
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significant means for developing US-PRC relations in the 1980s as President Ronald 
Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984. A year later, 
President Li Xiannian visited the US while Vice President George H. W. Bush 
traveled to the PRC and opened the US Consulate General in Chengdu. Between 1985 
and 1989, reciprocal visits among cabinet-level officials of both countries occurred, 
capped by the trip by President Bush to Beijing in February 1989. Many of these 
diplomatic and professional exchanges continued after the suppression of the 
Tiananmen protests. Such exchanges gave both the American and the Chinese people 
opportunities to learn each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. 
  
In 1996, the PRC conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait prior to the 
pending presidential elections in the ROC on Taiwan. This triggered Taiwan Strait 
Crisis, prompting the US to dispatch two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. 
Subsequently, the tension in the Taiwan Strait diminished. With these developments, 
the relations between the PRC and US started to improve again, as manifested by the 
increased high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including 
human rights, non proliferation, and trade. By the fall of 1997, President Jiang Zemin 
had visited the United States while President Bill Clinton visited the PRC in June 
1998. To date, the PRC and the US continue to work closely on regional issues such 
as North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. Although, the countries continue to 
maintain good relations, there are speculations on both sides. 
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The issue of Taiwan remains a volatile issue between the two countries. In addition, 
the PRC passed an anti-secession law (Appendix 3) stating that the PRC would be 
prepared to resort to non-peaceful means if Taiwan declared formal independence. 
While the US officially observes the One-China policy and acknowledges that Taiwan 
is part of China, Americans believe the US has to defend Taiwan against military 
aggression by the PRC because it is a democratic government. 
   
Clearly, there is ambiguity with regards to the stand of US regarding the unification of 
mainland China and Taiwan. While the US does not officially recognise Taiwan as 
independent from mainland China, it supports the membership of Taiwan in 
international organisations as an independent government. Furthermore, as the US 
continues to supply arms to Taiwan on the pretext that Taiwan’s defence needs are 
aimed at preventing the forced unification efforts by the PRC, the prospect of the 
People's Republic of China applying a military solution to unite China and Taiwan 
remains high. As Liu (2002) explained “From China's perspective, building up 
China's military potential to retake Taiwan by force is a purely defensive measure, the 
logic being that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, a fact the US officially 
acknowledges.” Hence, there is a risk that China may view US support of Taiwan as 
an act of war against China (Liu, 2002). Other issues between China and the US are 
the military expenditures of the Chinese government which were perceived by most 
Americans as going at a fast rate, and the human rights violations allegedly committed 
by the communist government. 
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Despite these issues China and US are able to maintain good economic relations. A 
2005 Report (Bunton) showed that the two-way trade between China and the US has 
grown from $33 billion in 1992 to over $230 billion in 2004, and that more than a 
hundred US-based multinational corporations have projects in China. The cumulative 
US investment in China is estimated at $48 billion.  
 
The establishment of Nixon’s foreign policy with China was undoubtedly successful 
and brought peace between the US and China. However, the Taiwan issue still 
remains unresolved to this very day.  
  
The Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China 
For over 30 years, Taiwan has been facing an identity crisis. Whether Taiwan should 
be a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or be its own independent nation 
has always been an extremely difficult and delicate topic that lies close to Taiwanese 
hearts. The impact of Taiwan’s stance on global politics could very well be 
devastating.  
 
There have been numerous debates on this subject, and there is evidence supporting 
each of the debaters’ standpoints. Most importantly, it isn’t a question that is entirely 
up to Taiwan to answer. Depending on what the Chinese government is willing to 
allow, it might not be taken lightly by them.  
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Ever since the Taiwanese government’s 1987 announcement of its policy allowing 
people to visit their relatives in China, business trading agreements, investment, the 
tourist industry and cultural exchanges between the two countries have reached a new 
record high. Ma (2003) points out that, in 2002, trade between Taiwan and China 
reached a value of US $40 billion dollars, seeing over half a million Taiwanese people 
working or studying in China. More than four million people travel across the Taiwan 
Strait each year. The relationship between Taiwan and the PRC has not only been 
remarkable, but an historic event as well. However, when comparing the rapid growth 
in business with the political progress between the two countries, you can 
immediately identify the dawdler. Business growth travels at jet speed, while political 
relations with the Chinese are still awaiting clearance for takeoff. One could say that 
there has never been a positive advance in political relations between the leaders of 
both sides; in fact, the situation could be said to have gotten worse.  
 
The Chinese government feels strongly that Taiwan is a part of China and persists 
with its One-China Policy, i.e. there should be only one China in the world. This 
policy does not have the support of the Taiwanese people, who have always been 
opposed to such an idea. However, countries such as the United States and many 
others are all for the proposal. This, in turn, places an enormous amount of pressure 
on Taiwan to follow and leaves very little space for it to stand alone as an independent 
nation. Therefore, activities such as an independence movement in Taiwan are 
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considered by some to be a threat to world peace. 
 
There have been several occasions when Taiwan has been pushed to extremes and 
security has become a real concern. These included the official visit to the United 
States of America of the former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui (President, 1988 – 
2000) in 1995. The visit caused China to stage war games along China’s east coast, 
only a few hundred kilometres from Taiwan (Wang 2005). Also, in March of 1996, 
the PRC held war games and missile testing once again in the strait between Fujian 
province and Taiwan (Wang 2005). These war games were held in response to 
Taiwan’s actions in attempting to declare itself a nation independent of China. 
 
Any announcement from Beijing can easily affect Taiwanese society and its economy. 
For example, in July 1999, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, Lee Teng-
hui, made a speech on a German radio station suggesting that talks between the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan should be “state to state, nation to nation 
talks” (Wang 2005). He stated that “Taiwan was an independent country and should 
be treated as one by the PRC.” The speech that he gave on the radio station 
immediately placed Taiwan in a red alert situation. Chinese officials were furious and 
made some threats to Taiwan’s safety. On the same day, the Taiwanese share market 
went down, as investors were concerned about Taiwan’s safety. Even today, there 
have been many official claims by Chen Shui Bian (the Taiwanese president since 
2000) that suggest movement towards independence. Chinese officials have 
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responded to these claims with condemnation and fury. These responses have also had 
a heavy impact on Taiwan’s economy.     
 
It has been mentioned more than once by the Beijing government that the People’s 
Republic of China will not give up the option of using military force to secure 
reunification with Taiwan. Beijing officials made their point even clearer by 
announcing an Anti-Secession Law in 2005 to remind the Taiwanese people of the 
PRC’s solid stance on this issue. However, despite possible action that might be taken 
by Beijing, Chen Shui Bien was re-elected in the presidential election of March 2004. 
This raised the tension between Taiwan and the PRC even higher. The success of 
Chen Shui Bian (leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)) showed that he 
had strong support from the Taiwanese people in leading the country towards 
independence. However, considering the vast improvements made to business, why 
would Taiwanese people be willing to give up their stable lives and strong economy 
to claim independence and face the possible consequence of war with the PRC? 
 
What is the motivation behind all the dangerous independence remarks being made by 
the vast and growing numbers of independence supporters in Taiwan? There can only 
be one answer: that these people wish to become independent. People in Taiwan see 
China as a third world country but also as a powerful country that continues to 
threaten Taiwan and prevent it from claiming world recognition as an independent 
nation. However, China has a strong economy and a high living standard in all its 
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major cities. Almost every international industrial giant regards China as one of the 
major market players. Still, most Taiwanese people, whose information is obtained 
from a misleading media and the government, regard Chinese people as lower class 
citizens. 
 
On the issue of Taiwan, this research paper neither sides with Taiwan’s independence 
claim nor supports China’s policy on immediate reunification. However, one thing 
that is certain is that good relations between the two are absolutely essential. Are 
Taiwanese people too “rational” in their treatment of China or are they being too 
emotional and patriotic in their feelings about the mainland Chinese?  
 
In the later Chapter I will identify the mentality of Taiwanese people in relation to the 
issue of Taiwanese and Chinese relations; and how they see Nixon’s One-China 
Policy. I raise several questions throughout this thesis and will address each with a 
clear and independent point of view. The foundation of this Taiwan crisis is based 
purely on issues of identity and social status.  
 
Analysis and Recommendation 
Nixon’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union marked a turning point in world 
history. It shows how the US utilised its foreign relations strengths to position itself 
between one superpower and another, emerging superpower. According to Penna 
(n.d.), the diplomatic relations with China initiated by Nixon and Kissinger achieved 
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three significant results: 
 
First, other countries were ahead of the US in opening relations with China and 
therefore, their economies stood to profit while US businesses were forced to skip 
trading with China. Second, the US at last recognised the serious split between China 
and the Soviet Union--Communists were not all the same. China and the Soviet Union 
had had sporadic border clashes. The US recognized that China was a potential ally in 
any conflict with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was a potential ally in any 
conflict with China. Third, if the rationale for hostility toward China had originally 
been that Beijing Communists were controlled by Moscow, then detente with 
Moscow removed the rationale for hostility toward Beijing. The US accepted China 
as part of the UN and agreed that China's seat on the Security Council and its veto 
power should belong to Beijing, rather than to Taipei (Penna, n.d.). 
  
Thus, the détente policy became a diplomatic weapon for the US to advocate its 
interests without risking the nation's security. It had adopted the policy of détente to 
ensure that when the rift between China and the Soviet escalates, the US will be on 
the winning side. Liu (2002) argued that the US policy of détente “has been motivated 
solely by the US need for leverage against the USSR”. He further argued that the 
geopolitical strategy of Nixon: “sought to perpetuate a central role for the US in world 
affairs by forging new relations not just with China, but also with the USSR, both 
being prime adversaries of the US in the post-World War II world. Yet the USSR was 
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the main target, and China was a card in US-Soviet detente. The central theme of this 
strategy of triangular diplomacy involved a new determination at the height of the 
Cold War that world communism was not politically monolithic and that the Trotsky 
notion of world revolution did not survive any reality check….Thus, US ‘détente’ 
with the USSR and a ‘linked strategy’ involving nuclear arms control and economic 
relationships would be important tools for containing superpower bilateral nuclear 
confrontation, with minimum political risk to the US and potentially high profits for 
US business.” (Liu, 2002) 
  
Furthermore, it can be said that both Nixon and Kissinger used China to exert 
pressure upon North Vietnam toward a war settlement (Liu, 2002), at the expense of 
the Soviet Union. Unclassified government documents indicated that Kissinger may 
have revealed intelligence information on Soviet military dispositions while 
negotiating for the visit of Nixon to China. (Liu, 2002) 
 
Months before Nixon’s visit but only a few weeks after Henry Kissinger’s secret trip 
to Beijing in July 1971, the Soviet ambassador asked Kissinger on 17 August 1971 
whether he had provided the Chinese with intelligence information on Soviet military 
dispositions. Kissinger denied that he had, but various secondary accounts (e.g., 
Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 1994, p. 262) suggest, however, that 
he soon provided intelligence data to the Chinese as early as his October 1971 visit to 
Beijing. The relevant documents from October 1971 remain classified but new 
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evidence shows that Kissinger was more than willing to provide sensitive intelligence 
information to the Chinese. The transcript of a meeting on 13 December, during the 
Indian-Pakistan war, shows Kissinger offering Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua 
highly sensitive information, derived from satellite reconnaissance photography, on 
Soviet military deployments. Whenever Kissinger made his first offer of intelligence 
information, this was an important step in the Nixon administration’s extraordinary 
effort to tilt US policy toward Beijing. (The Kissinger Transcripts, n.d.). 
  
Kissinger defended the diplomatic conduct of Nixon as a way of upholding the “firm 
belief in national interests as the fundamental guiding principle of diplomacy and as a 
central organizing principle of major power relations” (Soeya, n.d.). Kissinger (1994) 
stated that Nixon sought to navigate according to a concept of America's national 
interest... If the major powers, including the United States, pursued their self-interests 
rationally and predictably, Nixon believed--in the spirit of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment--then equilibrium would emerge from the clash of competing interests 
(Kissinger, 1994, p. 705).  
  
Therefore, given the heightened tensions between China and the Soviet Union prior to 
the period of détente , good relations between the US and China provided the US with 
a swing position where it could enjoy both rapprochement with China and détente 
with the Soviet Union, consequently, acquiring diplomatic leverage over both China 
and the USSR (Liu, 2002). 
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With China emerging as a possible contender for superpower status in the 21st century 
with its bustling economy, traditional dealings with the global powers such as the US, 
the UK and Russia, and its high level of international interests (Dellios, 1999), it is 
imperative that relations between China and the US must be periodically examined 
and evaluated based on mutual interest and benefits to avoid any misunderstanding 
that could escalate to military aggression by both countries towards each other. As 
Weber (2005) states “the Sino - American relationship is now central to the health of 
the global political economy, but it is not a healthy relationship. Stories about 
globalization and economic interdependence are important. But the notion that the 
Sino-American relationship is market-driven is illusory and misleading. This is a 
political relationship through and through. It’s about power and control as much as it 
is about wealth.” 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
When talking about the One-China Policy, the first book to look into would have to 
be the Memoirs of Richard Nixon. 'This book was written to retell his life from the 
time he was born till the time he gave his last speech when he resigned from the 
position of the President of the United States in 1974. As a biographical account of 
his life, his recollections were supplemented with “contemporary” resources such as 
memos, correspondence, public papers and tape transcripts. He divided the chapters of 
his book according to the significant periods of his political life. In each period of his 
political life, his accomplishments, his struggles and his stands were recalled with 
significant enlightening and enlightened insights about his decisions. On the issue of 
the One-China Policy, he recounted every incident he could think of that may be 
related to the creation of the One-China Policy.   
 
These incidents happened prior to the journey of President Nixon to China: His 
recollections begin from the time he wrote his inaugural speech in 1967 where he 
spoke indirectly about his goal of promoting better diplomatic relations with China. 
He said “We seek an open world . . . a world in which no people great or small will 
live in angry isolation”. He also wrote Kissinger a memorandum urging the 
government to improve its attitude towards exploration of the possibility of 
rapprochement with the Chinese government.  
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There were several publicly-known meetings in Warsaw, Poland, with envoys from 
both camps. US Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel was the US representative 
while Lei Yang, the Chinese charges d’ affaires was the Chinese envoy to these talks. 
The subject of the talks was about changing the venue of their talks to Beijing.   
 
However, it almost fell through when the Cambodian operation erupted. For few 
weeks, communications between two teams were cancelled. According to Nixon, he 
almost felt that the Chinese government would not continue with their talks. A few 
months later, the Chinese government signalled that they were willing to resume talks 
with the American government and continue their seemingly “strengthening but 
fragile ties”.   
 
In July1970, Catholic Bishop James Edwards Walsh, who was arrested in 1958, was 
released after 12 years of imprisonment. This somehow signalled subtly to the 
international community the intentions of the Chinese government to continue with 
what they had been doing for the past several years. 
 
After this action from the Chinese government, Nixon continued discussing his 
intention of having diplomatic ties with China with different Heads of different 
countries at various different political functions, and the Yahya Channel was 
established; “Yahya” being President Yahya of Pakistan who became a mediator 
between China and the US. Polo I was the first secret journey of Dr. Henry Kissinger 
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to Beijing to explain and gather information for the policy their country was creating 
regarding their relationship with China. Polo II was the second secret journey of Dr. 
Henry Kissinger to Beijing. The announcement that shocked the whole world was 
when President Nixon announced in late spring of 1972 that he would go to China for 
talks about their governments and the strengthening of ties between them. The 
meeting between Mao and Nixon finally took place in China, in the year 1972. 
 
This book written by former President Nixon was done very eloquently. It is 
thoroughly expressed and supplemented by accounts from the diary he kept as the 
President of the United States. Such eloquence paved the way for an easy 
understanding of the incidents leading to the creation of the One-China Policy. With 
the author of the book being President Nixon himself, the veracity of the incidents 
leading to the creation of the policy became unquestionable. This is because of the 
fact that he himself was one of the two persons in this world who truly knew what 
happened in the meeting between the leaders of China and the United States. 
 
The parts about China are specifically mentioned in the book. Unlike other books, it 
concentrates on the relations between China and the US during the talks leading to the 
Communiqué in 1972. Although there were of significant events that almost stopped 
both governments from pursuing better diplomatic relations, such as the wars in 
Cambodia and Vietnam, it did not dwell too much on them. It made it comprehensible 
for its readers because unnecessary information is minimized. In his accounts and 
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recollections, it is impressive to note that the author acknowledged the roles of other 
members of the group in the creation of the policy. He neither trivialized nor 
overestimated the roles of these said individuals. He however reinforced that fact that 
even the United States, a country considered as a superpower, experienced difficulties 
forging diplomatic ties with China. It made him appear very human to his readers. He 
also pointed out in this book the subtleties the governments had to take to achieve 
their goals. 
 
The words used by President Nixon to express his thoughts on the One-China Policy 
were simple. However, it was written with such level of honesty and eloquence that 
increased its depth. It was direct and to the point, but the added comments of the 
author about the characters of the people involved made it more interesting for its 
audience. Although the intention of the President was to write a narration of what 
took place between “China and America” 1970 - 1972, the fact that he analyses the 
incidents in between this period clarified questions about the decisions to pursue the 
moves he did. During this time and even now, when one attempts to read about them 
in the archived articles, confusion and more confusion comes about. However, 
because the President did analyse them, the issues become clearer.  
 
The Nixon-Kissinger China Policy is one of the most controversial and discussed 
issues in the second half of twentieth-century. Richard Nixon led a colourful political 
career and Henry Kissinger was one of the most admired, feared, and criticised 
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secretaries of state during the years when the United States beginning to wield its 
considerable international influence, not only in the western world, but also into the 
far east. Henry Kissinger became Secretary of State on the 22nd of September in 1973 
and held that position until the 20th of January 1977. He also held the position of 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. At present, he is the chairman 
of an international consulting firm. As a diplomat who has travelled the world, 
Kissinger often writes down his strong opinions of various international relations 
issues that the United States has to deal with. 
 
One of his most recent books was published in 2001 and asked the question: “Does 
America need a foreign policy?” In this book Kissinger did not seek to answer the 
question because the answer is obviously affirmative. But Kissinger outlined the kind 
of foreign policy that the United States must have. Kissinger’s thoughts in this book 
reflect his China experience. In this book, Kissinger (2001) first described the present 
foreign policies of the United States. He called them the “four international systems” 
which have characteristics that are supposed to impel the United States to modify and 
redefine its foreign policies.  
 
These international systems are: (a) the relationship of United States with Western 
Europe; (b) the relationship of United States with the Middle East, specifically 
regarding the mediator role of the US in the Middle East Conflict; (c) the relationship 
of the United States with the countries on the continent of Africa, which is also 
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ravaged with several conflicts; and finally, the one aligned with the topic of this study, 
(d) the relationship of United States with countries in Asia, particularly with the 
Peoples Republic of China. 
 
Kissinger succinctly describes Asia in this manner:  
The great powers of Asia -- larger in size and far more populous than the nations 
of nineteenth-century Europe -- treat one another as strategic rivals. India, China, 
Japan, Russia -- with Korea and the states of Southeast Asia not lagging far 
behind -- consider that some of the others, and certainly a combination of them, 
are indeed capable of threatening their national security. Wars among these 
powers are not imminent, but they are not inconceivable either. Asian military 
expenditures are rising, and they are designed principally as protection against 
other Asian nations (though some of China's military effort includes as well the 
contingency of a war with the United States over Taiwan). As in nineteenth-
century Europe, a long period of peace is possible -- even likely -- but a balance 
of power will necessarily play a key role in preserving it (Kissinger, 2001: 26). 
 
Based on his writings, one may draw a diagram that categorises the different nations 
in Asia, and one will find that at the centre of the diagram, there will be three circles 
representing the three most powerful and influential countries, which are China with 
its extremely large population and an increasing military power, Japan with its rapid 
technological advances and formidable economic power, and India whose strengths 
are neither supreme nor outstanding but nevertheless place the country in a powerful 
position. 
 
Kissinger (2001) contends that never has there been a moment more timely than the 
present decade to have the United States review its current foreign policy, especially 
with China. This is because, according to his observation, the country is enjoying a 
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form of pre-eminence in terms of military power, economic power, and even cultural 
influences, which can be likened to an empire. And, perhaps, this American empire 
can be considered even greater than the ancient Roman Empire. The United States, 
Kissinger insisted, must have a foreign policy which has a long-range approach and is 
supported by subtle ideology.  
 
Kissinger laments that the current foreign policy is too reminiscent of the Cold War 
and no longer relevant to the changing climate of today’s politics. Beyond 
containment, the major thrust of American Cold War diplomatic foreign policy was to 
return the defeated enemies, Germany and Japan, to the emerging international system 
as full-fledged members. This task, unprecedented in respect to nations on which 
unconditional surrender had been imposed less than five years earlier, made sense to a 
generation of American leaders whose formative experience had been overcoming the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The generation that organized resistance to the Soviet 
Union had experienced Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, which had restored 
political stability by closing the gap between American expectations and economic 
reality. The same generation had prevailed in World War II, fought in the name of 
democracy (Kissinger, 2001: 28).  
 
The position taken by the United States is usually a benevolent power over the nations 
that it has defeated during the wars. The First World War brought about an 
unprecedented rise in its economy and the occurrence of the Great Depression was 
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unexpected, although some economists contend that the Great Depression was 
inevitable during those years. The psychological makeup of the American leaders was 
then influenced by the experience of the Great Depression and along with this is the 
strong desire for stability. Stability, however, is often synonymous with a desire to not 
change any system that is currently working. It was a stability that led to the lack of 
dynamism of many US leaders which caught the American nation flat-footed in the 
face of global changes. The foreign policies that the United States has today, 
including the China policy that was established in the 1970s may no longer be 
relevant. Kissinger explains that: “It was Vietnam that broke the fusion of ideology 
and strategy that characterized the thinking of what is now termed "the greatest 
generation." Though the principles of American exceptionalism continue to be 
affirmed by all participants in the domestic discussions of foreign policy, their 
application to concrete cases became subject to a profound and continuing dispute” 
(Kissinger, 2001: 28). 
 
Kissinger, however, does not exactly outline what the new foreign policy should be. 
And the new foreign policy that is being touted by Kissinger can only be understood 
if one has a background on the previous policies. This is because any present 
characteristic of foreign policy is undoubtedly an outgrowth or perhaps a mutation of 
previous policy, despite any claim to the contrary. Thus, to determine where Kissinger 
is coming from, it would be advantageous to determine his views on one of the most 
interesting periods, of American politics, the transition from the Nixon presidency to 
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Ford’s.  
 
Kissinger wrote his memoirs for these years and published it in a book entitled 'Years 
of Renewal'. Published in 1999, this book again contained many of Kissinger’s 
brilliant analyses of the various world events that affect the American nation. He also 
gave detailed portraits of two Presidents, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Thus, the 
book has three major focuses: (a) the complexity of foreign relations; (b) Nixon’s 
brilliant mind and sad paranoia; and (c) Ford’s confidence and lack of egotism. The 
title of the book refers to the years when Ford assumed the presidency. 
 
Establishing a China policy or any other foreign policy is always a complicated 
matter, according to Kissinger. He explains that if diplomatic relations were as easy as 
academicians wanted them to be in the numerous college seminars they give, then the 
Middle East conflict would have been resolved many years ago. Kissinger shows a 
distaste for people who assume that foreign relations are simple agreements. In an 
episode in which Kissinger was tasked to put together an interim foreign policy for 
the new Ford administration, Kissinger recounts the difficulty and delicacy of putting 
together the representatives of three powerful nations: 
“To avoid confusion abroad, it was important to establish a sense of continuity in 
our foreign policy, at least for an interim period until the new President could 
determine what changes, if any, he wished to make. To this end, I had brought 
along a transition plan, the essential feature of which was to put before every 
government around the world a personal presidential message … Since it was 
physically impossible to see each ambassador individually, I proposed that Ford 
meet them in regional groups, allotting about an hour to each. The first group 
would be NATO ambassadors, followed by Latin America, the Middle East, 
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Africa, and Southeast Asia. Since the nations of Northeast Asia did not fit any 
grouping, and since Japan was an indispensable ally and China a key element in 
our triangular diplomacy, I recommended that their diplomatic representatives be 
received individually. (Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, was on home 
leave; he would be received as soon as he returned.) Finally, there would be 
separate meetings with the ambassadors of South Korea and South Vietnam -- 
two countries on behalf of which American blood had been shed. Their ultimate 
safety depended on making sure that their adversaries understood the new 
President's commitment to their security”. (Kissinger, 1999: 23-24) Kissinger was 
always the master of his own shuttle diplomacy.   
 
In the second focus, intended to describe Nixon as a man, as a vice-president, and as a 
president, Kissinger seems to navigate towards the conventional ideas, which is quite 
unconventional compared with the methods that Kissinger used to present his ideas. 
The conventional ideas that Kissinger put forth regarding Nixon are that Nixon was 
blessed with a brilliant and analytical mind. There were many times that this 
analytical mind saved him from the clutches of his adversaries. Yet the tragic side to 
this is that Nixon suffered from a kind of paranoia that sometimes impeded his 
actions. Still, in getting a portrait of Nixon, one finds that Kissinger tends to give a 
romantic image. 
 
“It is difficult to write about Richard Nixon, who combined intelligence, patriotism, 
and courage with self-destructive flaws as in a Greek tragedy. The hatred he evoked 
in his political opponents was extraordinary even by the turbulent standards of 
American democracy. I served as his principal adviser on foreign policy for five and a 
half years and, when we were both in town, often saw him several times a day. Yet, to 
some extent, I still remain mystified by the personality of the perhaps most complex 
President of the twentieth century” (Kissinger, 1999, p.43). 
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One may assume that indeed Nixon is similar to a Greek tragic hero whose wisdom 
would be almost unquestionable. This implies that the China policy that Nixon and 
Kissinger established would also be next to unquestionable. After all, the existence of 
diplomatic relations between America and China was originally considered to be 
impossible. But history showed that there were many loopholes in the China policy 
and that there were also many unresolved issues for which any resolution was not 
viable. For example, the United States had acknowledged the one-China policy but it 
also clearly admitted that it would not stop Taiwan from getting independence and 
establishing its own democracy.  
 
The problem lay in ideology. The People’s Republic of China was mainly a 
communist country, and the United States wanted to project the image of itself as the 
bulwark of democracy. Thus, stopping Taiwan would be similar to destroying the 
very principle that the United States utilized in many of its decisions. Unfortunately, 
China is a power to be reckoned with and the United States has pledged to the 
Chinese government that it will not give any form of aid to Taiwan. Nixon, faced with 
this situation was unable to come up with a better solution. 
 
The description of the other President, Ford, is not directly related to this research 
study but it is a focus of Kissinger’s book. Thus, a portrait of Ford will be briefly 
presented before the next piece of literature is presented. But first, one must be aware 
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that because Kissinger worked closely with Nixon many people had expected 
animosity between Ford and Kissinger. Surprisingly, Kissinger did not consider Ford 
an adversary. Kissinger’s general description of Ford goes like this: 
“Gerald Rudolph Ford was an uncomplicated man tapped by destiny for some of 
the most complicated tasks in the nation's history. The first non-elected President, 
he was called to heal the nation's wounds after a decade in which the Vietnam 
War and Watergate had produced the most severe divisions since the Civil War. 
As different as possible from the driven personalities who typically propel 
themselves into the highest office, Gerald Ford restored calm and confidence to a 
nation surfeited with upheavals, overcame a series of international crises, and 
ushered in a period of renewal for American society” (Kissinger, 1999, p.17). 
 
Kissinger may not regard Ford as brilliant as Nixon, but Ford possessed a certain 
confidence and sharp discernment that saved the United States from several crises. 
This comment by Kissinger about Ford came as a surprise to some reviewers of 
Kissinger’s book. But Kissinger’s opinion of Ford is not the focus of this research. 
This description of Ford only serves to demonstrate the brilliance of the tactician’s 
mind that was behind the China policy enforced by the United States since the 1970s.  
 
On the study of his diplomacy, Kissinger wrote a book that was published in 1995. 
This book can be considered as a guide for other aspiring diplomats, but by which 
country it will be utilized is anyone’s guess. In fact, Kissinger did not believe that a 
strategy utilized in one country can be used again in another country. This book can 
then be an exercise of the mind that went through several international negotiations, 
all with other brilliant and powerful leaders.  
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The major message that Kissinger wanted to impart through this book is that among 
so many countries all over the world, only the United States has come up with several 
unique and admirable foreign policies. The United States is unique in its foreign 
policies because it was able to accomplish seemingly impossible objectives through 
the use of tactics that were never before employed in American history. This does 
sound like Kissinger is praising his own handiwork, but he did proceed to put forth 
many convincing arguments that support the above thesis. Kissinger also concedes 
that other countries are as capable of making unique foreign policies as the United 
States.  
 
Of course, any analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy should not just be based 
on the works of the creators of the said foreign policy. It would be interesting to have 
Nixon’s opinions but this would be impossible. Fortunately, there were other political 
analysts that attempted to describe Nixon and his principles that were behind the 
Nixon-Kissinger China Policy. Three of them are Richard Thornton, Robert Litwak 
and James Humes. 
 
Thornton is a professor of American history and his general view of the Nixon-
Kissinger China policy is that it was made by the Nixon administration and that it was 
continued by the Kissinger “shogunate”. Of course, there is no literal shogunate, for 
this term refers to Japanese warlords that controlled and divided historical Japan. But 
Kissinger’s role extended far beyond the Nixon administration and this is why 
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Thornton utilized the term. 
 
Thornton’s treatment of the foreign policies, by itself, can be considered scholarly and 
the reader is encouraged to follow the strategic arguments he offers. But, with the 
subsequent dramatic description of the Watergate scandal and the colourful portrayal 
of the people involved, Thornton’s writing, despite the possibility that the contents are 
true, leans towards creative fiction. This affects the scholarly beginning of the book. 
 
Litwak provided another perspective of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy by using 
several historical and conceptual contexts. Litwak (1984) contends that the Nixon-
Kissinger China Policy was heavily influenced by two factors, the relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Nixon Doctrine that came out 
after the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine was 
made public on July 25, 1969 and the United States still maintains its position that it 
will give aid to nations who are fighting against communism. However, the United 
States will give limited military aid similar to that given to Vietnam, basically 
providing means for a nation to fight communism.  
 
Then, the bulk of the aid will be largely economic in nature. The Nixon Doctrine also 
expressed the United States’ willingness to provide shelter to nations that the country 
considers as allies or vital to its security. The same Nixon Doctrine was applied to 
foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf. This was against Kissinger’s original idea of 
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not using the same strategy for several countries. But the use of this Doctrine in this 
region, according to Holt (2004) allowed the flow of military aid to US allies in this 
region. The subsequent Carter Doctrine became the basis for the US military 
involvement in the Gulf War and the Iraq War. 
 
Humes (1997), to describe Nixon and explain the reasons behind his decisions 
particularly as regards China policy, enumerated and described Nixon’s ten 
commandments of statecraft. Humes also described how these ten commandments of 
statecraft were correctly or incorrectly applied in various situations that the country 
faced. But Humes began with the words used by Nixon in introducing these ten 
commandments of statecraft. 
 
“A President needs a global view, a sense of proportion and a keen sense of the 
possible. He needs to know how power operates and he must have the will to use it. If 
I could carve ten rules into the walls of the Oval Office for my successors in the 
dangerous years just ahead, they would be these” (Humes citing Nixon, 1997: 13). 
 
Based on this powerful introduction, here are concise descriptions of Nixon’s ten 
commandments of statecraft: 
 
1. Always Be Prepared to Negotiate, but Never Negotiate Without Being Prepared. 
(Humes, 1997, p.29) – Nixon was probably obsessed with the thought of being 
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prepared. He was known to have immersed himself in Russian politics and culture 
before a meeting with the Vice President of the Soviet Union. Nixon’s goal was to 
achieve a détente. Nixon may approve the development of an anti-ballistic missile to 
repel possible missile strikes or he may establish a rapprochement with China, which 
is still considered by the Soviets as an adversary despite their similar ideologies. In 
the end, Nixon carried out both options. 
 
2. Never Be Belligerent, but Always Be Firm (Humes, 1997: 45) – This 
commandment was especially applied during the Moscow summit. Before the 
summit, the South Vietnamese were beginning to be overwhelmed by the military 
power of the North Vietnamese who are backed by the Soviet Union. A retreat by the 
South Vietnamese would place the United States in a weakened position. To prevent 
this, Nixon ordered a tactical move: the mining of Haiphong Harbour. This move 
prevented the Soviet from supplying more military aid to North Vietnam. Thus, 
during the Moscow summit, Nixon was in a better position to negotiate.  
 
Unfortunately, the Soviet General Secretary, Brezhnev, was aware of the tactical 
move and lashed Nixon in a furious manner. Throughout the episode, Nixon remained 
calm and kept on clarifying whether Brezhnev’s words could be considered threats. 
Eventually, Brezhnev’s belligerence was his own downfall because it indicated a 
weaker position. Nixon was said to have obtained a unilateral diplomatic victory 
(Humes, 1997). 
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3. Always Remember That Covenants Should be Openly Agreed To But Privately 
Negotiated (Humes, 1997: p.57) – This commandment is better explained by Vaughn 
(2001) in his own analysis of Nixon’s ten commandments of statecraft. According to 
Vaughn: 
“Given the bureaucratic resentment of open relations with the People's Republic 
of China, the diplomatic implications of the Soviet Union's knowledge of 
normalized relations between the Americans and the Chinese, and the fervour of 
the Cultural Revolution and its purges in China, open diplomacy was not an 
option to Nixon and his Chinese counterparts. Instead, Nixon embarked on a 
Metternichian guise of diplomacy, complete with secret envoys, veiled messages 
passed through the media, and a network of international connections between 
himself and the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that included de Gaulle of France, 
Ceausescu of Romania, and Yahya Kahn of Pakistan. After a contingent of 
American ping-pong players were invited to China and Henry Kissinger took a 
secret flight to a Chinese military airport, an official invitation was extended to 
President Nixon from Beijing to visit the People's Republic of China; Nixon 
quickly accepted. A few months later the historic normalization agreement was 
signed between the two nations” (Vaughn, 2001: 46) 
 
4. Never Seek Publicity That Would Destroy the Ability to Get Results (Humes, 
1997, p.75) – This commandment of statecraft can be applied to the Chinese 
relationship, but it was earlier applied by Nixon when he was still vice president. Six 
months before the elections, Nixon and his President, Eisenhower, had already 
supplied ammunition and training to Cubans who fled Castro. A planned invasion was 
underway. However, during the election campaign, Nixon was being criticized by 
Kennedy for the government's weak stance against Castro.  
 
Nixon could have defended himself and created a better image by disclosing the 
planned Cuban invasion, but by doing so, he would have made the entire operation 
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public and this might make the invasion fail. Thus, Nixon opted to keep his silence. 
“That would have been utterly irresponsible: it would have disclosed a secret 
operation and would have completely destroyed its effectiveness” (Humes quoting 
Nixon, 1997, p. 79). These words of Nixon have gained the approval of Humes and 
Vaughn. 
 
5. Never Give Up Unilaterally What Could Be Used as A Bargaining Chip. Make 
Your Adversaries Give Something for Everything They Get (Humes, 1997, p.91). – 
The United States had been planning for many years to establish diplomatic relations 
with China. But many pessimistic political analysts predicted that the US would need 
to withdraw its support of Taiwan and pull out its troops from Vietnam to obtain those 
relations. The image put forth was that the United States seemed willing to bend over 
backwards just to open relations with China. 
  
Surprisingly, the Nixon administration did not do all these things and Washington 
established a liaison office in Beijing. This is because Nixon was aware that China 
wanted full embassy status. Nixon kept the situation hanging until China no longer 
demanded a formal withdrawal of US support for Taiwan. That is, the US may still 
support Taiwan, even militarily, if China attacks the small democratic state. 
Eventually, two administrations later, China obtained full diplomatic status from the 
Carter administration. 
 
 61
6. Never Let Your Adversary Underestimate What You Would Do in Response to a 
Challenge. Never Tell Him What You Would Not Do (Humes, 1997, p. 105). – 
During the Cold War, the two superpowers that were head to head were the United 
States and the USSR, but the latter was decidedly weaker in military power and 
almost stagnant economically. It was able to maintain its power because of its 
unpredictability. When an adversary is unpredictable, it holds a sword of Damocles 
and puts fear into its enemies.  
 
Nixon was aware and appreciative of this unpredictability even before he became 
president. Thus, when he became president, Nixon engaged in unpredictable 
manoeuvrers that sometimes earned him the reputation of a “madman”. For example, 
he ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam from December 18 to 
December 30, with one rest day, Christmas Day. This image of unpredictability that 
was cultivated by Nixon instilled fear, even in his ally, the South Vietnamese leader, 
President Nguyen van Thieu (Vaughn, 2001). Of course, the unexpected bombing 
earned strong criticism from the media and human rights organizations. But Nixon’s 
target audience was not the media. His targets were the other leaders who are not 
taking friendly actions towards the United States. 
 
7. Always Leave Your Adversary a Face-Saving Line of Retreat (Humes, 1997, p. 
121) – This was applied during the crisis in the Middle East when the Arab forces 
were up against the Israeli Army. No political analyst has yet utilized this 
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commandment in the study of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy, but this does not 
imply that future events will not prove or disprove this idea. But on a general note, 
this commandment simply allows the adversary to have a way out, since one who has 
no way out will tend to believe that he has nothing to lose and can inflict much 
damage. 
 
8. Always Carefully Distinguish Between Friends Who Provide Some Human Rights 
and Enemies Who Deny All Human Rights (Humes, 1997, p. 133) – This was not 
applied to the Chinese relations. Humes (1997) and Vaughn (2001) used the situation 
in Iran as an example. That is, the government of the Shah of Iran had been favoured 
by the United States government because it had always been fair in its dealings with 
oil and had granted civil rights to women despite the fact that Iran was an autocratic 
government.  
 
Unfortunately, there were critics against this particular favouritism. Media pressure 
pushed the Carter administration to publicly question the relationship between U.S. 
and Iran. The seed of doubt sowed by these public statements resulted in tension in 
the relationship between Iran and U.S. Eventually, the Shah was replaced by the 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran became an Islamic theocracy, making it a virulent 
enemy of the U.S. 
 
9. Always Do at Least as Much for Our Friends as Our Adversaries Do for Our 
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Enemies (Humes, 1997: 149). – To illustrate this commandment of statecraft, Humes 
(1997) again utilized the situation in the Middle East, citing the American support for 
Israel. This will not be elaborated fully since the Middle East situation has been 
mentioned several times already.  
 
The reason why the Middle East situation was cited was to establish a point of 
comparison for the China policy. As more research is reviewed, it appears that the 
mediation process in Middle East conflict and the establishment of diplomatic ties 
with China were both complex. The nature of the complexity has similarities and 
differences. The similarities lay in the opposing ideologies while the differences lay in 
the political and cultural situation. 
 
10. Never Lose Faith. In Just Cause Faith Can Move Mountains.  Faith Without 
Strength Is Futile, but Strength Without Faith Is Sterile (Humes, 1997, p. 159). – This 
is probably the most philosophical of all Nixon's commandments. According to 
Humes (1997), Nixon intended this last commandment as advice for future leaders. 
Will this last piece of advice hold true in the Nixon-Kissinger China policy? 
 
To better evaluate the commandments of statecraft, and eventually, the Nixon-
Kissinger China policy, another perspective must be taken from another political 
analyst, Gordon Chang. In his book, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, 
and the Soviet Union, Chang (1990) illustrated the difficulty of establishing 
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diplomatic relationships with China and a fairly peaceful relationship with the Soviet 
Union. None of the three countries were considered friends. In Chang’s point of view 
as a professor of American history, the establishment of the relationships was 
unexpected and the strength of these relationships was, at best, tenuous. Yet, Chang 
suggested that this tenuousness was probably the best characteristic of the 
relationships between these three countries. That is, if there is a stronger relationship 
between China and the US, this may destroy détente, and if there is a closer 
relationship between the Soviets and the Americans, China would not be open to 
diplomatic relations. 
 
For a more detailed information regarding the establishment of the tenuous relations 
between the three countries, the work of William Burr may be consulted. Burr was 
once a senior analyst at the National Security Archive and he was also a director of 
the Archive’s Nuclear Documentation Project. His position gave him access to much 
sensitive information including transcripts of the top secret talks with China and the 
Soviet Union. These transcripts were originally classified, which implies that 
divulging the contents of these transcripts may present some form of danger to the 
security of the United States. But today’s political and social climate has radically 
changed. This does not imply that there is less danger in the world, but the concepts of 
danger, sovereignty, freedom, transparency, and political power have evolved or 
mutated. 
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Kissinger is the main protagonist in the transcripts published by Burr, but the main 
subject is the diplomatic talks involving three powerful countries. The other players in 
the transcripts were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Leonid Brezhnev, 
Andrei Gromyko, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and George Bush. The transcripts 
were made public under  the Freedom of Information Act, for the study of would-be 
politicians and diplomats and for analysis by present diplomats and critics. In his 
context with the transcripts, Burr stated that the now characteristic Chinese suspicion 
of the term “peaceful evolution” probably stemmed from the wooing of China to the 
American side.  
 
Today, in the twenty-first century, the Nixon-Kissinger China policy still has both its 
supporters and critics. The supporters, of course, are people who also support Nixon 
and Kissinger. The critics are people who are against these two.  
 
One Nixon supporter was the journalist Cyrus Sulzberger. In a book entitled The 
World and Richard Nixon, Sulzberger wrote positively and approvingly about 
Nixon’s successes in foreign relations. Sulzberger (1978) attributed Nixon's success to 
the experiences that had prepared Nixon for statesmanship and diplomatic relations. 
These experiences included extensive travel and reading and according to Szulzberger 
made Nixon a brilliant tactician and negotiator. But, as critics of Sulzberger pointed 
out, the journalist studiously avoided any mention of Nixon’s performance in the 
nation's domestic affairs.  
 66
 
For example, Sulzberger made no comment, approval or criticism of the unexpected 
bombings that Nixon approved. There was much media clamour against the bombings 
and Sulzberger was part of the media. Of course, one may not have sweeping 
expectations regarding any group, particularly the media. At the same time, 
Sulzberger may have been privy to Nixon’s reasons for the bombing but chose not to 
publish them. This book, after all, appeared in 1978, which was several years  before 
the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act and the publishing of some contents 
from the National Security Archive. This was also before the release of Nixon’s Ten 
Commandments of Statecraft that explained the bombing as part of Nixon’s 
“madman” strategy in order to project an image of unpredictability. 
 
Another supporter of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy is Roger Morris, who served 
on the National Security Council. Morris served during two administrations, those of 
Johnson and Nixon. Thus, from his experience, one may assume that Morris has some 
credibility. Morris, however, did not write about Nixon. He focused on Kissinger. 
Morris (1977), in his book, has ambivalent feelings towards Kissinger. On one hand, 
he has reservations regarding the unexpected actions and oftentimes too smooth 
dealings of Kissinger. Yet, Morris applauded Kissinger’s performance as a co-creator 
of various American foreign policies, especially the China policy. Establishing 
diplomatic relations with a country of an opposing  ideology and which has a history 
of maintaining co-operative relations with countries that the United States does not 
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consider as allies was perhaps the most difficult and challenging tasks that a diplomat 
will ever face.  According to Morris the accomplishment of this task, is evidence of 
the diplomat’s greatness. Morris, of course, was referring to Kissinger. 
 
Another political analyst who wrote about Kissinger was Robert Schulzinger. This 
analyst’s work, entitled Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy, was published in 
1989 and can be considered a work that has more modern views. Unlike the previous 
books about Kissinger and Nixon, which were published a few years after the Nixon 
administration, Shulzinger allowed the passage of time to filter through the numerous 
events of the recent past before putting forth his analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger 
China policy. Similar to Morris, Shulzinger focused on Kissinger. 
 
According to Shulzinger (1989), there were three major accomplishments that 
Kissinger, as a diplomat, was able to accomplish. The first one was the attainment of 
détente with the USSR, which today seems no longer relevant because the Cold War 
is over and this once-superpower is now divided into several countries which are 
intent on establishing their own sovereignty and identity. The second major 
accomplishment was the establishment of an American presence in the Middle East. 
This region of the world cannot be viewed as the friendliest to the United States, yet, 
through the diplomatic efforts of Kissinger, the American government is now a major 
player in the various events in this region. And the third major accomplishment was, 
of course, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
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China. The Nixon-Kissinger China policy is the result of Kissinger’s diplomatic 
efforts and brilliant mind. 
 
However, Shulzinger (1989) also pointed out that Kissinger was far from the perfect 
diplomat. There are many areas that Shulzinger called “gaps” in the performance of 
Kissinger. Shulzinger is inclined to believe that although Kissinger may have 
achieved a coup in getting opening diplomatic and trade relations with China, the 
relations with other countries operated with less finesse. The bombing of North 
Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia were not evidence of a sterling performance. 
Thus, similar to Morris, Shulzinger has ambivalent views regarding Kissinger’s 
diplomacy. 
 
There were, however, strong critics of Kissinger and the various foreign policies that 
he authored, during both the Nixon and the Ford administrations. One of these strong 
critics was Tad Szulc. Szulc is an investigative reporter who worked for the 
Associated Press and then for the New York Times. Szulc’s work, however, does not 
have the benefit of the Freedom of Information Act from which he could have 
obtained more information. But then again, Szulc’s work has always questioned the 
sincerity of the government's efforts to be transparent and this doubt implies that 
Szulc would have been one of the media people who would be critical of the contents 
released bythe National Security Council archives.  
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The thesis of Szulc’s book is the establishment of an illusion of peace during the 
Nixon administration. That is, the Nixon administration may have opened diplomatic 
ties with China and may have attained détente with the Soviet Union, but the 
relationships with these two communist countries did not bring actual and complete 
peace within their regions. Szulc (1978) contends that the so-called success with 
China was marred by the many acts of violence that the United States committed 
against other nations in Asia, such as North Korea and Cambodia. Perhaps, from the 
point of view of Szulc, no reason would be sufficient to justify the bombings on North 
Vietnam and the waste of innocent lives. Thus, the theme of Szulc’s book is the fake 
morality and the assumed cloak of immortality that many American leaders wear 
today. This fake morality and arrogantly assumed immortality cannot be strong 
foundations for the creation of foreign policies. However, Szulc's treatment of the 
historic events that he described and cited can also be described as unbalanced. He did 
not consider the points of view and the actions of the foreign leaders, such as the 
Soviet General Secretary, the President of North Vietnam, the President of Cambodia, 
and the President of Korea.  
 
Another critic of Nixon and Kissinger was William Bundy. Similar to all the other 
literature, Bundy's book, which came out in 1998, was about three significant foreign 
diplomacy events during the Nixon administration. But first, one must be aware that 
Bundy served three other Presidents besides Nixon. Bundy (1998) explains that 
Nixon’s experience in foreign policy was based on his many years of experience in 
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political life. Nixon was not limited simply to domestic policy. For twenty years 
before Nixon became president, he travelled the world and was part of the meetings of 
the National Security Council. In describing this, Bundy immediately established that 
Nixon, before becoming president, could be assumed to be well-prepared in making 
foreign policies. The flipside of this is that Nixon may already have had strong 
opinions about certain world leaders. Bundy explains that such is shown when Nixon 
displayed a sympathetic attitude towards the Pakistani generals. 
 
In his analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy, Bundy proposes that the greatest 
influence was the so-called “pactomania” invented by Dulles, which was all about 
having mutual defence treaties along a geographic line from Turkey to Japan. With 
the intention of having these treaties and the significance of the geographic locations, 
Nixon realized the importance of establishing a strong presence in Asia: the ideal 
option was to have diplomatic relations with the biggest country in this region, which 
is China. 
 
Thus, according to Bundy, Nixon proceeded to established foreign policies based on 
ideas that he had even before his presidency. Nixon found an ally in Kissinger, who 
became the National Security Adviser. Bundy (1998) commented that Nixon should 
have consulted the Secretary of State, William Rogers, but Nixon ignored this 
protocol and authored foreign policies together with Kissinger. Bundy, who was the 
assistant secretary of state, obviously did not approve of Nixon’s actions. Bundy 
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resigned on the grounds that the policy making was not being made through 
appropriate offices, which should be the State Department. From these early 
statements by Bundy, the reader must then be alerted to the possibility that Bundy’s 
examination of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy may be biased, or worse, lacked 
information. Still, Bundy tackles major foreign policy issues and examines them 
against the policies that Nixon and Kissinger formulated. In this research paper, 
Bundy’s examination of the China foreign policy will be elaborated, although the 
reader is informed that other foreign policies were also discussed in the book. 
 
The Nixon-Kissinger China policy has been regarded by many political analysts as a 
major feat in U.S. diplomatic relations. Bundy disagrees by stating that China only 
capitulated in agreeing to open diplomatic relations with the United States because the 
Chinese government was not friendly to the Soviets. That is, the Soviets, by supplying 
the North Vietnamese with military aid, were causing many problems for China. The 
pressure that the Soviets brought within the locality of China, according to Bundy 
(1998), forced the Chinese government to sign the diplomatic agreement with United 
States. China was dealing with a Soviet threat and was not so much enamoured by the 
diplomatic abilities of Kissinger. Bundy claims that the Chinese intelligence had 
learned of Soviet plans to bomb nuclear plants in China. The United States 
government was simply acting at the right time and at the right place. Bundy proposes 
that even without Nixon and Kissinger, China may have sought such diplomatic 
relations because the Chinese leadership had its own compelling motives. 
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Nixon and Kissinger, as described by Bundy (1998), were not the geniuses behind the 
opening of relations with China. They were just the men who were available at the 
time. And to prove the inadequacies of Nixon and Kissinger in establishing admirable 
foreign policies, Bundy proceeded to describe the actions of the United States against 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Nixon seemed to have the mistaken idea that the United 
States could protect South Vietnam using the strength of the United States Air Force. 
Bundy sees the bombing of Cambodia as the worst error that the Nixon’s 
administration ever made, perhaps as scandalous as the Watergate scandal that forced 
Nixon to resign. Bundy recounted the bombing of the border area of Cambodia in 
1970 and then in 1973. Bundy insists that Cambodia was not a war in the view of the 
American people. It was simply Nixon’s war. This comment of Bundy reflects a 
similar sentiment today with the ongoing situation in Iraq. That is, the war in Iraq is 
not that of the American people. The war in Iraq is simply Bush’s war. But of course, 
the pros and cons of this statement will demand another compilation of varying views. 
 
In conclusion, Bundy (1998) makes three very strong accusations against Nixon and 
Kissinger. First, the formulation of the foreign policies was never within the accepted 
norms especially because the State Department and the Secretary of State were largely 
ignored. This could be the origin of Bundy’s contention, but there are other reasons as 
well. Second, Nixon and Kissinger did not utilize professionalism in creating the 
foreign policies. Bundy described them as two men who were just “steered by 
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examples and stereotypes drawn from their own experiences” (Bundy, 1998: 515). 
And the third strong accusation is that Nixon and Kissinger operated under the theme 
of deception. 
 
Given the views of political analysts, journalists and former employees of the White 
House, there is yet another source that can shed light, perhaps on another facet of the 
foreign policies, particularly the China policy. This source is Nixon's speech writer, 
William Safire. In his book, “Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate 
White House”, Safire provided an interesting portrait of Nixon, along with other 
political personalities, especially Kissinger. Safire’s focus may not have been the 
China policy, but his work provides insights about the most controversial American 
president of all time. The use of Safire’s work would be in lieu of any literature that 
would have come from Nixon himself. 
 
The first memorable part of Safire’s description of Nixon is the presence of dualism in 
the president. Safire used the old “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” to present this duality of 
Nixon’s personality. Kissinger only described a certain form of paranoia about the 
president, but Safire’s description is more radical and may even have invited 
psychologists into the fray of analysing Nixon’s political career. The use of these 
famous gothic characters is tantamount to suggesting the existence of schizophrenia. 
Safire (1975), in a daring move, describes that the Dr. Jekyll in Nixon is constantly 
attempting to suppress the Mr. Hyde, while the rest of the other time, the Dr. Jekyll is 
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engaged in activities that are meant to hide the Mr. Hyde from public view.  
 
Despite this description of Nixon, Safire did not show any animosity against his 
former boss and his examination of the foreign policies was middle of the road. For 
example, Safire simply described Nixon’s trip to China in a manner which is detached 
but full of details. Safire did not condemn the bombing of Cambodia but simply 
narrated the events that led to the president's decision. Finally, he dwelt on describing 
the tricks that some of the people at the White House made that pulled the United 
States into the whirling vortex of the Vietnam War. Safire did not approve of this 
particular war. 
 
All the previous literature, except for one book written by Kissinger, was created 
during the last part of the twentieth century. What do political analysts in the earlier 
years of the twenty-first century have to say regarding the Nixon-Kissinger China 
policy? Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin compiled several views, not only of the 
Nixon-Kissinger China policy, but of the US-China diplomatic relationship. 
 
According to Kirby (2005), before any US-China relationship, and before the moves 
by Nixon and Kissinger to open diplomatic relations with China, and even before the 
Cold War, there was already an existing Sino-American conflict. This was right on 
the heels of the Second World War. The Chinese were allied against the countries that 
the United States supported during this war. Thus, during the late 1940s and 
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throughout the 1950s, all activities involving China and the United States were 
strained with mutual fear. 
 
Then, the Chinese Nationalist army fled to Taiwan. Without the presence of the 
United States in Asia, China may have summarily dealt with the Nationalists on 
Taiwan. But, with the American presence, Mao Zedong goal's was modified. 
According to Preussen, Accinelli and Li, the original goal of crushing the Nationalists 
was changed into attempting to discourage and disband the Nationalist Army on 
Taiwan without provoking the United States into declaring war against China.  
 
Obviously, the United States did not welcome a war against the biggest country in 
Asia and this is why then president, Dwight Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, 
John F. Dulles, also utilized measures to avoid provoking the PRC. Bernstein 
described that the American policy as mirroring the Chinese policy: “One sees that 
each power was frustrated by its inability to shape the other's foreign policies and 
international behaviour. Hostility reached a high point during the Taiwan Straits crises 
where both sides glared at each other but purposely avoided an armed confrontation” 
(Bernstein, 2005: para. 6) 
 
The US certainly approved of the democratic state that the Nationalists planned to 
build at the time, but providing too much and too obvious support for Taiwan would 
place the US in an untenable position with China. There were also ambassadorial talks 
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that Eisenhower initiated, but historically these were insignificant since no significant 
agreements were made. Yet these ambassadorial talks established the road of 
communication for Nixon and Kissinger. 
 
This literature review first presented the need for a foreign policy, as described by 
Kissinger. But the United States already had several foreign policies, one of which 
was the China policy. This China policy is sometimes considered the hallmark of the 
greatest diplomatic skills in American history and it was carried out by Nixon and 
Kissinger. But there were also critics of the Nixon-Kissinger China policy, and their 
critiques were usually linked to the Watergate scandal that forced Nixon’s resignation 
and to the arrogance and duplicity that Kissinger sometimes exhibited. But another 
view that must be taken, to add another facet to the Nixon-Kissinger China policy, is 
the foreign policy of China towards the United States. It would appear that both 
countries have mirror image policies and this is what led to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
Taiwan Issue – Nationalism and Identity 
The Taiwan issue is largely about the ideology of nationalism and identity. After 
being separated from the mainland for decades, Taiwan has developed a unique 
“Taiwanese” identity. This is the core reason why Taiwan refuses to unify with the 
PRC and acknowledge the PRC's “One China Policy”, as it has certainly became a 
political tool in Taiwan.  
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In examining this Taiwanese identity, I draw upon Brown’s observations and research 
into Taiwan’s newly developed national identity. The growing number of nationalists, 
especially among the younger generations, and their support for independence claims 
will also be discussed. To explain the significance of the “Taiwanese” mentality, this 
thesis draws upon Lin’s analysis of Taiwanese people’s emotions towards mainland 
Chinese. I also draw on Gellner’s definition of Nationalism, and Anderson’s imagined 
communities to provide a clearer understanding of the new Taiwanese nationalism.  
 
Gellner offers a dynamic framework for examining Nationalism. He points out that 
Nationalism is an emotional act. Gellner (1983: 1) states that,  
 
“Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of 
this principle. Nationalist movement is the feeling of anger aroused by the 
violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. 
…But there is one particular form of the violation of the nationalist principle to 
which nationalist sentiment is quite particularly sensitive: if the rulers of the 
political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, 
for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political 
propriety. This can occur either through the incorporation of the national territory 
in a larger empire, or by local domination of an alien group.”  
 
Gellner’s view of nationalism provides a model for understanding the emergence of   
Taiwanese nationalism. The first sign of pan-Taiwanese identity emerged prior to the 
arrival of Japanese troops in 1895. “James Davidson, an American war correspondent 
with the Japanese army reported that Taiwan formed a short-lived “Republic of 
Taiwan” and organised a seven-year resistance to Japanese occupation of the island” 
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(Brown, 2004: 8). The movement was evidently nationalist, yet it was an unsuccessful 
attempt to form a nation-state. However, a link to Gellner’s theory of nationalism is 
apparent. Currently, Taiwan faces pressure from the PRC over unification. The PRC’s 
forceful political stance, missile testing, and its blocking of global recognition of 
Taiwan have all encouraged Taiwanese nationalism. 
 
“Nationalism was, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty” 
(Hutchinson 1994). For Hutchinson, there are varieties of nationalism, one of which is 
nationalism for the purposes of liberation; for example, after the first partition of 
Poland in 1775, the American declaration of independence in 1776, the 
commencement and second phase of the French revolution in 1789 and 1792, and so 
on. If we consider China as a kingdom, we will be able to see why Taiwan persists 
with its independence movement despite possible consequences that may endanger 
the security of the Taiwan Strait.  
 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communitie' (1991) seeks to comprehend the 
ideological term “nationalism”. He argues that nationalism and the idea of a nation 
state is imagined. But nationalism isn’t imaginary. Let’s draw a parallel between 
Anderson’s view on imagined nationalism and the sense of Taiwanese nationalism.  
In Imagined Communities (1991: 6-7), Anderson states that nationalism: “…is 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them. Yet in the minds of each, 
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lives the image of their communion.” “The nation is imagined as limited because even 
the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if 
elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.” “It is imagined as sovereign 
because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were 
destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.” “It is 
imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship.” 
 
Anderson’s theory provides an explanation for what I define as the incompatibility of 
the current imagined Taiwanese Identity/Nationalism and the sense of “Taiwanese-
ness” with the issue of cross Taiwan Strait relations.  
 
The type of language used in Taiwan and its political overtones show what Anderson 
regards as the voice of official nationalism. There are two main languages, Chinese 
and Taiwanese (Min-Nan). Using a certain language in a particular city is an 
important practice for politicians during election periods or when trying to raise a 
certain type of political awareness. Taiwanese (Min-Nan) has proven to be the most 
popular language for gaining votes from independence supporters, as it is a language 
that demonstrates “Taiwanese-ness”.  
 
Anderson points out that official nationalism emerges when the ruling class feels 
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threatened by nationalist movements. Forming an official language is a key to 
securing governmental power. “The philological-lexicographic revolution created and 
gradually spread the idea of language as personal property, that people who speak and 
read the same language belong to a certain group, a form of an imagined community” 
(Anderson, 1991). 
 
Brown’s extensive work on defining Taiwan’s identity provides in-depth analysis 
valuable for conceptualising the Taiwanese identity and also provides a useful 
foundation for examining the political rivalry between Taiwan and China. However, 
while agreeing with Brown’s definition of identity, I will be challenging Brown’s 
arguments that use identity to define a nation. First, we will look at how Brown 
defines identity.  
 
Taiwanese identity is mentioned in several publications. How is Taiwan different 
from the PRC? Brown (2004: 13) conducted a remarkable study of Taiwanese 
identity, arguing that: “identity is based on social experience, not cultural ideas or 
ancestry; cultural meanings and social power constitute two distinct, though 
interacting, systems that affect human behaviour and societies differently; 
demographic forces such as migration affect human behaviour and societies in yet 
another why; and human cognition – both cognitive structure and decision-making 
progresses – mediate the influences of culture, power, and demographic conditions.”  
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“Identity must be negotiated; [it is] not simply a matter of choice, because identity 
formation in individuals and groups derives from their interaction with the social and 
cultural context in which they live. …identity of individuals as members of groups – 
especially national identity and ethnic identity – are portrayed by political leaders as 
fixed, with borders that are not based on individuals” (Brown, 2004: 13) 
 
In developing a greater understanding of Taiwanese-ness and trying to examine the 
intricacies of the Cross-Strait issue from the point of view of the Taiwanese public, I 
draw heavily from Lin’s analysis of Taiwanese people’s emotions towards the 
mainland Chinese. His work has influenced much of my research on this topic. In 
more ways than one, Lin’s work has also reflected, albeit more eloquently, some of 
my own arguments and views on the “Taiwan Strait problem”.  
 
Lin argues that Taiwanese society is becoming more open and has a different political 
standpoint, but that no one should avoid this issue: Cross-Strait relations are the key 
to Taiwan’s development in the future. Misunderstandings come from a lack of 
communication, especially in the case of China and Taiwan, where each had closed 
the door to the other for decades before resuming social and business exchanges. 
Although close social and business ties across the Strait have formed, trust and 
understanding between the two was still nowhere to be found (Lin 2005). 
 
Lin discusses “the subjective feelings” of the Taiwanese in their view of 
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contemporary Chinese society. Taiwanese people purposely pay no attention to the 
changing Chinese society today. They still view the Chinese as third world citizens 
and ignore the success of mainlanders in global economics. This attitude has placed 
Taiwan in a disadvantageous position in handling the Cross Strait problem and it may 
result in a devastating outcome. A poor economy and a war is not something Taiwan 
can afford (Lin 2005). 
 
But Lin isn’t criticising the Taiwanese people in his book. He only points out the 
reality and the erroneous emotional political approach taken by the Taiwanese people 
in facing this sensitive issue. Embracing “Taiwanese-ness” and “de-Chineseness” is 
not the right path to take (Lin 2005).   
 
Taiwanese politicians are known for their strategy in targeting their supporter groups. 
In Taiwan, middle and lower working class people are the most enthusiastic in 
political demonstrations and they discuss politics “with passion”. Lin defines the 
behaviour of these working class Taiwanese as a “paradox”. He argues that since both 
China and Taiwan believe in capitalism, it does not matter who is ruling the country – 
whether it’s the Democratic Progressive Party, the Nationalist Party or even the 
Communist Party. This would not have any direct affect on the middle and lower 
working class Taiwanese. Lin believes that this intense interest is due to the 
dissatisfaction of those people with their reality. Thus, they feel fulfilled when they 
talk about something that concerns the whole society. They are clearly being 
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manipulated by politics (Lin 2005).  
 
Furthermore, Lin does not believe that Taiwanese people should forget their pride 
while facing the PRC government; after all, Taiwan has experience that the PRC can 
doubtlessly learn from. Taiwan is a small island, but that is no reason for China to 
disregard its potential. It isn’t right to say, “how far advanced Taiwan is beyond 
China” in terms of technology, society, living standards, etc. The correct way to 
describe the situation should be, “How much can Taiwan contribute to or share” with 
China in terms of their experience. Despite taking different paths and having grown 
apart from each other, they still have common ancestral roots (Lin 2005). 
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Chapter 3: The Main Thesis  
 
This chapter discusses the One-China Policy which was formulated and implemented 
by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. It chronicles how the policy came to be, what 
transpired during the Nixon-Mao meeting in Beijing, what the policy states, and what 
outstanding issues there are regarding the One-China Policy.  
 
I shall firstly discuss briefly what the United States of America had acknowledged 
and recognised as the legal government of China prior to Richard Nixon’s term as 
president, before the formulation and implementation of the One-China Policy. The 
following is an excerpt from an article written by John J. Tkacik, Jr. in September 5, 
2002 for The Heritage Foundation: “On July 25, 1928, driven by a legalistic concern, 
but not necessarily a practical respect, for the integrity of China’s landmass, the 
United States concluded that Chiang Kai-Shek’s “Republic of China” (ROC) was 
about as close as anyone would get to a viable Chinese regime and decided Chiang 
could represent all of China. Through the 1930s, World War II, and the Chinese Civil 
War, Washington continued to view the ROC as the sole legal government of China. 
The ROC, however, was defeated by the Communists in 1949 and for all practical 
purposes, it was replaced by the “People’s Republic of China” (PRC).” (Tkacik, 
2002)     
 
On July 19, 1971, then United States President Richard Nixon made a brief but very 
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significant announcement (Time 1971). Taking only  about ninety seconds of 
television time, Nixon changed the course of history by making an announcement that 
modified almost all of the political and social assumptions as well as the patterns of 
post war diplomacy that were set by his predecessors. The announcement was a fairly 
simple and not unexpected one from a president: he was to make a state visit. 
However, the destination and purpose were what made the announcement surprising: 
Nixon is going “to Beijing to meet with China’s Mao Tse-Tung, sometimes referred 
to as Mao Zedong, and Premier Zhou Enlai before next May” (Time 1971). The 
meeting and visit was co-ordinated by then National Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger through a secret meeting with Chou in Beijing the previous week. The main 
objective of his visit was “to seek normalisation of relations between the two 
countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides” (Time 
Magazine 26/07/1971).  
 
Indeed, the announcement created a stir, soliciting an enthusiastic and excited 
response from various officials and sectors in US society. It was considered to be a 
turning point in history primarily because there had not been any form of 
correspondence between the two countries prior to the Nixon administration. In 
addition, this propelled Nixon and Kissinger into the global spotlight and to the height 
of their brilliant careers. This was the first time that a Western head of state would 
visit Beijing since Mao’s revolutionaries had defeated Chiang Kai-Shek’s government 
on the mainland in 1949 (Time 1971). This entailed the breaking down of the official 
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estrangement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China which 
had been operating for almost twenty-five years. Nixon and Kissinger’s action plan 
had signalled that it was now the right time to change their stand and to convene and 
discuss matters that were long overdue. To the American people, their president had 
demonstrated courage and the determination to improve their country’s international 
relations. The mere fact that a meeting and a state visit had been set meant that 
international relationship, regardless of between which countries were now viewed in 
totally different perspectives. 
 
Nixon’s announcement was met with exuberance because the meeting between he and 
Mao could signify a resolution or answer to the long-term and bloody Vietnam War. 
It could also pave the way, slowly but surely, for the two sides to settle their conflicts 
thereby allowing them to finally address each other civilly. Such conflicts or issues 
included the status of the Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist government in Taiwan, the 
admission of Beijing to the United Nations, and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations.  
 
It was later revealed that Kissinger had met with Zhou for sixteen hours prior to the 
latter inviting the U.S. president for a visit and meeting. This and the eventual 
invitation for a state visit to Beijing clearly insinuated that there was already some 
progress regarding the resolution of the outstanding issues because otherwise, both 
sides would not have deemed it necessary for their national leaders to meet at the 
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summit level. 
 
As mentioned, this was also a brilliant addition to the resumes of Kissinger and 
Nixon, especially the latter who has been considered to be perhaps the most embattled 
US president. This gave Nixon a chance to establish his ability as a peacemaker and 
public relations strategist, perhaps also a helpful factor to his re-election. A lot of 
people noticed Nixon’s 360-degree turn from the politician who gained prominence 
on the basis of impassioned anti-Communism ideals to the state leader who sought to 
bring together the capitalist and the communist. Clearly, this move was a bid to re-
define history. Ironically, two years prior to this announcement, Nixon had urged the 
bombing of China during the Korean War and for that, the Chinese or Beijing 
officials had thought Nixon to be a “cunning and crafty swindler and a murderer” 
(Time 26/07/1971). However, the current turn of events had allowed the US president 
to walk chin-up in Beijing and meet with leaders Mao and Zhou.      
 
Apparently, the planning for Kissinger’s secret trip as well as Nixon’s shift from anti-
Communism to global public relations officer had started as early as Nixon’s election 
to presidential office. He had asserted earlier that “any American policy toward Asia 
must come urgently to grips with the reality of China” (Time 26/07/1971). Even in his 
previous other state visits and foreign trips as president of the United States, Nixon 
had already expressed to other state and national officials that he would like to see an 
open communication line with China. He even went to the extent of employing the 
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assistance of the French and the Canadians to act as intermediaries. Perhaps the most 
helpful ally and intercessor that Nixon got was then Rumanian President Nicolae 
Ceausescu who was, by far, the only Communist leader who was on good terms with 
both Russia and China. The American government also made some modifications in 
its press releases and public announcements. For instance, then Secretary of State 
William Rogers had issued several public announcements in which he recommended 
and justified the need to ease the tension with the Chinese; this was as early as 1969. 
In addition, in 1970 saw the very first time that a presidential and official document 
had referred to China formally as the People’s Republic of China since the 
Communist takeover; the US government had always referred to China as Communist 
or Red China prior to the issuance and release of this document. After this, President 
Nixon was always quoted as using that phrase in public and in social functions. This 
is a clear indication of what Nixon used to say that his administration is “not bound 
by previous history” (Time 1971) in reference to the relationships of the previous 
administrations with the Chinese government. In his intention to seek good relations 
with the emerging superpower in Asia, Nixon had given the Chinese the idea or 
message that he wanted to resolve and get his country out of its involvement in the 
Vietnam War. 
 
The first time that the US had expressed its intention to open communication and 
cooperation channels with China, the latter did not give an immediate and positive 
response. It was only around late 1969 that Chinese officials demonstrated some 
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interest. For instance, they had agreed to resume the discussions in Warsaw which had 
first started in 1955; this was an attempt to explore and negotiate on the options of a 
possible peaceful co-existence. These discussions were temporarily suspended when 
the US invaded Cambodia. When the US bombed Laos, the Chinese still had not 
reacted as vehemently compared to their previous responses to US military 
movements. By the time the Americans had bombed North Vietnam, the latter had 
reacted against their Chinese ally, owing to the mild response and reaction that they 
had shown and given to the Americans. The Chinese had no choice but to reassure 
them that such was not the case; Zhou Enlai personally led the delegation that pacified 
the North Vietnamese. 
 
Indeed, the state of affairs as well as the pace of changes had improved in April 1971 
(Time 1971). To start things off, the American Ping Pong team had been invited to 
Beijing for an exhibition game. The US for its part had lowered the trade barriers 
specifically on non-strategic products. Edgar Snow, an old China correspondent, had 
returned from a trip to Beijing, bringing with him news that was generally considered 
to be good but somewhat surprising: that Chinese leader Mao wanted Nixon to visit 
him, preferably sometime after May of 1972. This is in response to Nixon’s earlier 
statement in one of his press conferences that he wanted to go to China. The reason 
for Mao's preferred date was cited as being for political reasons. As early as April of 
1971, Nixon, with the help of some of his trusted staff, conducted intensive research 
and study that eventually concluded with Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing to meet 
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with Zhou. At that time, complete secrecy was required and imposed in order to allow 
some room for further strategizing and action plans and also so that should the 
discussion yield unfavourable results, it would not cause both parties any humiliation 
or embarrassment. The strategy was kept well secret, so much that Nixon and 
Kissinger were said to have worked on it not within the White House for fear of leaks, 
but in the more secure Lincoln Room. Even the Chinese people were said to be 
excluded from the secret planning. 
 
Kissinger was eventually able to go on his planned trip. The press release for this trip 
was that it was supposed to be a foreign trip including five countries and solely for 
purposes related to resolving the war in Vietnam. He was able to travel to Beijing 
from Pakistan without arousing suspicion because he had pretended that he was ill 
with some sort of stomach ailment. Kissinger arrived in Beijing, already aware that 
Zhou was more than willing to meet with the US president. However, not much has 
been said about the discussion that transpired between Kissinger and Zhou and even 
up to now, there is no clear evidence as to how these two were able to convince each 
other on the advantages of having a summit meeting. 
 
One thing that remains for sure is that this plan and meeting would greatly affect three 
major outstanding issues of that time. First, it would definitely affect the ongoing 
Vietnam War even if Nixon had not mentioned it in his announcement. Anyone would 
say that his trip to Beijing would surely touch on the topic and that was inevitable not 
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to do so. In fact, people had seen this meeting as an immensely helpful channel or tool 
through which the war may be resolved and finally put to an end. Although it is 
accepted that China would not be able to force Hanoi and push for negotiations or a 
peace pact, the fact that China had great influence over Hanoi owing to the past and 
present assistance that the former had extended to the latter during the war. People 
and government officials alike were also predicting that the Chinese leaders were now 
growing tired of the war because it caused for them nothing but more time, effort, and 
finances down the drain so that they are more likely to focus on building and 
strengthening their economic aspects. The US had also assured the Chinese that they 
will never emerge from the war in any status that would cause humiliation and 
downfall to the Communist groups. It has also been speculated that Kissinger may 
have assured Zhou that the US government would push through with their withdrawal 
plans, culminating with Nixon’s state visit to Beijing. In return, Zhou may have 
informed Kissinger that the Chinese government would coordinate with Hanoi for 
possible negotiations and settlement without losing the confidence that they would 
eventually be able to conquer South Vietnam. In addition, Zhou may have volunteered 
to manage and organize a meeting that could resolve a settlement for the entire 
Southeast Asia conflict, a move that would give China an edge over the USSR (Time 
1971). However, this never took place because the North Vietnamese diplomats had 
insisted that the settlement could only be concluded in the peace talks transpiring in 
Paris. 
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The second major issue that would be affected tremendously by the Nixon - Mao 
meeting was the subject of Taiwan. During his monumental announcement, Nixon 
had indirectly alluded to the US treaty commitment to Taiwan when he stated that his 
government’s action “in seeking a new relationship with the People’s Republic of 
China will not be at the expense of our old friends” (Time 1971). As all people know, 
the position and significance of Taiwan in world affairs at that time was relatively 
small, almost negligible when compared to that of China’s. As such, anyone could 
probably predict that even if the US defence commitment to Taiwan was legally 
binding and the emotional ties between the two are relatively strong and of a high 
degree, the US government officials could definitely forego and wash their hands 
clean of Taiwan should China ask them to. In addition, the ideology that the 
Nationalist government on Taiwan believes in and follows, that of  Chiang Kai-Shek 
being the leader of the whole of China, has long been found to be senseless and weak. 
However, the US still found it hard to ignore the fact that Taiwan has prosperous and 
flourishing free economy and perhaps one of the largest non-Communist armed forces 
in the whole of Asia. 
 
Unfortunately, this does not ring true for the Chinese who consider Taiwan as their 
highest priority problem. Very early on, there was speculating that China would 
probably insist that the US withdraw its support of 9,000 military personnel from 
Taiwan. In preparation for this, the US government has already halted its operations 
and the sending of regular naval patrols to the Taiwan Strait. Both parties, the US and 
 93
China, had, in due course, come to a considerably fair agreement: that the US could 
keep its treaty obligation to Taiwan and for its part, Beijing would not attack Taiwan.  
 
The third issue that was likely to be touched upon by the summit meeting was of the 
admission and recognition of the US as to which state, the PRC or the ROC, was the 
legal government of China. Nixon’s move has caused the US to consider Taiwan’s 
position in the United Nations (UN) as something that was still on shaky ground. 
Until that time, the US was one of the sixty-three countries that had acknowledged 
Taiwan as the legal government of China. However, Nixon’s decision to proceed with 
Kissinger’s secret visit as well as his courtesy visit to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai 
was only indicative of one thing: that his administration now recognizes the Beijing 
government as the legal government of China.  
 
Both the US and China could enormously benefit from this co-operation. For the 
Beijing government, perhaps the main motivation was their desire to join the league 
of powerful nations and to give Communism a place in global politics which would 
also give them an advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, Mao Zedong’s 
administration would get more deals and benefits at only a little cost. The most 
significant gain for Beijing was that they would be able to acquire the reputation and 
credibility as a skilful operator and manager in world affairs. This would also give 
them an opportunity to strengthen their position in the world economy and in 
organizations like the UN as well as leverage with other industrialized and powerful 
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countries. Most of all, it would allow Mao Zedong to finally unite Taiwan with the 
mainland of China, forming a stronger and bigger nation.  
 
For his part, Nixon saw this as an opportunity to reach toward Asia and to promote his 
influence and reputation beyond the boundaries of the United States. As mentioned 
earlier, this would be a good addition to his resume; an excellent passage in the 
history books; and a good point to remember his name for re-election. This would 
also eradicate his poor performance record and would entail better and wider success 
in foreign affairs. As for his country, the US, this will mean an additional ally, bigger 
and better, in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Still, Nixon’s announcement was met with such favourable response that even his 
critics acknowledged his judgment and ability. The announcement gave the 
Americans hope for further growth and development, to grow and develop beyond the 
limits of the United States and to reach out to other continents.  
 
Nixon was viewed as someone who had stepped over the borders and had succeeded 
in getting rid of the Americans’ fear of Communism. He had justified his decision and 
strategies by stating in a newspaper briefing that China will one day rise to be “an 
enormous economic power” (Time 1971). As such, Nixon believed that the isolation 
of the Chinese people should come to an end because, if not, it might later on post a 
threat to world peace. The US president also believed that the United States was the 
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only powerful country that could take steps towards a good relationship with China; 
other countries could not do that due to various issues including irreconcilable 
differences in beliefs and political systems. To further rationalise and expound his 
action plans, Nixon had cited the Chinese - American communities in the West Coast 
of the US all whom were able to rise out of poverty and had proved to be very law-
abiding. He considered the Chinese people as the most industrious in Asia and that 
China would eventually provide the US with a supply of talented and highly skilful 
people. Clearly, Nixon now saw Communism less as an adversary or as a fault, an 
indication that ideology and culture was fast becoming less significant compared to 
the need to live peacefully and to the necessity to forge good international relations.     
 
The result of the meeting between Nixon and Mao was what has become popularly 
known as the One China Policy. This is the culmination of Nixon and Kissinger’s 
historic week long state visit and meeting with the Chinese: a joint communiqué that 
was made public on February 27, 1972 (the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972). 
Actually, this was formally called the Shanghai Declaration because it was 
proclaimed and made public in Shanghai, China in 1972 (Kagan 2003). A declaration, 
in terms of international diplomacy, it was not a law but rather a statement that has 
been made or issued by state leaders in order to establish a working policy for 
international relationships. Based on history and on numerous cases, declarations are 
often effective in providing order but only for a limited period of time because certain 
conflicts or issues would surely arise later on, questioning the validity and tautology 
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of its clauses (Kagan 2003).  
 
This Shanghai joint communiqué was said to have been drafted as early as during 
Kissinger’s secret visit to Zhou Enlai as part of the groundwork that the two had laid 
for the coming summit meeting. It was also Kissinger who laid the framework as well 
as edited and proofread all the details, working until late at night with then Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qiao Guanha during the Nixon-Mao meeting.  
 
The Shanghai Declaration or the One China Policy was an agreement between the 
United States, as represented by Nixon and Kissinger, and the People’s Republic of 
China, as represented by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. It recognised there was only 
one China and that Taiwan was a province, a part of China. The One China Policy had 
likewise assured the public that both countries would continue to work toward the 
normalisation of their relations through the expansion of so-called “people-to-people 
contacts” and the opening of various trade opportunities between them (Shanghai 
Communiqué, 1972). True enough, it was also, in part, an indirect reference to the 
Soviet Union when both parties stated that neither of them “should seek hegemony in 
the Asia Pacific region and [that] each is opposed to [the] efforts by any other country 
or group of countries to establish such hegemony” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972). 
 
Earlier, the Chinese and the Americans found it hard to achieve common ground 
owing to the numerous differences in their political beliefs and culture. Because of 
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this, Chou had put forward a non-conformist and unconventional draft for the 
communiqué. This paved the way for the two sides to finally agree on certain terms 
and conditions. For instance, each country had been allowed to state its own views in 
separate paragraphs if necessary such as on the issue regarding the ongoing Vietnam 
War. The US had backed Nixon’s latest peace plan whereas China had articulated that 
they were still firmly supporting and pushing for the Communist proposal.  
 
Perhaps, in spite of the joint effort to co-operate and iron out all the outstanding 
issues, the US and the Beijing administration found next to impossible to come to a 
concrete agreement regarding Taiwan. The US had been working on a dual purpose: it 
had sought acceptance and improved relations with the Beijing government but at that 
time, it still recognised Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist government in Taiwan as the 
legal government of China (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972). This was the main reason 
why the US had a preference for a policy that would advocate and recognise “two 
Chinas”. On the other hand, Beijing had always viewed the outstanding issues 
between them and Taiwan as being an internal political matter. They tried to convince 
the US to withdraw the American troops in Taiwan because they saw this as a 
violation of their sovereignty. In return, the US was adamant that the Beijing 
administration should resolve their outstanding issues and conflicts with Taiwan 
without using force. The two parties were finally able to reconcile these indifferences. 
Kissinger said that both the US and China were more than willing to meet halfway, 
setting aside the issues concerning Taiwan; they will certainly not allow any kind of 
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impediment to surface in their new relationship: “The basic theme of the Nixon trip - 
and the Shanghai Communiqué – was to put off the issue of Taiwan for the future, to 
enable the two nations to close the gulf of twenty years and to pursue parallel policies 
where their interests coincided” (Kissinger, 1979). 
 
The US had declared its “interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves” (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972) and had given in to Beijing’s 
request by withdrawing its military forces from Taiwan, agreeing to reduce its 
military support and involvement in Taiwan as the tension in the said area also 
lessened. The PRC, on the other hand, had rejected the option and suggestion of the 
existence of “two Chinas”. They were firm in their pronouncement that the 
government being administered by the PRC should be the sole legal government of 
China and that Taiwan was just a provincial constituent of China. Hence, the US 
acknowledged such belief without clarifying its own conviction as to their stand about 
Taiwan and as to who was the rightful legal government of the “One-China”. This is 
because Nixon knew that his administration could not just turn its backs upon its 
commitment to Taiwan. 
 
The term “One-China” had not also been well defined because it could generate 
different types of interpretation based on the stance and belief of the one interpreting 
it. The origin of this term may be traced back to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and 
had been used extensively in various declarations such as that of the Cairo 
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Declaration in 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 (Jue, 2005). In both 
documents, Taiwan was included and attributed as a Chinese territory that Japan had 
to restore to the power and administration of the ROC by the end of war (I will give 
more details later in this chapter). However, the PRC stood firm on its grounds that 
the ROC had already been defeated in 1949 and should therefore cease to exist. As 
such, the US had to assure the Beijing government that they were not in favour of 
Taiwan gaining its independence and, based on a National Security Archive report 
released in December 11, 2003, Nixon had gone to the extent of assuring the Chinese 
that he would work against such an outcome.  
 
Up to the present, a lot of people still lack a good understanding of the One-China 
Policy. Perhaps it would help to detail what actually had transpired during the Nixon 
state visit to Beijing’s Mao Zedong, as well as some discussion on the contents of the 
One-China Policy. It is common knowledge that Nixon flew to China on an invitation 
from Zhou; he was accompanied by his wife, Secretary of State William Rogers, 
Kissinger, and other officials. The state visit lasted from February 21-28, 1972. Nixon 
met with Mao on the first day of the visit, discussing and exchanging views on Sino-
US relations and some matters regarding world affairs (Joint Communiqué of the 
United States of America and the People’s Republic of China 1972). Subsequent 
discussion followed not only between the two national leaders but also between the 
other American and Chinese officials. Both parties had said that the visit and the 
meetings were indeed beneficial to both countries because, after so many years, it was 
 100
only during this time that the two were able to express and explain their views and 
actions on a variety of issues. They had also evaluated outstanding international 
concerns together, detailing each side’s position and opinions about the said matters 
and how they will be able to face the challenges together as allies.  
 
Early on in their meetings, the Beijing administration stated the grounds and 
conditions upon which they would enter into an agreement with the US They had 
expressed that wherever there is oppression, there is also resistance and that countries 
yearn for only one thing, and that is independence. People resolve to revolt to gain 
liberty. Such is the trend in history. The Chinese people advocated equality and 
deterred bullying and domination of bigger and more powerful countries over the 
smaller and weaker countries. With this, the Beijing administration was clearly telling 
the US that they would enter into an agreement only if they are treated as an equal; 
the agreement should not be to the advantage of US and should not entail US 
interference on how the Chinese government would prefer to run their country. The 
Chinese accept the fact that they will probably never gain prominence as a 
superpower with the same status as that of the US, but they still oppose domination 
and power politics of any kind. Instead, they opt to support the struggles of the 
oppressed people and have always advocated campaigns for freedom and liberation. 
They also believe that one country should never be under the power of another. In this 
regard, the Chinese had clearly expressed their support to the people of Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia. All of these countries have experienced being attacked by the 
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US; this is an apparent indication that the Chinese may be willing to negotiate with 
Vietnam on the ongoing warfare but they will not force the latter to go into a 
settlement with US.  
 
The US also made some statements concerning their side. Foremost of these was an 
assertion that “peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce 
immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict” (Joint Communiqué 
1972). This is actually their way of seeking cooperation from China. They had also 
expressed their willingness to work towards a just and secure peace, fulfilling the 
aspirations of the people for freedom and development and assuring the Chinese that 
this relationship shall be devoid of foreign aggression. The US likewise seeks to 
maintain an open communication line between them and the Beijing government in 
order to avoid tension, misunderstandings, and conflict later on. They had conveyed 
that countries should treat each other with mutual respect and should there be any 
competition, then the contest should be healthy and peaceful; a country, whether big 
or small, is not always flawless and error-free which means that each and every 
country in the world is encouraged to evaluate their attitudes and stances from time to 
time in order to keep their values intact. The US also supports the ideology that the 
Asian people should be allowed to remain free and to claim their rightful place in the 
globe without any intervention or meddling from other countries.  
 
Basically, the statements made by the US consisted of private assurances in response 
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to those given by the Chinese; these were assurances that should the Americans be 
allowed to maintain a good relationship with mainland China, they would not attempt 
to dominate and interfere with the Chinese government. 
 
Although the social systems of China and the US are entirely different from each 
other, they managed to overcome the discrepancies and come to terms of agreement 
by considering that the two countries should carry out their relations based on the 
principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as on equality, 
mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence (Joint Communiqué 1972). As such, the US 
and China expressed in the One-China Policy that “…progress toward the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of 
all countries; both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; neither 
should seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by 
any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and neither is 
prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or 
understandings with the other directed at other states.” (Joint Communiqué 1972) 
  
In addition, both China and the US had also aired their view that it would be against 
the interest of the international community for countries to group together and 
eventually divide the world into various spheres of interests.  
 
A further review of history, specifically of past disputes, reveals that one of the root 
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causes or stumbling blocks in the negotiations was the US’s association with, and 
recognition of, Taiwan. As such, the US had given in to the Beijing government’s 
request to withdraw their military forces and had acknowledged there is only one 
China. In the Shanghai Declaration, the US reiterated that they “acknowledge” that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait form one China and that includes Taiwan 
which is a province of China. The US government did not challenge this stand but 
rather re-affirmed its willingness for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Since 
the Beijing administration had expressed firmly that the dispute between them and 
Taiwan was purely an internal issue, the US had left the resolving of this concern to 
the Chinese. Both countries were encouraged to focus their attention on broadening 
their understanding of each other by discussing key areas such as science and 
technology, sports, culture, and broadcasting and journalism; these were key areas 
through which “people-to-people contacts” and regular correspondence would prove 
to be extremely advantageous.  
 
Another area of great consideration for both parties was that of bilateral trade. This 
likewise demonstrated excellent mutual benefits for both sides. The US and the PRC 
had concurred that economic relations, founded on equality and mutual benefit would 
serve the best interests of the two counties. It is in this regard that they consented to 
facilitate the progressive development of trade between their nations.  
 
To ensure that the One-China Policy would be implemented smoothly the US and 
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China both agreed to stay in contact and ensure regular coordination through the 
various channels available. For instance, an American representative was to be sent to 
Beijing regularly for evaluation and concrete consultations that would further enhance 
and contribute to the normalisation of their international relations, as well as to 
continue their exchange and discussion of views especially those concerning issues 
that are of common interest to the two countries. 
 
The week-long trip was capped by the expression of hopes of the two countries that 
all of their discussions and the joint communiqué would assist in the opening up of 
new opportunities and prospects that could contribute to further enhancement and 
development of their relationship and to the betterment of their own country’s status. 
It was also believed that the normalisation of relations between the two countries 
would not only serve the interests of the concerned Chinese and American parties but 
would also play a significant role to the encouragement of world peace and in the ease 
of tension and conflict between Asia and the other continents. 
 
Behind the One-China Policy – US – People’s Republic of China – Taiwan  
If there was ever a more analogous story that occurred within a time-span of two 
decades, from the 1960s to the 1970s, it would have to be about the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait and of their connection with the most powerful country in the world. As 
expected, much of the focus went to the bigger China and of the start of a “normal” 
relationship that had much excited everyone’s expectations and wishes. But this had a 
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price, the junking of a promising relationship with the other China, the Republic of 
China, and to observers and pundits, much of what had transpired in this “lesser” 
story, had been cloaked with much secrecy and media camouflage. And yet, the stage 
that had been set “with nearly identical casts of characters on the American side and 
with the pivot of action for both the decision to alter Washington's official 
commitments in East Asia.” (Tucker, 2005). 
 
This was very important to the US which, emerging into the coming Cold War, was 
counting down potential enemies and China was seen as an important equation along 
with the Soviet factor. But the discounting of the Republic of China described as 
“being one day the United States was wedded to its ally, the Republic of China 
situated on the island of Taiwan, and the next it had opened relations with the People's 
Republic, which dominated the mainland”, raised enormous discussion and debate; 
and that because the sudden shift “was so radical, a myth came to surround it” 
(Tucker, 2005).  
 
The originators and cultivators of this myth were both President Richard M. Nixon 
and Henry Kissinger who “told of a bolt-from-the-blue initiative undertaken at great 
political risk but carried out with consummate skill by the only individuals who could 
have realised it” (Tucker, 2005) But before one delves into the making and 
consummation of this myth, it would be helpful to backtrack and examine how the 
two major players, China and Taiwan came into the set-up. 
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When Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, it made Taiwan into 
one of its colonies, not really a sore point for the Taiwanese, even as the Japanese like 
to assert that it was responsible for laying down much of the country's economic 
infrastructure. The defeat of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party by Mao Zedong’s 
Chinese Communist Party in a bitter civil war resulted in an exodus of almost 1.5 
million people led by Chiang Kai-Shek, to Taiwan where he transferred the Republic 
of China with its capital in Taipei. Chiang of course, in the absence of any attempt by 
the PRC on mainland China to represent itself on the world stage, made the claim for 
the rest of the mainland on behalf of the ROC.  
 
Even the United States and its allies recognised the ROC and it even remained a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, representing China of 
course. But in 1971, because of ever shifting currents in some of the world’s dominant 
player nations, the UN General Assembly voted to make the People’s Republic of 
China the official representative of China, in effect displacing Taiwan in the Security 
Council. 
 
The next year, President Nixon’s historic visit to China and the signing of the 
controversial Shanghai Communiqué effectively committed the US to the PRC, but 
not without a few important questions raised with very few answers. As is true of 
myths in general, this one encompassed elements of truth and of fiction, papering over 
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sins and weighing heavily on future efforts to understand, not just the development of 
US relations with China, but especially the trajectory of US relations with Taiwan.  
 
What exactly were these issues? How did Taiwan in particular fare amidst this 
achievement that the popular media touted as a major breakthrough?  
 
Again as has been emphasised earlier, what was ultimately helpful in this regard was 
a careful analysis of how this re-opening of China played out in the interactions of 
America’s foreign policy decisions at a crucial time in the Cold War. The question 
that America was playing to see its enemies in a clearer light certainly belied the fact 
that it actually had more communists on its side of the fence than did the much feared 
and hated Soviet Union (Litwak, 2005) But did Nixon and Kissinger really act in the 
best interests of the US when they made the historic approach to normalise ties with 
China?  
 
Some don’t think so and raise the important point that “that the means to that laudable 
end were deeply flawed, that they fundamentally undermined US credibility and 
sowed the seeds of continuing distrust in United States - Taiwan and United States - 
China relations.” An argument could be made that Nixon and Kissinger wanted so 
intensely to realise their goal that they surrendered more than was necessary to 
achieve it, and the price was paid, not in the near term by the Nixon White House, but 
over the long term by the people of Taiwan and by US diplomacy writ large (Tucker, 
 108
2005).  
 
An overview of some recent revelations, most notably, by admissions from some of 
the players themselves, Nixon and Kissinger would help enlarge and illuminate the 
background drama that Taiwan played itself and how these have changed the future 
landscape of East Asian power and the role that the US continues to play in this area. 
 
In newly declassified documents in 2003, available at the National Security Archives, 
President Nixon actually assured the People’s Republic of China during his Beijing 
trip that while the US “would not support, but could not suppress, the Taiwan 
independence movement.” These documents show the secrecy of these assurances, 
something that had been hidden from the general public for over two decades which 
still supports the kind of foreign policy that the US applies to Taiwan up to this day. 
(NSA, 2003) 
 
More revealing in the documents were transcripts that showed how nervous and 
anxious China was over the possibility that Taiwan could actively assert its 
independence, which contradicts Henry Kissinger's memoir account that they "spent 
very little of our time" on Taiwan. Also revealed by the documents was the extent to 
which the US was taking the Soviet threat seriously. During the same Beijing trip, 
“Kissinger also gave the Chinese a top secret intelligence briefing on Soviet forces 
arrayed against China.” (NSA, 2003) 
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In later interviews, Kissinger would never deviate from the outward appearances that 
the Beijing trip afforded. Asked about China being one of his great successes and of 
why rapprochement was the key word used, he replied: “The principal reason for 
seeking a rapprochement with China was to restore fluidity to the overall international 
situation. If there are five players and you can't deal with one of them, it produces 
rigidity. Secondly, we wanted to demonstrate to the American public that 
Vietnam was an aberration, that we had ideas for the construction of peace on a global 
scale. And thirdly, we wanted to isolate Vietnam”. (NSA, 2006) 
 
There is no mention of Taiwan in the equation even as he along with most of Nixon’s 
close aides and advisers continued to press the obvious tension between China and the 
Soviet Union. In fact, if one is to make a blunt judgment of it, Taiwan, at least in that 
time frame and context probably wasn’t important enough of a variable to be included 
in what was always touted according to Kissinger as a triangular relationship between 
Russia, the United States and China, “in which we attempted to be closer to each of 
them than they were to each other so we could calibrate our policy in relation to 
specific crises that arose in relation to our national interests” (NSA, 2005). The only 
reference to Taiwan would be his assertion that this policy would give America 
“much greater flexibility in relationship with other Asian nations that were under the 
shadow of China.” (NSA, 2005) 
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Still, there is much of that modest bragging of how historic and overtly unpredictable 
the whole China thing was even as documents mentioned have revealed much of it 
already pre-planned. Asked when he stepped down about his feelings on China, 
Kissinger luxuriates in the large expanse of that moment: “when you read about great 
events, people always think that there was an elevated feeling. When I stepped off that 
Pakistani jet in Beijing, my major concern was whom I was going to meet and how 
were we going to conduct the conversation. I didn't put my foot down and say, "Now 
I've just made history, and this will never be forgotten." I thought "Whom am I going 
to meet, and how am I going to bring it to a conclusion?"(NSA, 2006) 
 
Nixon of course couldn’t be far behind as Kissinger drew him in even as he 
downplayed the impact of the moment with some modest parrying saying that he 
knew they had made the history; But “Nixon had a different problem from me: Nixon 
was President, and Nixon rehearsed what he would say when he reached China; and 
that was quite appropriate: he needed to make an impact”. (Kissinger, 2001) 
  
Yet away from the seeming pretence at some spontaneous and totally unpredictable 
challenge that lay before them, the facts as revealed by declassified documents show a 
much more dramatic and calculated drama that also revealed the extent to which 
Taiwan was involved, an involvement that was of course downplayed and even 
pushed further back into the shadows. The documents included such tidbit as Premier 
Zhou Enlai's claim that Washington had let pro-independence politician Peng Ming-
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min escape from Taiwan, to which Nixon and Kissinger denied that Washington had 
given any help and assured Zhou that they opposed Taiwanese independence (NSA, 
2006). There were also Nixon’s repeated assurances to Zhou that Washington would 
discourage any Japanese "military intervention" in South Korea or a Japanese role in 
Taiwan. 
  
Far from the generic assertions that sought to make the Soviets think that the visit was 
simply one of diplomacy, there was Kissinger's detailed run-down of Soviet forces 
along China's borders, including ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic 
air defences, and strategic missiles, with special attention to nuclear weapons (NSA, 
2006) 
 
On the home-front, this presents an intriguing look into how Nixon and Kissinger 
were playing the game domestically even as Kissinger told the Chinese that; "none of 
our colleagues know that we have given you this information and nobody in our 
government except for the President and these people here know that we have given 
you this information. The intelligence people do not know that we have given you this 
information." (Burr, 2000) 
  
This revelation is pivotal to understanding how much of the game had been 
manoeuvred not by any strong outside forces, although the Cold War certainly 
affected much of it, but rather showed the shrewdness, intelligence and political 
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courage of men such as Kissinger. Kissinger had always insisted that as Security 
Adviser, he didn’t run a bureaucracy, so therefore, if the White House were to 
conduct any negotiation, it had to be done by a back channel. (Kissinger, 2000) When 
he was Secretary of State, he said that there was lack of a back channel and that the 
need for one was specifically made for President Nixon who could be in a difficult 
situation if there wasn’t one.  
 
President Nixon, who was very decisive and very capable of making big decisions, 
was not however capable  “...in overruling subordinates to their face, and therefore he 
found it very, very painful – in fact he found it, for all practical purposes, impossible - 
to tell a bureaucracy, I disagree with you, and you will do it my way." (Kissinger, 
1979) And thus a back channel had been set up precisely for the China negotiations to 
avoid that complication. 
  
William Burr in the Kissinger Transcripts however paints a different picture of the 
esteemed diplomat and downgrades the event as nothing more than a glorified photo-
op saying that the “symbolism of the initial opening of China aside, the transcripts 
suggest there was little substance in the US - Chinese relationship, which does seem 
more like a pantomime to impress the Soviets than a real partnership.” Reviewers 
such as Zellikow concur that indeed, only when Kissinger and Mao talked about the 
villainous Soviets could they find a truly engaging subject if only for a few minutes. 
In the end, the transcripts are more interesting for what they reveal about the Chinese 
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and the Soviets than about the better-known Dr. Kissinger (1999). 
  
Though much of the credit has been given to Henry Kissinger, which is not surprising 
because of the man’s impeccable savvy and diplomatic shrewdness, Nixon’s role, 
overshadowed later by the Watergate scandal that saw him resign from the White 
House, was also important, as his decisions (and solely made by him) laid the 
foundations of both America’s Asian foreign policies as well as Taiwan’s rise to 
power. So how exactly can we define Nixon’s role in this context and in the greater 
perspective of foreign-policy making by the United States and of his predecessors? In 
Robert Litwak’s very incisive and revealing book, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 
two very important foreign policy key words have been dissected, their greater 
significances explored beyond the historic Beijing visit. 
  
Litwak opens for discussion the conventional wisdom which holds that when 
President Richard M. Nixon came into office in January 1969, he already had in place 
the defined set of foreign-policy principles that later came to be known as the “Nixon 
Doctrine.” Records from the Department of State show a far different set of facts 
which also corroborate Kissinger’s statements about how the rapprochement came 
about; obviously, Nixon was going through the whole thing in a far more casual and 
spontaneous manner than anyone had initially thought. 
  
Within days of his inauguration, Nixon ordered that “every encouragement” be given 
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to speculation that the United States sought rapprochement with the PRC. Through 
Kissinger, Nixon issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 14, U.S. 
China Policy, on February 5, 1969. (3, 4,) Although these documents indicate that the 
original impetus for re-examining policy toward the PRC came from Nixon, 
Kissinger’s enthusiasm for a major initiative toward China grew rapidly (Department 
of Security, 2006). 
  
Further records from this period show the responses to this directive (NSSM 14) 
along with top level meetings that ultimately outlined the direction of US policies. 
The Department of State considered numerous strategies and various options—
Present Strategy, Intensified Deterrence and Isolation, or Reduction of PRC’s 
Isolation and Points of US-PRC Conflict”—but ultimately, all “ discussions tended to 
focus on how the United States could reduce tensions, and whether the PRC would be 
receptive to any initiative.” (DOS, 2006) In the midst of all these, Nixon and 
Kissinger were also playing delicate manoeuvres and diplomatic magic with Taiwan. 
  
From 1969 right up to the middle of 1971, things were going smoothly between the 
US and the ROC, but in the background things were brewing that threatened to blow 
the whole thing wide open. Foremost was the growing concern and unease of Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s government over the seeming lessening of hostilities between the US and 
the mainland. American security and defence departments persisted in their efforts to 
monitor and reduce the military build-up of the ROC.  
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When in 1969, information on the planned modification of travel and trade 
restrictions to the PRC came out, Rogers and Kissinger scrambled for damage control 
by assuring ROC leaders that “there had been no change in basic US policy toward 
Communist China.” Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 
Marshall Green, Ambassador to the ROC, Walter McConaughy, and Rogers met 
separately with ROC leaders to explain the lessening of US-PRC tensions and the end 
of the Taiwan Strait patrols. Kissinger also met with the ROC Ambassador to the 
United States, Chow Shu-Kai. (DOS, 2006) 
  
During the Warsaw Talks in early 1970, Nixon assured Chiang that meetings with 
PRC officials would not in any way affect US Defence commitments to Taiwan. But 
things were definitely not going the way they had before as more diplomatic 
complications arose. When the United States grudgingly accepted the admission of 
Taiwanese dissident Peng Ming-Min into the country, the ROC wasted no time in 
accusing America of explicitly supporting the Taiwanese independence movement 
even as Kissinger and the Department of State defended the move on the grounds of 
the US having no legal basis for refusing entry.  
  
When Chiang Kai-shek’s son, the then Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo visited the US 
and met with Nixon in 1970, he raised concerns over the Warsaw talks and expressed 
the general sentiment of the ROC that US attention was diverted to Southeast Asia to 
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the detriment of ROC security. He also spoke with Kissinger and Defence Secretary 
Melvin R. Laird about the issue of army weapons and unequivocal American support 
in this regard (Kimball, 2006) 
  
Still, the tensions grew as more eye-opening developments seemed to signal an 
inevitable American rapprochement with the PRC. One issue was the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan and the final disposition of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai in Chinese) 
Islands, which are located roughly between Okinawa and Taiwan. Ambassador Chow 
Shu-kai urged Nixon and Kissinger to state publicly that any Japanese-American 
treaty would not prejudice ROC claims to these small islands (Kimball, 2006). 
  
By and large, there seemed to be no stopping the inevitable, and records released by 
the State Department detailing the days and events leading up to Nixon’s trip to 
Beijing showed how and where Taiwan fitted in the scheme of things. 
  
One of the most interesting transcripts prepared for this volume from the White House 
tapes covers a long conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on the eve of the 
February trip to the PRC. (192) Kissinger remarked that the Chinese are “just as 
dangerous (as the Russians). In fact they’re more dangerous over an historical 
period.” This fascinating discussion touched upon almost all aspects of Sino-
American relations and the US role in East Asia. Nixon made clear his concerns over 
appearing to abandon the ROC or reduce its presence in East Asia (DOS, 2006) 
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Through this difficult time, Kissinger was always indispensably on Nixon’s side and 
in a memorandum that he prepared for the president titled “Mao, Zhou and the 
Chinese Litmus Test”, he urged that Nixon to show “seriousness and reliability” in 
talks with the PRC leaders, revealing exactly not only his influence, but incisive 
perception of the situation (Kissinger, 1979) 
  
All throughout the discussions with Zhou, the issue of the ROC remained constant. 
Continuing where Kissinger had left off, Nixon affirmed the belief that the war in 
Southeast Asia was connected to the US presence in Taiwan and reiterated the 
assurance made by Kissinger that two-thirds of the US forces on the island could be 
reduced or totally removed if it would take that to resolve the war. Knowing full well 
by that time the possible repercussions of the communiqué, Nixon played up the 
tension drama further; “what we say here may make it impossible for me to deliver on 
what I can do.” Nixon claimed that three groups wanted his trip to China to fail: those 
on the left because they wanted better relations with the Soviets; those on the right 
who for “deeply principled ideological reasons” wanted to support the ROC; and 
supporters of India who feared Sino - American détente. (CRS, 2006) 
  
But the die had been cast and as for the PRC, Zhou’s statements in the official 
declassified transcripts show a certain cryptic-ness typical of the Chinese, but hinting 
at the PRC’s future dealings with its so-called renegade province. However, as Zhou 
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stated on the final day of Nixon’s trip, “That is, we being so big, have already let the 
Taiwan issue remain for 22 years, and can still afford to let it wait there for a time. 
Although the issue of Taiwan is an obstacle to the normalization of our relations, yet 
we are not rushing to make use of the opponents of your present visit and attempt to 
solve all the questions and place you in an embarrassing position.” (NSA, 2006) 
 
More revealing, and affirming the analysis of many on the right, was a memorandum 
by President Nixon to his top men (Rogers and Kissinger) which emphasised “the 
need to avoid public speculation over the impact of the trip to the PRC, and “there 
should be no further elaboration” on the communiqué, particularly those sections 
related to Taiwan.”(Nixon, 1990) 
  
Inevitably in the days that followed, the United States sought to effect damage control 
over the effects of the secret meeting, in particular with Taiwan, although the tone 
was now that of what was done was done. Nixon himself hinted as much in a meeting 
with the American Ambassador to the ROC Walter McConaughy when he instructed 
him to tell the Taiwanese leadership that the US would continue favourable ties with 
the ROC. In typical counterpart fashion, Kissinger made his own moves when he met 
ROC Ambassador to the US James Shen to offer America’s continued support saying 
that, “nothing in his tenure in the White House had been more painful to him than 
what had occurred (the secrecy over Dr. Kissinger’s trip to Beijing and the 
announcement of the President’s visit).” But after all has been said and done, the final 
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analysis seemed to be agreement and that according to Nancy Tucker, “their promises 
were bigger, their compromises more thoroughgoing, and their concessions more 
fundamental than they believed the American people would readily accept.” (2005) 
  
At the end of the day, what became more prominent was not the persuasive and 
diplomatic suaveness of the Beijing brokers, nor of an issue made out to be so urgent 
as to possibly threaten or provoke another tension-filled crisis, but of a deception 
made to cover what ultimately turned out to be vested interests. To Nixon and 
Kissinger, the overarching geopolitical significance of a relationship with China 
justified eliminating all intervening obstacles. Thus the effort to replace an established 
relationship with the Republic of China in favour of an exciting new tie with a more 
exotic mainland China progressed in secret, involving a minimum of staff to provide 
analysis. The pace was gruelling, and the focus relentlessly on Beijing. (Tucker, 2005) 
  
In truth, Nixon and Kissinger hardly worried about the ROC leadership under Chiang 
Kai-shek; documents and records show that most of the actions taken to assuage 
Taiwan were simply nothing more than bland assurances. But at the end of the day, 
what really matters was how the people of the Republic of China felt about the events 
and of how it shaped their lives and the direction of their future endeavours. For most 
impassioned Taiwanese, their bitterness over the events was tinged not with absolute 
anger, but by a clear understanding of their position in the context of ever changing 
political currents, now swirling on a global scale. 
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The “creative ambiguity” of the Shanghai Communiqué, was the way in which the 
Beijing authorities were recognised as the government representing China, but in 
which the United States stated that it “acknowledged” the Chinese position, that there 
was but one China, and that Taiwan was part of China (New Taiwan, 2006) 
  
There was a clarification in the wording of the communiqué; did it mean that the US 
“recognised” that Taiwan was part of China? The answer seemed to be an 
unequivocal, no, because the US simply took note of the Chinese position but did not 
state its own position in the matter (NT, 2006).The consensus however and events 
after 1972 showed that this distinction did not particularly matter anymore in the 
sense that if American actions are to be taken as an indication, the position was an 
outright rejection of recognition. But Taiwan has obviously moved on and has 
disregarded at least in principle any binding connections or communiqués with either 
the US or China pointing out in regard to those made without the proper 
representation of the people of Taiwan, such arrangements were moot.  
  
The Taiwanese were proud to point out that they have made a very successful 
transition towards a very healthy democratic system. There was much agreement and 
pride that the new and democratic Taiwan “does not want to be a part of a repressive, 
dictatorial, and corrupt China, but cherishes its own Taiwanese identity, language, 
culture, and newfound political freedom and that this new nation wants to find its own 
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place under the sun, [and] contribute not only economically, but also politically to the 
international community.” (New Taiwan, 2006) 
  
When the PRC celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1999, the ROC did not miss the 
opportunity to also celebrate its 50th anniversary on Taiwan, noting the significance of 
the fact that for over the past half-century, “order has been maintained in the Taiwan 
Strait through the "American model of peace" (the 1972 system), supported by the 
US-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty, the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 and the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979.” (Wakabayashi, 1999) 
  
While recognising the constant desire by mainland China to shake things up a bit with 
them, the Taiwanese have pointed out striking parallels in the fates of the two, 
pointing out that “while successful commercialisation has raised China's economic 
status in the international community, a reality that China cannot ignore is that 
Taiwan's 10-year-old democracy has gradually been asserting itself in the 
international political arena” (Wakabayashi, 1999)  
 
And this is something that the PRC and the rest of the international community cannot 
ignore, least of all the United States which may have abandoned the ROC at a time 
when the PRC factor weighed heavier, but in some ways retained crucial links in 
recognition of the ROC’s importance in the region as being vital to future American 
interests. However, the US did not abandon its promise to defend Taiwan. In the 
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Shanghai Communiqué, the US advocated a “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue.” Despite its gradual termination of direct military aid to Taiwan in the 1970s, 
the US steadfastly upheld its promise to provide military technology. After severing 
formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the US used the Taiwan Relations Act as a 
policy basis for selling "defensive weapons" to Taiwan (Wakabayashi, 1999) 
  
The transformation across the Taiwan Strait began almost immediately, although the 
'status quo' then and until today remains unchanged. The argument is that the so-
called US model of peace was a double-edged sword; the rapprochement may have 
appeased fears for the PRC, but that in “maintaining only "civic relations" with 
Taiwan, the international community also denied the statehood of the KMT's colonial 
regime on Taiwan. Even so, the PRC has never actually ruled Taiwan because of the 
US promise of indirect defence.” (Wakabayashi, 1999) 
  
The contradiction even extends as far as to the US policy of "peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan issue", which has indefinitely postponed an end to the civil war, which 
was actually the Chinese Communist Party's expectation and that while the 
international community overwhelmingly abandoned the lie of "the PRC not being 
China's legitimate government," it also imposed the false appearance of the ROC on 
Taiwan not being a state.” (Wakabayashi, 1999) 
  
But beyond whatever political contradictions or mysteries the agreement may present, 
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one thing was certain, and that is the fact that after 1972 Taiwan was spurred to 
unprecedented growth on all fronts, social, political and economic. Politically, there 
was a plenty of experimentation and change; Chiang Kai-Shek’s son, Chiang Ching-
Kuo, for one, tried a form of limited democratization which held elections for 
representation; this was a means of coping with the repercussions of the Beijing visit. 
  
There was also effort by the Nationalist government to adopt a thoroughly Taiwanese 
identity and to appoint personnel and bureaucrats in the government whose Chinese 
ancestors had arrived in Taiwan before 1945. But the democratization process really 
began in the late 1980s when President Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted martial law, thus 
enlarging the democratic landscape of the country. His death and the subsequent 
assumption of a leader Lee Teng-Hui whose lineage belonged to early immigrants to 
Taiwan meant that things had come full circle. 
  
On the economic side, a much heavier impact on Taiwan’s fledgling economy was not 
from the repercussions of the Beijing visit, but the first energy crisis which became 
the catalyst of a worldwide recession, raising inflation to record levels. In the ROC, 
commodity prices soared, as shortages of food and industrial raw materials added to 
the country's woes. Although commodity prices did not increase as much during the 
second energy crisis in 1979 as they did during the first, it still produced an adverse 
impact on economic growth (GIO, 2006) 
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Relying on its ingenuity, the government tried to deflect the impact of the energy 
crisis by setting up a heavy chemicals industry through the Twelve Major 
Construction Projects. Internal economic reforms and changes were implemented to 
boost foreign trade; these included lifting many trade restrictions, lowered tariffs, 
setting up of a unitary exchange rate, and abolishing the required permits for remitting 
money abroad. In 1979, the foreign exchange rate system went from a fixed rate to a 
floating rate, while controls on interest rates were loosened the next year (GIO, 2006) 
It was ironic that the period between 1963 and 1980, also the most turbulent 
politically, considered as having witnessed the most economic rapid growth in the 
history of Taiwan and that regardless of the successive energy crises, annual growth 
rates had been hovering at over 10 percent annually in a sustained decade long run.  
  
The 80s became pivotal in a whirlwind of economic, social, and political changes 
highlighted by a surprising renewal of relations with the mainland as Taiwan’s 
economy became more and more open, shedding restrictive and protectionist policies 
and trends. In 1984, the fist steps towards genuine openness happened when the ROC 
leadership laid the groundwork for both the globalization and liberalization of the 
economy. This was marked by the abolition of interest-rate controls, the slashing of 
tariff rates and the doing away of a central exchange rate. 
 
With the establishment of the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park in 1981, Taiwan 
established a strong foundation for the industrial development which would later 
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prove to be its strongest point, with the following years seeing several more strategic 
developments in this area; in1990, the Statutes for the Encouragement of Investment 
were allowed to expire and in 1991, the Statutes for Industrial Upgrading were 
adopted (GIO, 2006) 
  
ROC foreign-exchange reserves ballooned to stratospheric levels because of the rapid 
growth of trade and of its attendant surpluses, reaching beyond the US$ 70 billion 
level. But because there weren’t enough provisions and channels to push these 
reserves into appropriate investment areas, the buoyed up stock market finally peaked 
and burst, exacerbated by inflated real-estate markets, the black market and unabated 
gambling. This resultant appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar against the US dollar 
meant lower competitiveness among small and medium sized companies and 
businesses that saw the practicality of finding other areas with more stable business 
climates. This proved to be another turning point for Taiwanese, who quickly 
understood the need for drastic measures to turn the industrial sector around as the 
landscape shifted. 
  
Labour-intensive industries were no longer the mainstay of the industrial sector and 
were slowly being replaced by technology- and capital-intensive industries. This 
transformation of Taiwan's industrial structure stemmed in part from global economic 
trends at that time. The government's plans for technological development toward the 
end of the 1970s, which led to the establishment of the Hsinchu Science-based 
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Industrial Park in 1981, also played a hand in this transformation (GIO, 2006) 
  
It was this same innovative industrial park that made the smart move of recruiting 
highly skilled Chinese who lived overseas to return to Taiwan for work, thus 
effectively using their technological talents to developing what would later become 
the country’s globally competitive strongholds in the electronics and information 
industries. To illustrate all these in numbers: in terms of production value, the ratio of 
light industries to heavy chemical industries, respectively, was 51.52 percent to 48.48 
percent in 1986. In 1995, the output of the light industries dropped to only 33.63 
percent, while the heavy chemical industries' share rose to 66.37 percent (GIO, 2006). 
 
It is important to note the year 1987 not only because socially, martial law was lifted 
giving voice to a wide variety of social complaints and grievances that needed airing, 
but also because it was the year that saw the start of civilian contacts with the Chinese 
mainland. 
  
In 1987, the ROC government announced that Taiwan residents could visit their 
relatives on the Chinese mainland, an event that led to growing private exchanges 
between the two sides. By 1996, Taiwan's business sector had invested US$6 billion 
on the mainland, according to the ROC's official records. However, according to 
Beijing's statistics, the figure surpassed US$20 billion (GIO, 2006) 
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It would seem therefore that in the politics of economics, the stronger voice would be 
the voice of need, and judging by the numbers from investments made in the 
mainland by the private sector, cross-strait trade will continue regardless of any 
political turbulence. Ironically, all the investment and trading with the mainland has 
effectively decreased the value of the same business with the United States. 
 
“Over the last three years, Taiwan has registered trade surpluses with Hong Kong: this 
surplus amounted to US$19.73 billion in 1994, US$24.26 billion in 1995, and 
US$25.1 billion in 1996. A major part of the exports were actually destined for the 
Chinese mainland through Hong Kong.” (GIO, 2006) 
  
What could have been perceived as hindrances to one’s growth to prosperity have 
even become assets that worked to Taiwan’s advantage. Take the case of the ROC’s 
exclusion from the United Nations which meant that it could also not participate or 
take advantage of World Bank programs, not that it needs them. It doesn’t! 
  
Because of this Taiwan had to beef up its foreign reserves to be able to demonstrate 
that it could do business on a scale demanded by stringent global standards and as a 
result, “more than 100 nations have established trade and cultural ties with Taiwan, 
proving that having extensive foreign-exchange reserves helps demonstrate 
commanding solid financial power.” Substantial foreign reserves also ensured 
protection for the domestic market should any emergency arise, and, more 
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importantly, it does away with expensive foreign loans that have become the bane of 
most countries at the mercy of World Bank grants. 
  
The Taiwanese would hate to boast, but comparisons with the United States in 
economic achievements cannot be avoided even as the memories of the surprise 
Beijing visit seem to be hazy. By the end of the 1980s, the United States had already 
become the number one debtor nation in the world, despite its outstanding economic 
achievements. Meanwhile, the ROC has not accumulated much foreign debt. In 1986, 
the ROC's foreign debts stood at roughly US$4 billion; however, by 1987 this figure 
had already been reduced to US$1.4 billion (GIO, 2006) 
 
But more than figures, the Taiwanese would rather hinge their prosperity on good old-
fashioned hard work and dedication. It couldn’t be helped however that the Taiwanese 
have achieved a level of prosperity that arouses envy in the length of time it took to 
achieve it. 
  
In Taiwan today, 85 percent of people own their own homes. In terms of penetration 
of major home appliances such as television sets and telephones, Taiwan has almost 
reached the same level as England and the United States, with just about every single 
household possessing such luxuries. The number of households in Taiwan that own 
automobiles and personal computers is also rising, and is expected to reach the level 
of the developed world in less than ten years. (GIO, 2006) 
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Through all these, Taiwan was keen on sharing its economic development experience 
with the rest of the world. Without so much criticism, it cited the way the United 
States tried to impose its own methods, which when tested against Taiwan’s fell short 
of guarantees in the sense that while the US was a country of numerous resources and 
riches, it never really had the important context of struggling through poverty and 
near impossible hardship. 
  
Japan may make a pitch for its own success-story, and while the Japanese are much 
vaunted for their precise management skills, their rigid cultural casting makes them 
virtually impossible to emulate. But even as progress may have been pegged and the 
formula almost perfected, an economy is still subject to the flux of time with all of its 
twists and turns, not all of them quite positive.  
  
Today, like most affluent countries, Taiwan has to import labour and this has become 
expensive and socially problematic. On this front, it has pegged its strategy of using 
smarter technology and techniques to overcome the labour problem. The natural 
environment has proven to be a daunting obstacle simply because as a small island, 
Taiwan’s geographical profile has raised concerns over natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and typhoons and resultant damage like erosion and flooding, which 
threaten its agriculture and aquaculture production. 
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On the issues of trade, mainland China again presented a double-edged sword as 
concerns were raised over further liberalisation of imports which would literally flood 
Taiwan with products from the mainland, and over the direction of outward 
investments which has pitted manufacturers against government policy makers. The 
general sentiment on this issue was that “clearly, government and industry need to 
work together to reach a consensus that balances national security with economic 
development.”  
  
Again, social factors like population growth accompanied imbalances on the labour 
front as the proportion of people under the age of 18 continued to decrease, with a 
higher percentage of older people. This of course might result in an unfavourable 
situation where a majority of dependent people rely on a minority of productive 
people. On the issue of economic partnerships with other countries, the equation 
changed when the game was no longer one on one. With economic regions such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) 
shaping up all over the world, analysts are pointing out that Taiwan’s membership in 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum might raise some questions 
when Beijing raises its own questions. 
  
This again brings the whole discussion back to the One-China policy and how it 
continues to exert enormous unseen forces in the interplay of political, social and 
economic movements in the East Asian region. This is despite the call that if Taiwan, 
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Hong Kong, Macau, and the Chinese mainland can all put aside their political 
differences and work together toward enhancing economic interaction and realising 
their potential to support each other, they will be able to drive the continued economic 
development of the Asia-Pacific region. 
  
According to a CRS Report made for Congress on the current status quo of the One-
China policy made last September, 2006, the same issues remain at best, enigmatic 
and still unresolved. The report sums it up as despite “consistent statements in over 
three decades, the “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat 
ambiguous and subject to different interpretations.” Perhaps this was the way it was 
designed.  
  
Aside from the main question of whether the “one China” policy is still ideologically 
alive given the redefined contextual position it now occupies, the report also notes 
that much of the confusion and issues have arisen from the succession of American 
presidents after Nixon and whether they “have stated clear positions and have 
changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. vital interests in peace and stability” 
(CRS, 2006) 
  
In a 2005 article in the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger himself cited this same 
ambiguity, saying that “the relationship between the United States and China is beset 
by ambiguity. On the one hand, it represents perhaps the most consistent expression 
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of a bipartisan, long-range American foreign policy.” He goes on to say, however, 
that “seven presidents have affirmed the importance of cooperative relations with 
China and the US commitment to a One-China policy -- albeit with temporary detours 
at the beginning of the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.”  
  
Kissinger made a pitch to the Bush administration when he mentioned that President 
Bush and his foreign-policy people have compared the current state of relations with 
China as equalling that when Kissinger brokered the Beijing visit in 1971 and that 
heads of state of both countries plan to make future reciprocal visits for various issues 
and forums. But of course, it is not surprising that Kissinger would still be praising 
the fruits of Beijing in 1971. He even manages to turn the ambivalence around and 
attribute it to others; various officials, members of Congress and the media for 
attacking China's policies, from the exchange rate to military build up; he describes 
“much of it [as being] in a tone implying China is on some sort of probation. To 
many, China's rise has become the most significant challenge to US security.” 
(Kissinger, 2005) But even if it isn’t, as present events would prove that the PRC is 
more concerned over containing the problems brought about by its burgeoning 
economy, Kissinger plods on, reiterating his own rhetoric of 50 years ago, updated 
yes, but still the same. 
  
It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it 
the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was heir to an 
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imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, 
projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the centre of Europe (Kissinger, 
2005) He makes the assurance that after all is said and done, “the challenge China 
poses for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be political and economic, 
not military.” 
  
On the issue of Taiwan, he says categorically that the “problem of Taiwan is an 
exception and is often invoked as a potential trigger. This could happen if either side 
abandons the restraint that has characterised US - Chinese relations on the subject for 
over a generation. But it is far from inevitable. Almost all countries -- and all major 
ones -- have recognised China's claim that Taiwan is part of China.” (Kissinger, 2005) 
  
So what does this mean? A perpetual unresolved issue until such time that one gives 
in: which is asking for the impossible. And this is regardless of business as usual on 
all sides, to which Kissinger notes that “ despite substantial US arms sales to Taiwan, 
Sino-American relations have steadily improved based on three principles: “American 
recognition of the One-China Policy and opposition to an independent Taiwan; 
China's understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and is 
prepared to vindicate that principle; restraint by all parties in not exacerbating 
tensions in the Taiwan Strait.” (Kissinger, 2005) 
  
Kissinger’s suggestion is as revealing as it is accurate; the answer for now is “to keep 
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the Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework.” He then cites the recent visits to 
Beijing by the heads of two of Taiwan's three major parties as possible forerunners 
and that talks on reducing the build up in the Taiwan Strait seem feasible. And again, 
similar to the same attitude he displayed in Beijing in 1971, Kissinger is really more 
worried about the prospects of decisions made by China on the political and economic 
front and of its effects on the world. Taiwan and the issue of the One-China policy 
may have to wait on the diplomatic sidelines, suspended in foreign policy limbo. But 
even as these sentiments may seem impatient in calling for a re-definition of One-
China in light of Taiwan’s amazing and profound transformation from 
authoritarianism to democracy, the decision still lies not  on the US, but on the main 
players themselves, the PRC and the ROC. 
 
In Stanton Jue’s commentary for the AmericaDiplomacy.org he says quite succinctly, 
“that neither the PRC nor the ROC has ever retreated from the notion that Taiwan is 
part of China, and its claim of sovereignty over the island is not in dispute.” (2006) 
  
Beijing emphasised it again by saying that “the Adherence to the principle of one 
China is the basis and premise for peaceful reunification. China’s sovereignty and 
territory must never be allowed to suffer [a] split. We must firmly oppose any words 
or actions aimed at creating an independent Taiwan and the propositions which are in 
contravention of the principle of one China.” (Jue, 2006) 
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One-China Policy – Taiwan and the United States 
Indeed, the One-China Policy has been around for more than three decades now and 
the American government remain firm in its stand that “the United States 
acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge 
that position” (Tkacik 2002). This declaration has been a mantra for every US 
president since Nixon. Perhaps because people believed that if they say it often 
enough then it would someday become true and that all issues surrounding it would 
just vanish into thin air. In addition, the US administration has also consistently 
mentioned and stated in numerous press releases that the US will not support any 
movement or plan by Taiwan intended for the purpose of obtaining their 
independence and freedom from mainland China even if they have sworn to assist and 
to come to Taiwan’s defence should the need arise through the Taiwan Relations Act 
of 1979. However, one thing is for sure through the years and that is the One China 
Policy has evolved with time and with the circumstances surrounding not only the US 
and China but also Taiwan. For instance, this declaration has developed and advanced 
to cover three new related areas such as sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait 
dialogue. 
 
With regards to sovereignty, the US has never openly expressed its stand about 
Taiwan. In fact, in 1972 when the One-China Policy was first declared and made 
public, the US government still had certain inklings that it still recognised the 
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Republic of China in Taiwan as the legal government and representative of China. 
The shift in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC only formally occurred 
in 1979 as documented in the Normalisation Communiqué which was signed and 
declared on January 1. To further reiterate and reinforce these declarations, a later 
communiqué concerning arms sales was announced on August 17, 1982, stating in 
plain black and white that the US did not have any intention of pursuing the idea of 
having “two Chinas”, “One-China, One-Taiwan” or even the “One-China, two 
systems” (Kan 2001). Likewise, American presidents from Nixon onwards have 
released statements saying that the Taiwan issue is an internal matter, meaning that it 
should be left or set aside for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to 
resolve. The matter is not on the hands of the US and they are not supposed to meddle 
in “internal” affairs because there is another passage in the Shanghai Declaration, to 
the effect that neither the US nor China should interfere with the affairs of the other. 
Furthermore, the Taiwan Relations Act did not make any mention of the One-China 
Policy. 
 
In January 1979, the Carter Administration directly recognised China as the sole and 
legitimate government across China. It also broke official diplomatic ties with 
Republic of China on Taiwan. Along with the proclamation, the US government 
maintained three important points that would be used as basis for future relations with 
Taiwan.  According to them, although the US recognised the People’s Republic of 
China as the sole representative of the Chinese people in the international arena, it 
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would still continue to maintain its commercial, cultural and non-governmental ties 
with Taiwan.   
 
Although the Carter administration had decided to break diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
supporters of Taiwan in Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. 
According to the TRA, United States would maintain friendly ties with Taiwan to a 
certain extent, if only to foster commercial, economic and cultural growth with each 
other.  Included in the TRA is the stand of the US government that it would exert 
every possible effort in maintaining peace within the region, and protect the 
Taiwanese people from any entity who may jeopardize its social and economic 
systems. 
 
Although the US would continue sales of arms to Taiwan to make it self-sufficient in 
defending its territory, it would be the duty of any US President and Congress to 
determine the quality and nature of arms they may provide the Republic of China. 
 
President Ronald Reagan and Arms Sales - During his administration, the issue of 
defence sales by America to Taiwan became very prominent.  Somehow, it also shook 
slightly the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. 
President Reagan continually assured President Deng of the PRC that US still adhered 
to One-China Policy. The PRC Government, on the other hand, felt ambiguity on the 
part of US when it continually assured Taiwan about their implicit diplomatic ties. 
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This was due to the “six assurances” made by President Reagan in 1982. The six 
assurances included: “the US would not set a date for ending arms sales with Taiwan; 
would not hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; would not 
play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; would not revise the TRA of 
1979; has not changed its position regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan and; would 
not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.” Later, President Reagan 
added that such decisions were due, in part, to the peaceful ways the PRC chose to 
resolve its problems with Taiwan. It was also noted that although the PRC claimed 
that it would not use force against Taiwan, the US would not lower its guard against 
the PRC regarding the ROC. Any inconsistencies on the part of China would be 
brought to attention of Taiwan’s President if and when the US believed that the PRC 
was not being true to its word, and the US would stand up for Taiwan. 
 
The Chinese government, however, had some doubts. President Reagan finally said 
that the US had continually adhered to the US - PRC Communiqué of January 1979. 
Having said that, the President pointed out that US would continually acknowledge 
that there was one China and Taiwan was a part of it. The sales of arms to Taiwan 
would be dependent on the perceived needs of Taiwan as assessed by the President of 
the United States. To assuage Chinese doubts regarding arms sales, the United States 
would gradually decrease sales of arms to Taiwan. 
 
President George H.W. Bush Administration - During the administration of President 
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G.H.W Bush, Taiwan spoke out vehemently about the One-China Policy. 
Accordingly, Taipei embraced that fact that the ROC is the de jure government over 
all China as a nation ruled by ROC, it was established as a republic in 1911. It 
continued to have jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It recognised 
itself as part of China, the same way that Mainland China, in itself, is a part of the 
ROC’s China. The PRC, meanwhile, maintains its stand that it is the sole 
representative of Chinese people in the international arena.   
 
In 1992, in spite of the previous stand by President Reagan to gradually decrease 
weapons sales to Taiwan, President G.H.W Bush sold 150 F-16A/B aircraft to 
Taiwan. According to him, selling those articles of defence was a means for Taiwan 
to maintain its ability to protect itself and maintain peace in their area. It was also an 
extension of United States’ aims of maintaining order in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Conversely, he stressed that he as the representative of American people, was just 
being true to both the One-China Policy and the 1982 Sales of Arms Communiqué. 
He remained firm that there was only one China; the PRC.  However, the 1982 
Communiqué on the sale of arms to Taiwan stated that he, as the president, may 
decide whatever articles of defence may be sold to Taiwan, provided Taiwan used 
them to promote peace and stability in the area. 
 
Clinton’s Administration - It was during President Clinton’s administration that 
attempts to conduct diplomatic talks between Taiwan and China were initiated. They 
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were conducted in 1993 in Singapore.  Delegations from both parties came to discuss 
their concerns about the One-China Policy. During their talks, the PRC had been 
adamant in its stand that it is the sole legitimate government that may represent its 
people internationally. Although peaceful negotiations were their first option in 
resolving their domestic problems, it would not hesitate to use military means just to 
assure peace and order within its area. 
 
Taiwan, on the other hand, used the historical fact that the Republic of China had 
been an independent state since 1911. It argued that the issue between China and 
Taiwan was not an issue of disparity between two different countries. However, it did 
not trivialise the matter as a domestic dispute. It adapted the term “political entity” a 
rather neutral representation of how it views the two sides. It may be equated to a 
country or political organisation.   
 
In 1993, Taiwan attempted its bid for United Nations representation. The Republic of 
China argued that since Taiwan and Mainland China have separate political systems 
in their respective territories, it was only just to represent their people and allow them 
to participate in the activities of the international community.  However, Taiwan’s bid 
was denied. 
 
In 1994, Washington issued a statement about the PRC - ROC talks.  The United 
States remained adamant that it remained true to its word with China. That is, they 
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recognized that there was one China as the sole legitimate government of the Chinese 
people but they are also being true to the ROC as required by the TRA of 1979; they 
have only conducted relations with Taiwan to maintain cultural, commercial and 
unofficial ties. All transactions are said to be non-governmental. The US also 
applauded the dialogue between China and Taiwan and that they had tried their best to 
maintain peace and order in both their countries despite their adamant stands. 
However, they would still continue to supply adequate quality and quantity defensive 
arms to Taiwan so it could maintain its ability to sufficiently defend itself from any 
other nation.  Conversely, US would not allow legislative visits from leaders of 
Taiwan to the US. 
 
Although the US did not agree with Taiwan’s bid to be a United Nations member, 
they would support Taiwan in its attempt to be a member of any international 
organization that did not require statehood. Accordingly, it was a good opportunity for 
Taiwan to cultivate their cultural and commercial systems and in despite such a stand; 
the US maintained its position of not interfering with the dialogue between the two 
countries and would not pressure either of them to arrive immediately at a resolution 
to their conflict.   
 
The United States’ stand was greatly tested when President Lee of the Republic of 
China requested a USA visa to allow him to attend an alumni reunion event at Cornell 
University where he had obtained his doctorate.  President Clinton reiterated that they 
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would allow such visits provided that President Lee agreed to them being 'unofficial 
visits' as a private citizen, and not as the head of the ROC. According to this, by 
granting Lee a visa, they still have remained true to the TRA of 1979. In relation to 
this, the US sent a secret letter to President Jiang Zemin of the PRC indicating the 
US’s stand and reassuring China that the US: “will continue to oppose Taiwan’s bid 
for independence; will not support two Chinas – one China, one Taiwan; will not 
support Taiwan’s admission to United Nations.”(CRS Report on One-China Policy, 
2006) 
 
In August 1998, the newly elected president of Taiwan, President Lee Teng-hui 
proclaimed that although there was one China, it was a divided China, the same 
situation as Korea, having a North Korea and South Korea; and the same as that of 
Germany and Vietnam in the past. The second Koo-Wang talks took place in the same 
year. Taiwan reiterated its stand that the status of China was that of a divided China 
and only when mainland China has achieved democracy could unification of China as 
a nation be fully considered. 
 
The delegation of President Jiang Zemin retained its position of “one China, two 
systems” across the straits. Its government would continue its efforts to achieve 
unification of Taiwan and the PRC. It was during this time when Taiwan became 
unyielding to the request by China to be unified. With such a stand, the government of 
the PRC became more vocal in emphasizing the fact that they might resort to military 
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force to subdue Taiwan in its continued efforts of insisting that it be represented as 
part of one divided China. 
 
President Clinton then emphasised that although the United States still followed the 
One-China Policy, it was also their duty to adhere to the TRA of 1979. Included in 
that bill is the fact that they may, too, have to exert extra-judicial means, such as 
military defense, to maintain peace within the region.  However, the President still 
hoped that both parties would not have to resort to military means to bring about the 
unification of mainland China and Taiwan. 
 
In August 1999, Taiwan proposed a “special-state-to-state” relationship between 
China and Taiwan. The paper reiterated that President Lee’s intention when he argued 
that the “one-Divided China idea” was not to cause chaos within the region, rather he 
only meant to present the true status of China and Taiwan. He professed that he still 
adhered to the One-China principle, as interpreted by the ROC. It was the PRC, not 
Taiwan which had abandoned its adherence to it when it became aggressively vocal 
about the possibility of exerting force in hastening unification.  However, Taiwan 
emphasized that although China was divided, the two sides were still independent and 
equal to one another, and therefore, a special state-to-state relationship might serve as 
a buffer to open doors for possible unification in the future.   
 
In October of the same year, the People’s Republic of China replied that as long as 
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Taiwan agreed to utilise peaceful negotiations with China about the unification issues, 
the PRC would not use force against it, but if and when there was be any form of 
foreign interference of Taiwan or if it continuously refused to be unified with China, 
then military force might be used to solve the issue. 
 
In May 2000, Taiwan’s President Chen clearly and firmly stated that he would not 
declare independence from China as long as the PRC would not use military force 
against Taiwan to bring about unification. He also gave a “pledge that during his term, 
[Taiwan] will not change its national title; will not push forth inclusion of the state-to-
state description in their constitution; and will not promote a referendum to change 
the status quo regarding the question of unification.” However, as I will give in more 
detail in a later chapter, Chen's real intention is to promote independence in Taiwan  
 
Of late, some of America’s presidents have used wordings that are quite confusing for 
the public and sometimes even for the Chinese and Taiwanese people. For example, 
statements and press releases have evolved such as when Nixon first made the 
declaration in 1972, he mentioned that there would be “no support” coming from the 
US when it came to the subject of Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty. The “no 
support” conception has changed to the use of the word “oppose”. For instance, it has 
been mentioned or quoted once or twice in print or in speech that the US opposes 
Taiwan independence. Of course, the word “oppose” gives a different meaning to the 
statement, thus, sparking new issues in world affairs. However, it is quite fortunate 
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that this did not go unnoticed for the US administration. Such wordings were 
apparently revised from the opposition viewpoint to a more neutral stance by using 
the word “non-support” or the phrase “no support”. 
 
The next key area that is now covered by the One-China Policy is that concerning the 
use of force. The PRC in mainland China had never relinquished its right to use force 
in the Taiwan issue, primarily because this issue has always been viewed and 
considered as an internal problem. However, the PRC had explicitly expressed and 
demonstrated their willingness to adopt and implement a military solution if they have 
to; this is because they have also declared a policy in 1979 which favours and pushes 
for a peaceful unification of Taiwan and China. 
 
This PRC policy further emphasises that should Taiwan refuse to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement, then the PRC would not have any other choice but to employ force in 
order to achieve unification; no definite deadline has been set, however, with regards 
to any ROC decision to merge with the PRC (Kan 2001). This policy had also warned 
the US that they should not sell or provide arms to Taiwan nor forge any form of 
alliance with Taiwan. This eventually led to another communiqué on the part of the 
US, this time concerning the selling of arms to Taiwan. This communiqué imposed 
the reduction of arm sales to Taiwan. However, the selling of arms would not be 
stopped but instead should continue in accordance to the Taiwan Relations Act. 
Perhaps it is worth noting in this paper that in spite of the Chinese policy and the 
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unofficial relations, the US arm sales made to Taiwan have been significant (Kan 
2001). They also have the option to increase the volume of arms supply as well as 
their defence support to Taiwan when ever the safety and security of the latter is 
threatened. This is as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act. Another part of this act 
states that the US may be allowed to adjust their military deployments in Asia if there 
is a need to. 
 
The third area that is now included under the One-China Policy is that concerning 
cross-strait dialogue. Ever since Nixon’s term and the Shanghai Declaration in 1972, 
all succeeding American presidents had followed the pattern, whether in print or in 
their speeches, of voicing their expectation that the Chinese people will eventually 
settle the issue concerning Taiwan (Kan 2001). At times, some of the presidents 
would make a promise to mediate between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC in 
Beijing but there was always the precaution that they will never force the ROC to 
negotiate and settle with the PRC; Taipei will negotiate if they want to and when they 
are ready to accept the state that the mainland allows them. So far, nothing fruitful has 
come from these promises and the stance that remains the most applicable and 
appropriate: that “the future of the cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and 
Taipei to resolve. No administration has taken a position on how or when they should 
do so” (Kan 2001). 
 
In addition, Taiwan has undergone a transition from a one party state ruled by the 
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Nationalists to a multi-party democracy. They do not support the One-China Policy, 
but instead treat such declarations and agreements especially those between that the 
US and Beijing as non-binding, ineffective, and of little relevance primarily because 
these were formulated and implanted without any consultation or even just minor 
representation from the people of Taiwan. 
 
The One-China Policy may have been pronounced in China but the people of Taiwan 
insisted that they did not have any participation in it, whether in the process of 
creation or during the declaration. The policy was primarily thought of and created “to 
keep China out of the Vietnam War, to counterbalance the Soviet Union with China, 
and to open the markets for America” (Kagan 2003). Ever since the One-China Policy 
declaration, the PRC has used almost all means that could to support and strengthen 
its claim that Taiwan is a province of China and that the Communist government has 
every right to control and preside over it (Kagan 2003). To further subdue the 
Taiwanese people and to ensure that Taiwan would be united with China, the Beijing 
administration has even reserved the right to use force against Taiwan should the 
latter decide to revolt and claim its independence from the former.  
 
Taiwan’s bid for International recognition and its stance in the Asian region 
There is no denying that Taiwan has tried every means to gain global recognition to 
be an independent nation. Taiwan has maintained internal sovereignty, independently 
maintaining control over its internal affairs. However, it lacks the advantage of being 
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able to negotiate treaties and trade agreements in the international arena. This is 
because it has not been recognised as an independent country from China, with 
separate political system and Constitution. In spite of this, it has maintained itself as 
an important entity in the business world, constantly trading with independent 
countries. 
 
There are only 27 countries with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations; 
however it still maintains substantive ties with over 140 countries and territories. 
Although their relations with others are informal, it never fails to extend assistance 
through the International Cooperation and Development Fund and the International 
Humanitarian and Relief Fund.   
 
According to ROC Government Information Office, Taiwan utilises four important 
strategies in developing its international ties. The Republic of China, Taiwan, 
establishes friendly relations with other countries by way of participating in programs 
for culture, economics, technology, agriculture, and fishing. Fishing had been one of 
the main industries of Taiwan, and by exchanging information about cultivation of 
different species of fishes for trade, Taiwan is able to promote itself and participate in 
non-governmental diplomatic ties with various trading nations. It also participates in 
foreign trade with countries like the Cayman Islands, the United States and Japan, 
usually promoting technological products, most specifically computer parts, to these 
countries.   
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Taiwan and the United Nations - Taiwan had been seeking a chance to become a 
member of the United Nations since the 1970’s. To date, it has attempted on 10 
occasions to become a member, however, each time it has been denied. Taiwan 
sought such membership to represent its 23 million people with their democratic 
government, legal system and foreign relations with other countries. However because 
of United Nations Resolution 2758, only the People’s Republic of China can be the 
sole representative of the Chinese community. This results in the Taiwanese being 
unrepresented in the deliberations over important social, economic and security issues 
concerning the people of the world. 
 
Taiwan and the World Trade Organisation - Taiwan became a member of the World 
Trade Organisation in January 2002. However, its attempts for membership date back 
to 1990. Its bid for membership had been a source of some debate among WTO 
members. The conflict arose when the member nations had to make a decision 
whether or not they would allow accession of Taiwan when they themselves adhere to 
the One China Policy since they are diplomatically tied with PRC.   
 
In 1992, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signatories indicated that 
Taiwan would only be allowed to become a member after the PRC became a member. 
In 1995, Taiwan was allowed to become a member of WTO, the day after China 
became a member. A clause of this agreement was to treat Taiwan as a “developed 
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economy”. As a developed economy, it will abide to stricter rules. 
 
Upon its accession to the WTO, Taiwan agreed to remove tariff barriers. The 
following are some of the laws Taiwan has to abide to to maintain WTO membership: 
Tariffs – simple tariffs for agricultural products dropped to 14% in 2002 from 20%.  
By 2007, the tariffs should be lowered to 12.9%. Taiwan also agreed to join the 
Uruguay Round zero-to-zero which eliminates tariffs on pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment, construction materials and equipment, toys, and information technology 
products.   
 
Services – Taiwan agreed to open entry of foreign professionals to work in Taiwan, to 
be part of the information technological sector, and retail and wholesale sectors. 
Intellectual Property Rights – Taiwan agreed to conform to WTO standards in terms 
of their national program for international property rights. 
 
Benefits of WTO to China and Taiwan - Taiwan and China have avoided direct 
political and economic links since 1950’s.  
 
The issue of sovereignty had hindered each country from strengthening diplomatic 
ties with another. However, since the ascension of the two countries to the WTO, each 
had benefited from following the rules that minimized tariffs between member 
countries. Accordingly, Taiwan’s exports to China have increased from $8.1 billion to 
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$39.1 billion in 2001. Imports from China on the other hand, increased to $7.6 billion. 
China, conversely, received minimal imports coming from Taiwan. It was primarily 
because of the bills placed by the Taiwanese government to minimise exports by 
Taiwan to China to decrease the level of Taiwanese economic dependency on the 
Chinese market. Trade between the two countries largely happens via Hong Kong. 
 
Although no direct and formal links between the two countries has occurred in the 
1990’s, nor until the early part of the 2000s, such interaction may eventually lead to 
better relations between the countries initially in the economic arena, and perhaps 
leading towards political stability. The international community, however, is watching 
on the sidelines as the countries continue trade indirectly. 
 
Taiwan and its Membership of Regional Organizations - Taiwan became a member of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, also known as APEC, in 1991, prior to its 
membership of the World Trade Organisation. This membership has allowed Taiwan 
to have substantial ties with the different leaders of the participant countries of APEC. 
Being an active member of APEC, it allowed Taiwan to visibly represent its cultural, 
commercial, and economic systems to other nation members. Another benefit of being 
a member of APEC is that it has managed to become familiar with the inner workings 
of being part of an international organisation. It has maintained substantial diplomatic 
relations with the different leaders of the participant countries, has opened numerous 
doors for communications with other governmental entities. APEC provided Taiwan 
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information about the different strategies these participant-countries employ in going 
about their economic ventures with other nations. It also increased the level of 
awareness in Taiwan of the current trends in management of trade structures. 
 
Taiwan took advantage of this membership by actively participating in different 
economic summits. It utilized this experience as leverage to pursue its membership of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) by working closely with leaders of participant-
members of WTO. 
 
Taiwan also actively participated in putting forward proposals to increase its degree of 
influence in APEC. It managed to win chairmanships of forums and groups and 
hosted APEC-related conferences in Taiwan. The contributions of Taiwan to APEC 
were: 
 
Agricultural Technical Cooperation, 1995 – Japan and Korea created the Osaka 
Action Agenda to promote discussions about the guidelines pertaining to agricultural 
liberalization affecting the development of the participant-countries. Taiwan proposed 
Agricultural Technical cooperation which later becomes included in the Economic 
Technical Cooperation portion of the Osaka Action Agenda. 
 
In 1996, Taiwan started a signature campaign within the participating countries about 
an information technology agreement. In 1998, Taiwan, along with New Zealand 
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shared chairmanship of the Agricultural Technological Cooperation section of the 
Osaka Action Agenda. In 1999, Taiwan managed to be Lead Shepherd of the Trade 
promotion working group and a converser of the Group on Services. It was also this 
year when it made a proposal that will greatly affect the venture capital investment of 
each member-participant country. The proposal was about promoting start up 
companies and venture capital investment as a way to promote economic recovery in 
the region. And in 2000, Taiwan put forward a proposal concerning e-commerce, 
entitled “Turning the Digital Divide into Digital Opportunity”. It advocates narrowing 
the gap between the more advanced nations in technological knowledge in E-
commerce and the technological delayed. It become one of the highlights of 2000’s 
APEC summit. 
 
President Lee of Taiwan has invested in substantial diplomatic ties the country has 
from countries within the Asia Pacific region. These countries included Thailand, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. President Lee’s efforts 
in shifting the political system of Taiwan to a democracy proved important in trading 
with these countries. Since Taiwan, in the meantime, can not be internationally 
recognized as an independent entity from China, President Lee’s programs for 
economic and investment relations indirectly supported its plans to be politically 
recognized by the countries it trades with. 
 
Although the program created by President Lee with other countries were in particular 
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targeting improved levels of economic stability for Taiwan, President Lee also aimed 
to decrease level of dependency of Taiwan upon the indirect economic links it had 
with China as they traded their products in Hong Kong . 
 
Taiwan and Indonesia - Indonesia had some level of hesitancy in maintaining strong 
diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China. Although it had been 
consistently abiding with the One-China Policy, its experience of the PRC in 1965 
when the PRC had allegedly staged a military coup against Sukarno managed to cause 
some level of distrust in the PRC government. Indonesia broke off its diplomatic ties 
with China, and they weren't restored until 1990.   
 
The democratic government of Taiwan made an impression upon the leaders of 
Indonesia as a lesser threat to its military defences, as compared with the capabilities 
of China to war against it, if and when some political upheaval between the two 
countries arises in the future. Both countries, Taiwan and Indonesia, took advantage 
of their strengths to foster the economic growth of both countries. 
 
Indonesia considers Taiwan a significant business partner in taking exports of their 
products such as natural gas and coal. Taiwan’s investments, on the other hand, 
centred mainly in trading the products of their pulp and paper industries, agricultural 
sectors and fisheries with Indonesia. Its relations with Indonesia were hampered 
temporarily in 1998 when anti-Chinese riots erupted. Although the target of these 
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groups were Chinese from the PRC, Taiwanese businessmen in Indonesia were also 
alarmed. The Taiwanese government advised its businessmen to limit transactions, 
temporarily, with Indonesia while talks about increased protections for its nationals 
were being held between the Taiwanese and Indonesian governments. In the long run, 
the president of Indonesia complied with the request, thereby elevating the level of 
economic relations between Taiwan and Indonesia to stronger substantial diplomatic 
ties. 
 
Taiwan and Malaysia - Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia regarded China as a better ally 
than its American counterpart. The stand of Malaysia during the administration of 
Prime Minister Mahathir was a by-product of the PM's personal stand regarding the 
quest for globalization by countries in the West. Such views reflected greatly upon the 
diplomatic relations of Malaysia and China. Although Mahathir proclaimed the 
country's loyalty to China, investment by China in Malaysia remained insignificant.   
 
Taiwan remained the most significant investor in Malaysia. Malaysia’s reservations in 
communicating and forging ties with the West stopped when they forged relations 
with Taiwan. Taiwan’s investment in Malaysia was in the manufacturing of computer 
parts. The reasons businessmen chose Malaysia to invest in for their computer 
manufacturing industries mainly centred on cheaper labour and market potential. 
Taiwan also forged links with small businessmen in the textile and chemical 
industries.     
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In 1998, President Lee visited Kuala Lumpur and communicated with Malaysian 
leaders. President Lee indicated the expansion of investment ventures by Taiwan with 
the Malaysians in spite of the then economic crisis in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Taiwan and the Philippines - Relations between China and the Philippines have been 
strained ever since China began loudly claiming Mischief Reef, an island within the 
Philippines EEZ. Mischief Reef was said to be an island with vast oil reserves. Such a 
move by the People’s Republic of China became a source of political stress in the 
country since the Philippines initially believed that the removal of US bases in their 
country would allow them to forge better relations with China. Since then, the country 
has participated in many legal and political disputes allowing the country’s military to 
train with their American counter parts via the Visiting Forces agreement. It was a 
way for the Philippines to gain help from the Americans if China chose to attack the 
Philippines over the Mischief Reef dispute. 
 
Its relations with Taiwan were more for the economic gains it received from the 
Taiwanese investments. The Philippines has continually exported their computer 
components products along with data processing parts and machinery to Taiwan. On 
the other hand, Taiwan tried to maximize the use of Subic Bay Freeport, which was 
once an American military base. The major investment by Taiwan in the Subic 
Freeport were from Acer, a computer-producing firm and Hokey, a firm that 
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manufactures plastic materials. Both countries benefited from the large number of 
Filipinos working in Taiwan as professionals and labourers in different industries.  
The remittances coming from the Filipinos in Taiwan contribute to the income of the 
worker's families bqack home in the Phillippines. As part of the continuing better 
economic relations between Taiwan and the Philippines, the administration of 
President Aquino tried passing a bill similar to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.  
 
Taiwan and Thailand - Thailand's relations with China have always been firm, and are 
a by-product of the past tributary relationship with China. However, this has not 
stopped Thailand from forging better economic relations with Taiwan. Thailand has 
been one of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region where Taiwan has invested 
heavily.  Thailand is attractive for Taiwan investment due to its cheap labour and its 
potential market for textiles and electrical appliances. 
  
Taiwan and Vietnam - Vietnam was once attacked by China in the 1970s.  It has 
experienced the capability of China to cause destruction for Vietnam and its people. 
This occurrence had forewarned the Vietnamese government to approach its 
diplomatic relations with China in a more guarded way. It managed within its 
government to limit its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  However, it did not limit it 
from economic dealings with Taiwan.  Vietnam’s investments came more from the 
Taiwanese businessmen. Ventures in computer and electronic parts production by 
Taiwanese had been committed to because of the cheap labour and low infrastructure 
 158
costs. 
 
Implications of One-China Policy for Taiwan  
Many suggest that the One-China policy for Taiwan is considered detrimental because 
it sets certain limitations on its range of options in East Asia. Every move that Taiwan 
makes such as applying for membership in international organisations and application 
for international aid such as that offered by the Red Cross or the World Health 
Organisation is likely to be hindered or set aside because these are oftentimes 
interpreted as an undermining of the One-China Policy. It may be understood that the 
term ‘One-China” has been coined perhaps as a sign of nationalism and the desire to 
unite all cities and provinces into one country; however, they had included Taiwan, a 
territory that has never been under the authority and governance of the Beijing 
administration.  
 
As such, according to Kagan (2003), the people of Taiwan have continuously 
implored the assistance of the US to help them convince Beijing why they should 
grant them their independence and sovereignty. Some reasons for this were cited as 
(Kagan 2003): “Taiwan could be a potential offshore base for independent 
technological and industrialised development that could also help in building the 
economy of the whole of China. The Taiwanese democracy may also prove to be a 
good and adequate model for Beijing’s own political modernisation. A free Taiwan 
could entail that it could share economic, intellectual, cultural, and political values 
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with Beijing. Taiwan is calling for an improvement in the status quo attributed to 
them by the Beijing administration because the Taiwanese deemed this to be 
destructive to their morale; instead, the Beijing government should give them what is 
due. As a form of gratitude and appreciation, the Taiwanese are willing to make an 
arrangement for Beijing to share and utilise their resources provided that these will be 
used solely for the purpose of developing China.”     
 
However, it is still too conceited to say that “One-China Policy” is detrimental and 
suggest that China is still in need of various improvements from the help of Taiwan at 
present, as suggested by Kagan (2003). Indeed, there may be flaws in the policy when 
it comes to Taiwan issue, but, it is still a great achievement by Nixon and Kissinger in 
ensuring peace at a troubled time. 
 
Also, Taiwan has always been seen as a victim in One-China Policy, however, it isn’t 
quite so. There is no doubt that the policy limited Taiwan’s options in the 
international arena but, Taiwan, on the other hand, had also benefited from the policy. 
The hostile relations between the Nationalists and the Communists on both sides of 
the Strait were more likely to have continued if the One-China Policy had not been 
established.  
 
Chiang Ching-Kuo took control of Taiwan after his father Chiang Kai-Shek's regime. 
Under his government, he started paying attention to the development of Taiwan. It is 
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common knowledge that Chiang Kai-Shek had never intended to develop the island, 
since he only regarded Taiwan as a base for possible reconquest of the mainland in 
the future. It was the build up of relationships between China and the US and the One 
China Policy that made that ambition impossible, and so his son decided to develop 
Taiwan. During this period, education for the people was increased. Taiwanese 
overseas were encouraged to return to Taiwan as national income increased. 
 
In 1987, martial law in Taiwan was lifted. This was perceived as a public declaration 
to change the ROC political system into a parliamentary one. One of the dissidents 
group, the Democratic Progressive Party, a united anti-Nationalist Party group was 
formed. This decision affected Taiwan’s political environment by opening doors to 
possible democratisation. 
 
In January 1988, Chiang Ching-Kuo died. It hastened the pace by which Taiwan 
became a full-fledged democratic state. Social movements and protests against the 
government became prominent occurrences in the society. During this period, the 
Taiwanese government allowed Chinese mainlanders to go back to China to visit their 
relatives. Another significant change during this time was when Taiwanese 
businessmen were allowed to invest in China. However, the government controlled 
the size of investments for fear of decreasing the rate of growth of Taiwan economy. 
Such liberties were emphasised among Taiwanese. This democratic government 
became the representative of Taiwan’s liberation from an authoritarian regime.  
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Taiwan may well have helped in developing the mainland during that period. 
However, it had already turned around 180 degrees. The Chinese economy and its 
development had caught up if not passed Taiwan, and it is Taiwan who needs the 
bigger Chinese market today to grow. One thing for sure is that the closer the 
relationship between Taiwan and the PRC, the better it may be for Taiwan.  
 
At present, the economic relationship between Taipei and Beijing has grown to 
significant levels. The effect of this is that it has convinced both sides to initiate 
discussions, but only through unofficial organisations. On the side, the US has 
constantly increased its demonstration of support for the cross-strait dialogues, 
continuously applauding the every bit of progress and development in the dialogues.                               
  
The biggest problem around the Taiwan issue remains in the consistent independent 
movement that is being used for political gain in Taiwan. Taiwanese politicians use 
the sense of identity and nationalism to gain support in Taiwan. The One-China 
Policy is being valued negatively by many in the island of Taiwan.   
 
The Cross-Strait issue under Chen Shui-Bian since 2000 – Chen’s pro-independence 
agenda  
Ever since their separation in 1949, Taiwan and China, despite their similar cultural 
background, have developed entirely different political and economic systems. 
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Democratisation and economic development have made the Taiwanese people believe 
that their identity is different from that of the PRC and have strengthened the island's 
already deep-rooted “Taiwanisation.” From Beijing’s perspective, the “Taiwan 
problem” is getting more serious and the newly elected DPP (Democratic Progressive 
Party) government has made the situation more uncomfortable than ever. Judging by 
the actions Chen Shui-Bian has taken, many PRC leaders doubt President Chen’s 
sincerity in working towards resolving the differences between the two sides to 
achieve a mutually compatible relationship.       
 
Before the 2000 presidential election, Beijing laid out China’s central positions. It was 
clear that Beijing would be willing to work with the new leader of Taiwan; however, 
it has never been Chen’s agenda to consider reunification and the “one country, two 
systems” policy, although he vowed that he would not claim independence during his 
term as President. Even though he had announced the “Five Noes” in his inauguration 
speech (520 speech); namely, no declaration independence, no change to the title of 
the nation, no pushing the inclusion of the “two states” description in the Constitution, 
no promotion of a referendum to change the status quo with regard to the question of 
independence or reunification, and no abolition of the National Unification Council 
and the Guidelines for National Unification (Rigger, 2005), his real intentions 
remained unclear.  
 
According to Sheng (2002), Chen is waiting to consolidate his power before he 
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becomes strong enough to stand up against Beijing’s reunification plan. Sheng (2002) 
points out that Chen made the “Five Noes” under two conditions. First, that Chen did 
not indicate his real stance on the “one China” principle – his “Five Noes” would only 
apply “during my term”, which does not specify what will happen after. Second, his 
“Five Noes” only stood for “as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use 
military force”. However, military force has always been a consideration for Beijing 
to ensure Taiwan never declares its independence, though it would only be used as the 
last option. Chen’s “Five Noes” pledge for “as long as the CCP regime has no 
intention to use military force” contradicts Beijing’s current political position. 
According to Sheng, Chen’s unclear political speech with its little hidden messages is 
enough to cast doubt upon Chen’s real agenda.  
 
There are also many ambiguous declarations in Chen’s “Five Noes” policy. Chen’s 
statement “not to declare independence” does not mean he doesn’t intend to ‘promote’ 
the idea. He states that he is prepared to “not include the ‘two states theory’ in the 
Constitution”, which does not mean he rejects such a theory. Chen never stated his 
stance on the “one China” principle. Doubtless, the Chinese government has its own 
suspicions that Chen is insincere and it has been anxious about Taiwan’s new 
government. To avoid this issue, Taipei officials published a recommendation known 
as “three acknowledgements and four suggestions” (Appendix 4), to ease the tension.  
 
This recommendation of “three acknowledgements and four suggestions” was 
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intentionally introduced to ease the tension between Beijing and Taiwan’s newly ‘pro-
independence’ government. However, this turned out to be Chen’s strategy for 
dealing with Beijing’s “one China” policy. The recommendation was criticised by 
Beijing officials as irrelevant to the situation. According to the KMT (the major 
opposition party), this recommendation is simply a “play of words” and a “manifesto 
of non-agreement”, which was what Chen is good at (China Times, 17/09/2000).  
 
Judging from his actions, Chen’s ambitions were obvious. Despite Chen noting that 
“reunification isn’t the ‘only’ way” (cited from Sheng, 2002), which indicates that 
superficially he considers the possibility of reunifying Taiwan and China, this was 
just a mask he put forward for the Beijing government. On the surface, he announced 
he was prepared to work with the PRC in resolving the Cross-Strait issue; however, 
deep down, he was working on ideas for promoting independence to the Taiwanese 
people and to ensure his support from the DPP’s core constituency of pro-
independence native Taiwanese (as opposed to first or second generation immigrants 
from the mainland). Instead of uniting the mainland Taiwanese with the native 
Taiwanese, Chen was worsening the situation.  
 
Chen’s policy had drawn criticism from opposition party leaders. The KMT leader 
Lien Chan, a mainland immigrant himself, criticised Chen’s unclear policies towards 
the PRC. He articulated the inconsistency between Chen’s speech and the actual 
actions taken, stating that a politician needed to decide what was best for his people 
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and not promote independence nor distinguish between native Taiwanese and those in 
Taiwan originating from the mainland. If China was willing to build an equal 
relationship between Taiwan and the PRC, then, Lien states, he would be interested in 
discussing further the “one China” principle. He also reminded scholars to face the 
Cross-Strait issue with wisdom, disregarding any subjective personal feelings (China 
Times, 2000/09/17). 
 
In August 2002, Chen made his controversial remarks to a video audience in Japan. 
He expressed his support for a referendum in Taiwan to decide whether or not Taiwan 
should declare formal independence from China. The remarks infuriated the Chinese 
government, since “no passing of a referendum” was one of the “Five Noes” of his 
May 20 speech. Just a few days after Chen made such statements, a spokesman in 
Beijing accused Chen of “playing with fire”. The Chinese spokesman also said that 
Chen should “immediately rein in his horse at the brink of the precipice”, as he would 
“damage Taiwan’s economy and hurt the personal interests of Taiwan’s compatriots, 
which in turn will lead Taiwan to disaster” (The Economist, 08/08/2002). Chen must 
have known how China would react to any movement toward independence. 
However, Chen was pushing China to its limits to observe the reaction from China 
and from the Taiwanese people. Although his government tried to limit the damage 
and ease the Cross-Strait tensions initially caused by Chen’s remarks by claiming he 
had been over-interpreted by the Chinese officials, this was ineffective. According to 
the report, Chen had become anxious to display his anti-China stance.  
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Despite previous incidents, Chen once again raised tensions on the Cross-Strait issue 
in September 2003 by stirring up a debate over whether the country should formally 
declare itself independent. Chen is a ‘canny man’. He did not actually start the debate, 
as he did not wish to provoke China into invading Taiwan. Instead, Chen warned his 
rivals not to twist the constitutional issue into a debate on independence. Chen was 
aware such a comment would trigger the debate (The Economist, 02/10/2003). Chen 
aimed to bring in legislation to allow public policies to be decided by referendum, 
which could mean independence may come to the vote. At the time of Chen’s 
announcement, Beijing was celebrating the anniversary of the Communist Party’s 
takeover of the country in 1949 and could not give an immediate response.  
 
Not only once, but many times Chen has broken his promise, endangering the already 
sensitive Cross-Strait relations. During his term as president, his government has not 
made any positive progress with Beijing; instead, he has created more obstacles than 
previously existed. He also created divisions not only between natives and 
mainlanders within Taiwan, but also separated the Taiwanese people from the 
mainland Chinese as well. Chen’s policy has not only created more problems for 
Taiwan internationally but had weakened Taiwan itself. Sheng (2002) argues that the 
DPP’s insufficiency, incompetence and lack of experience in effective governance 
were all factors in Taiwan’s weakness.  
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“… the DPP’s party culture, the product of long years as the grassroots 
opposition, makes it difficult for the party to adapt quickly to its new role as the 
ruling party. It still often resorts to the methods it used when it was the 
opposition, such as mobilising the pro-independence native Taiwanese to come 
all the way from southern Taiwan to demonstrate in Taipei to show the “people’s 
voice” in order to put pressure against the KMT-dominated legislature. As the 
ruling party, it should refrain from such tactics, as this will only intensify the 
social division and tension. A party needs these masses at the grassroots level for 
votes. However, once voted into power, it should rely on social elites for effective 
governance and help unite the masses at the grassroots level with those elites.” 
(Sheng 2002: 63) 
 
In 2004, Chen was re-elected, perpetuating the already wounded relationship between 
China and Taiwan under Chen’s previous four-year presidency. To make the situation 
worse, Chen decided to heat up the already high tension across the Strait by 
announcing his pro-independence stance in an interview with the Washington Post 
soon after his election. In the interview, Chen stated that Taiwanese people would not 
accept the One-China Policy and that talks between China and Taiwan would be 
impossible if China were to insist upon it. He said he would proceed with plans to 
introduce a new Constitution in 2006 to be enacted in 2008 if passed (The Economist, 
01/04/2004). If the Constitution were put to a referendum where the public were given 
the right to decide on whether or not Taiwan should be an independent country as 
described in the Constitution, confrontation would be almost certain.  
 
The introduction of a new Constitution in 2006 may very well light the fires of war on 
the Cross-Strait issue. In response to movements toward independence and remarks 
made by the leader of Taiwan, China passed the “anti-secession law” in March of 
2005. 
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Although Chen did not mention if a new constitution would be put to a referendum, it 
concerned many. Chen raised unnecessary tensions and damaged Cross-Strait 
relations. Has Chen ever considered working with the Beijing government to resolve 
the issue or has it all been an act? According to Shi Ming-de, former DPP leader and a 
former extremist independence supporter, Chen has failed in his role as leader. Shi 
points out that all the speeches Chen has made are in response to events and that they 
are not consistent. On the one hand, China has allowed Taiwan to discuss 
reunification in a variety of ways to ensure benefits and peace for both sides (Anti-
secession law, 2005). On the other hand, the wave of “Taiwanese-ness” has become 
unstoppable, which places Taiwan in jeopardy (Anti-secession law, 2005).  
 
The PRC’s blockage of Taiwan’s international political recognition has created a new 
sense of Taiwanese nationalism that has ironically helped promote the new Taiwanese 
identity. During his first term and into his second term of the presidency, Chen 
manipulated and promoted what he called “Taiwanese Identity” to his advantage, for 
his independence agenda. “Taiwanese identity” became an extremely popular phrase 
in Taiwan and, sadly, it has also become a tool for the politicians to use in order to 
win elections. Many politicians now try to emphasise their Taiwanese-ness in order to 
gain support from the public.  
 
With the bad image most Taiwanese people already have of their neighbour, Chen 
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created a bigger gap through encouraging greater misunderstandings and harshness 
towards the people across the Taiwan Strait. Instead of encouraging better 
understanding of China and its people so that a peaceful resolution could be found, 
Chen criticised anyone who tried to do so. The “trip for a hopeful Taiwan Strait” to 
China by the two opposition leaders and their meetings with the Chinese chairman 
were strongly criticised by the pro-independence Taiwanese and President Chen (TTV 
News, 01/05/2005). Unfortunately, pro-independence supporters profoundly 
emphasise their Taiwanese identity in making such dangerous remarks. They do not 
realise the significance of what they are supporting.   
 
Ties between Taiwan and the PRC 
On 21 September 1999, a deadly earthquake struck Taiwan around 1:00 a.m. The 
quake measured 7.6 and had more than two thousand aftershocks. This tragedy caused 
tremendous damage to the island. The Taiwan Ministry of the Interior said the quake 
killed at least two thousand people. Beijing and Taipei, two cities that have regarded 
one another as eternal political enemies for more than 50 years, exchanged over 
520,000 phone calls between family members in the 24 hours after the quake (Wang, 
2005).  
 
Politically, China insists on the One-China Policy that there can only be one China in 
the world. The Chinese government opposes any independence moves made by 
Taiwan and stands firmly behind the principle of reunification. But their hostile 
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political relationship is unlikely to end in the near future. Economically, China is 
Taiwan’s biggest business trading partner, with trade worth US $400 billion dollars 
between them. The majority of Taiwanese overseas investments are in China. Total 
investments by Taiwanese companies have exceeded US $80 billion dollars. The 
economic relationship between Taiwan and China has become the main powerhouse 
behind the economic growth of the entire Asia-Pacific region. There are also more 
than 300,000 Taiwanese and Chinese married couples across the Strait. On average, 
three million Taiwanese people visit China every year and there are close to a million 
Taiwanese families living in China (Wang, 2005). 
 
In general, trade and investment should ease the political rivalry. Yet, a dense 
economic partnership can coexist with the deeply entrenched political conflicts across 
the Taiwan Strait. Compared with the close social and economic ties Taiwan has with 
China, Taiwan’s separatism from mainland China may seem incomprehensible. While 
Taiwan sends more capital to China than to any other country, the Taiwanese 
government proposes the idea of ‘de-mainlandisation’ to the public and increases its 
defensive missile spending with the US. The independence moves of the current 
Taiwanese government will clearly jeopardise Taiwan’s economy, not to mention its 
security.  
 
Lin (2005) states that the majority of Taiwanese do not really concern themselves 
with which party is ruling the country, so long as they preserve a steady, safe society 
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with a strong economy. Fine governance is that of a government that understands and 
focuses on the basic needs of its people. Gao (2004), in his book Improving Taiwan 
with 8 Thoughts, mentions the idea of “Taiwan comes first”, meaning, “the prosperity 
of the Taiwanese people should be taken as the main consideration”. When facing 
Cross-Strait issues, politicians should first ensure the economic prosperity of the 
Taiwanese people and then build a positive relationship across the Strait as relations 
between China and Taiwan strongly affect Taiwan’s economy. Gao (2004) believes 
that the economy will be the key element in the 21st century for evaluating the 
strength of a country, not its military. The English Prime Minister William Ewart 
Gladstone (1809 – 1898) once said, “Budgets are not merely affairs of arithmetic, but 
in a thousand ways go to the root of prosperity of individuals, the relation of classes 
and the strength of kingdoms.”  
 
Taiwan is the sixth biggest investor in China and could even turn out to be the largest, 
according to The Economist (13/01/2005). China’s latest list of its top 200 export 
companies is headed mainly by Taiwanese IT firms such as Hon Hai Precision 
Industry (whose exports from China in 2003 were in excess of $6.4 billion), Quanta 
($5.3 billion) and Asustek ($3.2 billion). There are 28 entries on the list altogether and 
they are all high tech companies. These Taiwanese companies have helped China 
become one of the top high-tech countries in the world. In 2002, China became the 
world’s second-largest IT hardware producer after the United States, overtaking Japan 
and Taiwan. China has even become the world’s largest IT hardware exporter to 
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America. More than 60% of all export products are made by Taiwanese companies in 
China. According to a statement by Nicholas Lardy from the Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, “far from being undermined by competition from China, 
Taiwanese IT businesses are benefiting from their production on the mainland, 
increasing their global market share across a broad range of products.” Also, Taiwan’s 
huge trade surplus with mainland China has helped them build up the world’s third-
largest holdings of foreign currency reserves, with a record $239 billion at November 
2004 (The Economist, 13/01/2005).  
 
Close business ties with mainland China not only helps development in China, but 
also helps reduce the economic gap across the Strait, which also benefits Taiwan’s 
own economy and global position. The 2000 Nobel Prize winner in Economic 
Sciences, James J. Heckman, believes that Taiwan has a very bright future with the 
PRC. Taiwan should use its unique role as an advantage in conducting business with 
China, also improving the skills of the mainland Chinese. The best opportunities will 
come from close business ties with China. Taiwan should not regard China’s positive 
developments as a threat and shut its doors to China. Instead, Taiwan should overlook 
its political disagreements and prosper together with China (Cited from Gao, 2004: 
66). 
 
Political influences on Cross-Strait business enterprises aren’t showing any positive 
progress. Since China is Taiwan’s biggest business trading partner and also the 
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biggest centre of investment for Taiwan, economically, Taiwan cannot avoid losing 
such a big account. According to Cheng (Cheng, 2005), Taiwan, as the weaker party 
(in terms of size, population and military might), is more dependent on China for 
export and investment opportunities. Nevertheless, Taiwanese governments, present 
and past have made and continue to make announcements that warn Taiwanese 
companies not to ignore the risks in Chinese markets. False information is given to 
the public and used as a strategy to promote the ‘de-mainlandisation’ of Taiwan and 
to slowly hollow out Chinese business investments. Former Taiwanese president Lee 
deng-hui said, “investing business in China is an act of suicide” (Cited from Gao, 
2004: 72). He made a few predictions over recent years about the growing Chinese 
economy such as: China’s economy will collapse 2-3 years before or after 1995; and 
the Chinese currency will fall in 1997. On several occasions he even alleged that the 
Chinese stock market would fall and so would economic development (Gao, 2004). 
Judging from China’s strong and growing economy today, I believe we can rule out 
all of these predictions.  
 
Unfortunately, the leader of Taiwan today still fails to confront reality and for that 
reason, Taiwan’s economy has to pay the price. Chen persists with his promotion of 
‘de-mainlandisation’ and urges businessmen to conduct proper risk assessments when 
doing business with China, calling China a competitor and threat to Taiwan. He also 
says that Taiwanese people will only ‘lower themselves’ depending on the 
developments of its competitor. (Macroview Weekly, Issue 557, 2005) Chen, like 
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Lee, places his personal feelings for the PRC ahead of the people’s interests, which 
clearly ought to be for a steady, growing economy. During his term as president of 
Taiwan, the economy has not grown but rather declined.  
 
Taiwan has the world’s 20th largest economy; China is 7th and America comes in at 
first place (The Economist, 13/01/2005). In 1999, Taiwan’s GDP growth was standing 
strong at 5.42%, and in 2000, just before the KMT handed over power to the DPP, 
Taiwan’s GDP growth was as high as 7.94%. However, the rapid growth in the 
economy did not last long after Chen came to power. In 2001, Taiwan’s GDP growth 
was at -2.18%; compared to previous years, this was a dramatic decrease. Public 
consumption, at 4.93% growth in 2000, had contributed 2.98% to the GDP growth of 
that year. However, public consumption growth declined to 1.04% in 2001, 
contributing only 0.62% to the GDP growth. In 2002, Taiwan’s economy didn’t seem 
to improve at all. 2002 showed less than 2% public consumption growth compared to 
an average of over 5% public consumption growth over the last 50 years. Public 
investments have also declined from 15.74% in 2000 to 1.56% in 2002. The impact 
on the economy has also been reflected in the unemployment rate. Taiwan’s 
unemployment rate has increased from 2.99% (293,000 people unemployed) in 2000 
to 5.17% (515,000 people unemployed) in 2002. Although Chen’s government 
emphasises that Taiwan’s declining economy is caused by the poor global economy, 
this is not probably the case. In fact, Taiwan’s trading with other overseas markets 
(especially China) has contributed to its highest GDP growth. The declining numbers 
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in Taiwan’s economy have been unmistakably due to the lack of confidence in 
investments and consumption. Clearly, the Taiwanese public has no confidence in 
their new government (Su, 2003).  
 
It is an undeniable reality that the Chinese market is important. “This is a time of 
global competition”, says Preston Chen, chairman of Ho Tung Group, which has over 
$100 million invested in China. “If you don’t go [to China], others will, and the first 
to suffer will be you” (cited from The Economist, 13/01/2005). Eamonn Kelly, GBN 
director and president, says, “China is going to surprise the world just like Japan and 
Germany after the devastation of war, by creating for themselves a new image” (cited 
from What’s Next: 141). Robert Hormats, Vice-Chairman of Goldman Sachs 
International, says, “China is going to be the great economic miracle in the first half 
of the 21st century” (cited from What’s Next: 99). During his visit to China in the 
1990s, David Glass, the director and president of Wal-Mart, said: “China is the only 
country on earth that can again reach US $100 billion dollars in profit” (cited from 
What’s Next: 233). Indeed, while every international company watches China, it is 
only logical and responsible that the Taiwanese leaders should construct a system for 
both sides of the Strait to grow despite their political disagreements and not place 
Taiwan outside the beneficial Chinese market. As Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan 
mention in their book, Confronting Reality, “if you don’t confront reality, you are out 
of the game.”  
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Political tensions and Taiwan’s restrictions on some investments along with the 
absence of direct flights are costing Taiwanese investors in China enormous amounts 
annually. Due to political issues between Taiwan and China since the end of the civil 
war, many direct linkages across the Strait have been disrupted. Until the two sides 
come to some agreement about opening up the ‘three direct links’ (communication, 
trade and transportation), it is certain that Taiwanese people and companies will suffer 
unnecessary expense. Mail is channelled through Hong Kong; cargo ships are routed 
through a third area and passengers departing from Taiwan transit through Macao or 
Hong Kong if travelling to China. A direct flight from Taipei to Shanghai should take 
only 90 minutes, but can take approximately 6 - 7 hours currently. If direct air and sea 
links were allowed, there would be an estimated saving of 15-30% in shipping costs 
and air travellers would save an estimated $390 million per year. However, this will 
not be possible unless Taiwan sees progress with the PRC (The Economist, 
13/01/2005). “You cannot create prosperity by law. Sustained thrift, industry, 
application, intelligence, are the only things that ever do, or ever will, create 
prosperity. But you can very easily destroy prosperity by law” Theodore Roosevelt 
(1858-1919), twenty-sixth US president.  
 
Chen Shui-bian has been planning to endorse the Constitution since 2006. The 
proposed constitutional revisions will not only act like the September 21 earthquake, 
shaking the foundation of Taiwan’s economy, it will also make the public fearful of 
war. Economically, if we apply the 80/20 principle, also known as the Pareto principle 
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(achieving 80% with 20% effort) to Taiwan’s economy, Taiwan can use its 
geographical and political advantages to receive 80% of profits with only 20% effort. 
However, instead of building good relations with China to ensure its wellbeing, 
Taiwan’s current government is heading in the opposite direction. Should Taiwan 
continue to spend large amounts of money making friends with small countries that 
most Taiwanese people have never heard of, or should Taiwan make friends with the 
country that is most important? Chen’s main achievements after eight years should 
have been to help Taiwan achieve unprecedented prosperity, shoulder to shoulder 
with China. Making Taiwan a better place to live for Taiwanese people should be first 
on Chen’s agenda.   
 
Kagan, 2003 suggests that, Taiwan’s democratic system can improve Beijing’s 
political moderation. However, according to (Rigger, 2005), Taiwan’s democracy is 
not yet mature.   
 
In China’s Dilemma (2001), Sheng points out three main reasons for Taiwan’s refusal 
to reunify: “1) a disparity in living standards; 2) different economic levels; and 3) 
democracy.” However, these three arguments are not the main reasons for Taiwan’s 
refusal to reunify with mainland China, though they do play a huge role in the 
discussion (or justifications used by the pro-independence Taiwanese against 
reunification). Following the changes China had made in recent years, some previous 
arguments are no longer relevant. It is time to re-evaluate these three reasons and 
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redefine why Taiwan refuses China’s political proposal. In this section, I aim to 
acknowledge the core grounds of these pro-independence Taiwanese who are against 
resolving this issue peacefully. I will look under the surface to focus on Taiwanese 
identity, which I believe to be a deeper significant factor. However, I will first look at 
the living standards, the economy and democracy of contemporary Taiwan.    
 
First, it is very important that the democratic system of Taiwan isn’t disregarded, for 
it is what most researchers use to support their claims for Taiwan’s independence. The 
fact of Taiwan’s democracy has attracted considerable sympathy and support 
internationally, especially in the West. It is true that Taiwan has enjoyed a democratic 
society, and for many decades this has worked exceptionally well for them. The 
success of the first presidential election in 1996 displayed Taiwanese beliefs and their 
respect for freedom and democracy. However, democracy is not yet adequately 
consolidated in Taiwan. Rigger (2005) notes that “Taiwan’s democracy is not 
consolidated, because fundamental structural problems stand in the way of political 
institutionalisation and improved regime performance.” 
 
A column from the Economic Daily News in December 2002 points to the increasing 
frustration over Taiwan’s new government:  
 
During the more than two years in which the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) 
has been in power, national affairs have been chaotic and the economy has 
declined; despite the various rationalisations it resorts to, the ruling group cannot 
escape responsibility. The high-sounding excuse that was used in the initial 
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period of the administration was that with new hands on the job it was difficult to 
avoid an inadequacy of experience, and that constant sharpening and refining was 
needed. But half of the administration’s term of office has already passed, and it 
is hard to exercise that excuse any more; nevertheless, today’s administration can 
still be described as having an inadequacy of experience and the need for constant 
sharpening and refining. Besides the fundamental reason that the DPP is lacking 
in talented people, an even more important factor is that those in power do not 
know how to use people properly; they frequently appoint the wrong people to 
the wrong post… (Cited in Rigger, 2005, Danger Strait: 16-17) 
 
Sheng (2002: 61-63) argued that “Taiwan’s democracy is weak in three essential 
areas: civil society, core values of the society, and state building.”  
 
“In a mature civil society – the base for a stable democracy – the intelligentsia as 
well as businessmen are comparatively highly independent, politically.” Unlike in 
a stable democracy such as the United States, the interests of businessmen and the 
intelligentsia could be easily affected by a change of government in an immature 
civil society like Taiwan. Also, Taiwan does not have a strong “civil power”, a 
“broad and horizontal social connection within the social system rather than the 
vertically connected social structure along family and/or ethnicity lines”. 
 
Therefore, the dramatic change in governance in Taiwan has doubtlessly brought 
about enormous political as well as social disorder that will last for quite a while 
(Sheng, 2002). 
 
“A stable democracy cannot be built on severe conflict of societal core values; if this 
occurs, it may lead to social and political chaos.” In Taiwan, the debates over 
independence, reunification and whether citizens are of Chinese or Taiwanese descent 
have become more divisive and volatile as the pro-independence DPP has come to 
power. The conflict over core societal values in Taiwan is an issue of much greater 
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concern than race relations, the origin and sanctity of human life (abortion, capital 
punishment), etc. What is more devastating is that after Chen’s election, the political 
mess exposed a weakness in Taiwan’s state building capacity, failing to accommodate 
the debates both internally (within Taiwan) and internationally (China and United 
States). “…Taiwan’s weak state building, which cannot accommodate ‘rule by 
rotation’ and ‘coalition government’ – both of which are common features in many 
stable democracies” (Sheng, 2002). 
 
Overall government performance has suffered as well from the new administration’s 
lack of governmental experience and shortage of technocrats. The inexperience 
coupled with disputes between various DPP factions and between the President’s 
Office and party members in the executive branch and the Legislature often results in 
inconsistent expressions of government policy. It has also led to two Cabinet 
reshuffles, including the change of premier. The separation of power issue among the 
President’s Office, the Cabinet, and the Legislature poses a pressing task for the new 
government. This has had a continuing impact on the Chen Administration’s ability to 
achieve policy consistency and administrative efficiency. In short, as many analysts 
point out. “The ruling party hasn’t learned how to rule, and the opposition party hasn’t 
learned how not to rule.” (Rigger, 2005, Danger Strait: 17) 
  
“Historically, democratisation has been used to improve governance, and not to split 
or challenge sovereignty.” Many Chinese are convinced that Taiwan is trying to relate 
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reunification with  democratisation in its “pragmatic diplomacy” in order to gain 
support for independence claims (Sheng, 2001). 
 
Should democracy become another tool for politicians to use to win votes? In the case 
of Taiwan, should politicians use democracy against the PRC? Anthony Giddens in 
Runaway World states that while the idea of democracy is spreading around the 
world, bubbles are slowly bursting in mature democratic countries. In the United 
States, a growing number of younger people have lost interest in politics. Fewer 
people are voting because they do not trust politicians. Giddens called this a “paradox 
of democracy”. Politicians focus their policies on specific areas of the community in 
order to secure more votes, thereby slowly losing people’s trust (Giddens, 2001). 
 
One the other hand, it is clear that the PRC is changing. People in China are slowly 
having more rights than they have ever had. In the major cities, people live their lives 
as we do in Australia and in other democratic countries. In 2002, China’s leader Hu 
Jintao said that China “must enrich the forms of democracy, make democratic 
procedures complete, expand… political participation and ensure that the people can 
exercise democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic administration 
and democratic scrutiny” (The Economist, 10/07/2005). Certainly, a change towards 
democracy will not happen overnight. For a country like China, with a population ten 
times larger than the United States, it will take more time to adopt any changes. 
Nevertheless, we must not discount the changes that have already been made in 
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contemporary Chinese society as well as the changes that are already taking place. 
Although Taiwan has demonstrated its impressive democracy by means of its success 
in holding presidential elections, it was not until 1996 that people were given the right 
to vote for their chosen leader.  
 
The majority of Taiwanese still believe that China is a poor third world country, even 
though this is no longer the case. Little do many people in Taiwan realise that China 
has moved forward as one of the top competitive countries in business. Politicians and 
the media are to blame for creating such an image and spreading false information 
about China to the Taiwanese public. China’s economic growth has not only matched 
Taiwan but has even managed to surpass it. 
  
Lower living standards are an unavoidable step for all developing countries. However, 
with the rapid growth in the economy and their emphasis on education, it will not take 
China too much longer to enhance people’s living standards and social status. Lower 
living standards do not mean that all Chinese people are living in poverty. In most 
Chinese cities, people already enjoy high living standards. The World Exposition was 
awarded to Shanghai for 2010 and Beijing won the 2008 Olympic Games, both 
further proof of China’s growing economy.  
 
Taiwan formed its own identity after Japanese colonisation ended in 1945. It took a 
different path socially and politically from the PRC, which caused an incompatibility 
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of identity between the Taiwanese and the Chinese today. Taiwan focused on its 
economy and reconstruction after the Japanese left. They built up a strong economy to 
become one of the “Four Asian Tigers”. However, it may be argued that if social 
experience makes one’s identity (Brown, 2004), then wouldn’t it also be possible for 
the Chinese to have the same identity as the Taiwanese, assuming they share the same 
social experiences, especially when they even use the same official language?  
 
The recent economic growth experienced by Taiwan and China does not only build up 
the good economic relationship between them, it also boosts social exchanges. 
Popular Taiwanese TV and music programs are viewed by the majority of 
mainlanders and receive great responses. As an example, Taiwanese singers often 
hold concerts in many Chinese cities. Also, TV dramas are made in various Chinese 
provinces, demonstrating this popularity further. The point is that although one may 
still be able to notice the Taiwanese identity at present, continued social exchanges 
will be a foreseeable lead to a culturally combined Taiwan and China.     
 
The conflict between Beijing and Taiwan may have been resolved if only the 
wordings in the Shanghai Declaration were selected with utmost care and tact. The 
common notion and thinking that “One China” means that Taiwan is a part of China 
is both true and false. This is true because Taiwan is indeed a geographical 
component of China. However, this is also false, because Taiwanese do not see 
themselves as part of the PRC. There are still issues for both sides of the Strait to 
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resolve.   
 
Nationalism and Identity of Taiwan 
Nationalism can affect people’s thoughts in a most unexplainable way. Tom Nairn 
writes that ‘“Nationalism” is the pathology of modern developmental history, as 
inescapable as “neurosis” in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity 
attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the 
dilemmas of the helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of 
infantilism for societies) and largely incurable” (cited from Imagined Communities: 
5).  
 
Taiwan’s nationalism has emerged from the persistent political blockages to 
international acknowledgement from the PRC as well as from its threats of military 
confrontation. After years of fighting for a global political status and fear and anger 
over war games and missile testing from the Beijing government, nationalism has 
slowly consolidated in Taiwan. Taiwanese-ness has been produced by Taiwanese 
politicians for the purposes of promoting independence and, later, as a tool for 
winning votes. 
 
Brown (2004) states that Taiwan’s new Identity, “with its basis in actual social 
experience, contributes to the increasing numbers of Taiwanese who approve of the 
calculated risk of angering China in order to win international support for Taiwan’s 
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sovereignty”.  
 
The growing numbers of the pro-independence Taiwanese threaten Taiwan’s 
wellbeing by refusing to nourish a good relationship with the PRC. They ignore the 
close ties between the two sides and the similarity in cultural backgrounds to insist 
upon what they believe is more important: an independent Taiwan. They emphasise 
the term “Taiwanese-ness” to distinguish themselves from the mainland Chinese. In a 
way, Taiwan seems to be closer to the West and even to Japan than to a country with 
a similar cultural background (China). “… many Taiwanese have strong bei qing (a 
complex that they are being victimised by mainlanders). People in the mainland will 
then have such bei qing, but in a reverse way. Chinese mainlanders are likely to take 
the view that the people in Taiwan have joined the West to weaken and contain China 
when it was in difficulty, instead of helping it” (Sheng 2001). 
 
The political and economic transformation between 1980 and 1990 changed 
Taiwanese identity dramatically. Taiwan’s identity became increasingly inclusive, 
proud and nationalistic. Unfortunately, the term “Taiwanese-ness” is today being 
manipulated by many Taiwanese politicians. According to The Economist 
(13/01/2005), the term Taiwanese nationalism was fostered by President Chen to win 
popularity. “DPP politicians largely echo the TIM (Taiwanese independence 
movements) when they promoted the ideas of an island-wide identity that combines 
elements of aboriginal, Chinese, Japanese and Western culture. Policies designed to 
 186
create, reinforce or protect this culture could prove key to strengthening an imagined 
community and thus furthering the nation-building project” (Phillips, 2005). The idea 
of independence has spread more widely among the Taiwanese people, especially 
among the younger generations. “Taiwanese-ness” is an imagined identity produced 
by widespread independence activities in Taiwan. What younger Taiwanese people 
believe in is the link between independence and patriotism; that if people are to show 
their patriotism, they must also support Taiwan’s independence (i.e. Taiwanese-ness = 
Patriotism = supporting Independence).  
 
Without a doubt, Taiwanese nationalism has become a political tool that has been 
abused by the pro-independence politicians and their supporters. For example, the 
recent visit to China by the opposition leader Lien Chan (chairman of the KMT) in 
April of 2005 and his historic meetings with the Chinese President/Communist Party 
General Secretary Hu Jintao, was criticised by many independence supporters. Soon 
after, the visit to China by opposition People First Party chairman Soong (who broke 
from the KMT in 2000) was also severely criticised.  
 
We have identified what “Taiwanese-ness” is about and seen politicians’ 
manipulation of this sense of identity. The younger generation pays no attention to 
any positive progress that Taiwan and the PRC make towards an agreement and 
would rather fight for an identity that in so many ways has proven unrealistic and 
imaginary.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
The One-China Policy was created by the United States and China to put the tension 
between them to an end – détente. It was an effort that recognised the People’s 
Republic of China as the sole governing body that may represent the people of China 
in the international community. It was also an effort by the United States to recognise 
that Taiwan, in spite of their good relations with the United States was just a province 
or dependent state of China, and may not be represented in international organisations 
as a country with its own government.    
 
Disputes between Taiwan and mainland China started in the early 1940’s. The 
Republic of China was ruled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under Chiang 
Kai-shek. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lead by Mao Zedong 
became dissatisfied with the KMT's governance. The Chinese Civil War erupted and 
in October 1949, mainland China came under the governance of Mao Zedong and the 
CCP. Chiang Kai-Shek and his army retreated to Taiwan. However, instead of 
recognizing Mao Zedong as the new ruler of China, Chiang Kai-Shek continued 
ruling over Taiwan, following the Republic of China constitution.   
 
During this period China still had good diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union but after 
some years had passed Mao Zedong realised that the Soviet Union was more 
preoccupied with “co-existing” with other countries. Since then the People’s Republic 
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of China departed from its relations from the Soviet Union. While these events were 
happening, the United States, on the other hand, had been establishing rather strong 
relations with Taiwan. Finally, in 1969, a bloody dispute along the border of the 
Ussuri River erupted between China and the Soviets. The relations between China and 
the Soviet Union were almost irreparable. 
 
The United States has been in the picture for quite sometime, negotiating with the 
Chinese government about “trivial” issues like “American claims to compensation for 
nationalised property and defaulted debts. …efforts to secure the release of Americans 
imprisoned in China.”(Kissinger, p. 684) However, its role had become more active in 
January 20, 1970 when it conducted its 134th meeting in Warsaw, Poland. Both 
envoys from the United States and China played a rather active role to promote the 
completion of One-China Policy in 1972. 
 
This paper aimed at evaluating the One-China Policy created by President Nixon in 
1972 by presenting and analysing the incidents that took place between 1970 and 
1972 that lead to the eventual creation of the policy. The incidents were presented in 
two parts: those that happened before the invitation to Beijing took place and the 
eventual happenings during the journey to Beijing. 
 
Invitation to Beijing 
In Henry Kissinger’s 'White House Years', he told of the incidents that took place 
 190
between China and the United States leading to the creation and establishment of the 
One-China Policy. He showed how both parties remained cautious in approaching the 
settlement and agreement leading to peaceful and diplomatic ties with each other.  
 
In the section entitled “The End of the Warsaw Channel,” Kissinger expressed the 
view that the strained relations between China and the United States had been a 
product of years of prejudices between the people of both countries. According to 
him, “for 20 years, US policymakers considered China as a brooding and chaotic, 
fanatical and alien realm difficult to comprehend and impossible to sway.” They had 
viewed the stand and actions of the Chinese government in the Vietnam War as an 
ardent need to expand. “Chinese, for their part saw the scale of our [United States’] 
efforts in Vietnam as disproportionate to any objective to be achieved” (White House 
Years: 685) He later expressed the view that the Chinese government read the United 
States’s role in the Vietnam war as an excuse for it to implicitly war against the 
Chinese.     
 
With such prejudices, both governments became very guarded in dealing with one 
another. Although both parties were willing to settle and resolve significant issues 
involving their respective governments, they remained firm on certain stands. During 
this period, it was the Chinese government which wanted to lessen the number of its 
adversaries. They wanted to make certain that in the event the Soviets became 
aggressive towards them, enough alliances with other countries had been formed to 
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support China to fight off the Soviets or that fewer countries would participate in the 
“seeming” war with Soviet Union.  
 
On the other hand, the Nixon administration was still hurting from the trauma 
incurred during the Vietnam War, but was still convinced that it could shape a new 
approach to international diplomacy. Nixon believed that by being on good terms with 
one-fourth of the world’s population, “it will restore new perspective to their 
diplomacy” (White house years: 685) 
 
The United States was willing to give the strategic reassurance the Chinese 
government needed in this hostile time for Sino-Soviet relations. However 
achievement of each other’s aims became hard-earned. Both had to overcome the 
prejudices that had been lurking in their minds for the last twenty years. The barrier 
between them had to be broken down, or even cracked in to several pieces initially to 
ensure they could pursue their respective goals.   
 
American ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel was the US representative while Lei 
Yang, charge d’affaires of the People’s Republic of China represented the PRC in 
several meetings in Warsaw, Poland. In January 20, 1970, the 134th meeting took 
place. It was used by the Nixon administration as the venue to express their 
willingness to send emissaries from America to Beijing. He utilized it to confirm the 
stand of the United States regarding their “would-be” involvement in resolution of the 
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Sino-Soviet issue. As read by Ambassador Stoessel, President Nixon stated firmly 
that “the United States did not seek to join in any condominium with the Soviet Union 
directed against China.” (White House Years: 687) Also, in the event when the United 
States decides to step in to settle the problem between the two countries, “it will not 
be based on their ideology but on their mutual interest.”  (White House Years: 686) 
 
Lei Yang meanwhile, responded by reading a statement drafted by the Chinese 
counterparts. It says “We are willing to consider and discuss whatever ideas and 
suggestions the US Government might put forwards in accordance with the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence, therefore really helping reduce tensions between 
China and the US and fundamentally improving relations between China and the 
United States. These talks may either be conducted at the ambassadorial level or may 
be conducted at a higher level or through other channels acceptable to both 
sides.”(Kissinger 1978: 687) 
 
Both statements from the two parties have somehow eased some tension between 
them. Although it took several months after the January 1970 meeting before the 
success of the proclamation became notable. In the 136th meeting that took place in 
Warsaw, the Chinese government finally accepted the United States’ proposal to send 
an emissary to Beijing. During these times, the government of the Soviet Union had 
constantly communicated with the US Government inquiring about the stand of 
President Nixon. It was Henry Kissinger’s choice to evade such inquiries.  
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(Kissinger1978: 688) This commitment to maintain this truce was tested when the war 
in Cambodia erupted in May 1970. The governments of China and the Soviet Union 
continued their disputes when each supported various insurgent forces in Indochina.   
 
When the disputes over Cambodia subsided in June 1970, attempts to open the contact 
were ventured once again. General Vernon Walters of America was the one tasked by 
the US Government to deliver the message to the emissary of the Chinese 
Government, Fang Wen. Several times, in diplomatic parties, both envoys from China 
and America crossed paths but the message was not delivered. The message this time, 
coming from the government of United States was about the possibility of sending 
secret envoys from both governments since the unsuccessful and public talks that 
happened in Warsaw. However, on the third time that their paths crossed, General 
Walters managed to communicate the message of the American government.   
 
Agreement to such a request on the part of China did not come through until late 
November of the same year. The answer from the Chinese government was delivered 
through the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan. The message stated that the 
government of China, along with its leaders, Mao Zedong and Vice Chairman Lin 
Biao “has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful 
means.”(White House Years: 701) 
 
All the efforts of both governments culminated in April 1971. During this time, 
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several more countries had recognized Mainland China and its government as the sole 
representative of the Chinese people in the international arena. China had been trying 
its best to establish new ties and re-establish old ties with its former allies. This had 
been enough for the world to see the sincerity of Chinese government to gain 
recognition and admittance to the United Nations. What the envoys of both countries 
tried to accomplish was finally consummated unknowingly by the table tennis players 
from both countries. Glenn Cowan of the United States table tennis team approached 
Chuang Tse-tung, China’s three-time world champion in table tennis.  They 
exchanged chit-chat and Cowan managed to obtain a ride home from the Chinese guy. 
The next day, Cowan approached Chuang to give him a shirt from the US. This 
friendly gesture was rewarded by a Chinese kerchief from Chuang. The Chinese table 
tennis team then invited the American table tennis team to come to China and play. 
The American coach, Graham Steenhoven, although hesitant at first to reply 
affirmatively to the request, deferred the decision to the American ambassador in 
Japan, William Cunningham. Since the ambassador was unaware of the Nixon 
overtures to Beijing, he told Steenhoven to accept the request.   
 
President Nixon was informed about the decision of Cunningham to accept the 
invitation by the Chinese table tennis team. When the President heard this, he 
withdrew the 100,000 troops in Taiwan at the same time, defending the Indochina 
policy. Simultaneously, the Chinese government, led by Zhou Enlai, received the 
American table tennis team warmly. The gesture did not go unnoticed. The Chinese 
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team later that day received an invitation from their American counterpart to tour the 
US and they complied gracefully.     
 
After many talks, the agreed day when Henry Kissinger would secretly proceed to 
Beijing was July 1. His trip to Beijing would be preceded by trips to Saigon, 
Bangkok, and New Delhi. The day remained significant for Henry Kissinger, for it 
was also the same day when Ambassador James Shen of Taiwan approached him to 
talk about Taiwan’s bid for dual seats in the United Nations. According to James 
Shen, he wanted reassurance from the United States that it would preserve Taiwan’s 
seat at the next United Nations General Assembly. It was heartbreaking for Kissinger 
because he knew that China and the United States had been secretly meeting to talk 
about formally strengthening its diplomatic ties which included the possibility of 
severing the United States ties with Taiwan.   
 
During his trip to different Asian countries mentioned above, he tried to prepare these 
countries about the impact of the forthcoming announcement of United States and 
Chinese diplomatic ties by subtly injecting in their conversations points about the 
Ping-pong diplomacy and their easing of trade with the Chinese. When asked by the 
different representatives from the respective countries he was visiting about the 
United States’ stand regarding the issues involving Sino-American relations, he 
stressed that by “moving towards China, the needs for global equilibrium were 
satisfied.”(White House Years: 736) 
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In Beijing, Henry Kissinger was met by four supporters of Premier Zhou Enlai.  They 
were: Chang Wen-chin, the head of the West European, American and Oceania 
Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry; T’ang Wen-sheng, a Brooklyn-born 
woman who had returned to China to serve as member of Premier Zhou Enlai’s 
government. Also present was Wang Hai-jung, a foreign ministry official and lastly, 
T’ang Lung-pin, from the protocol department.   
 
This group of important envoys was transported back to Henry Kissinger’s guest 
house to meet and talk with Premier Zhou Enlai. The team of 4 members each, 
including Kissinger and Zhou comprised the group which would initially discuss what 
was to become the One-China Policy. According to Kissinger, his meeting with 
Premier Zhou took 17 hours. What was accomplished in the first day between Zhou 
and Kissinger was more of the establishment of their respective grounds in the 
creation of the policy. It was during this talk when both sides acknowledged the 
importance of the other in achieving their goal towards peaceful co-existence. On the 
second day, the easy banter reminiscent of the first was transformed into a more 
serious tone. Discussions were mainly centred on the views of both countries and their 
respective governments about the other countries surrounding them. China had shared 
strong opinions about India and the Soviet Union. It also attempted to justify its stand 
in supporting the causes of North Vietnam. Startlingly, the government of Zhou Enlai 
told the envoys of the United States that it would never aim to be considered in the 
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international arena as one of the superpowers. China also acknowledged the 
difficulties United States was experiencing in being torn between the struggles of its 
allies.  
 
On the second day of talks, Premier Zhou finally asked the envoy from the United 
States whether a visit from President Nixon would be possible in the future. Later, it 
was agreed that the presidential visit might happen in spring of 1972, right after the 
elections in the United States to minimize criticism the US government would receive 
about the acceptance of the invitation.  
 
The envoys for the United States returned home elated, having accomplished what 
they came there for. They were able to discuss the points stressed by President Nixon 
such as issues of Vietnam and the possibility of triangular relations with the Soviets.   
 
The Week that Changed the World 
Kissinger returned to the United States on July 13. He took time explaining to 
President Nixon what took place during the three days that he was in China, talking to 
Premier Zhou. On July 15, President Nixon decided to publicly announce the secret 
trip Kissinger took in July 9-11 to Beijing to talk to the government of China. During 
this announcement, he specified that he might go to Beijing in May 1972 to 
personally represent the United States in China and talk to Premier Zhou to further 
their causes of maintaining peace between their people. In the President’s speech, he 
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stressed that the policy he would create regarding the ties he had with China was not 
in any way directed against other countries and their governments, but rather directed 
towards achieving peace within its region.  
 
The efforts exerted by both parties to secure the peaceful co-existence of China and 
United States were very tedious. Each had been prejudiced about the other. The 
American government and its policy makers saw China as a fanatical aggressor who 
aimed to maintain its identity and that any efforts of another government to loosen its 
grip on issues would be futile. This was because that the Chinese government was 
seen by their American counterparts as difficult to comprehend and to sway. On the 
other hand, the government of America was an aggressor, using seemingly “innocent” 
causes like the Vietnam War as an excuse to war against China. 
 
These prejudices had been unconsciously motivating the different moves of both 
camps. When China started loosening its ties with the Soviets, it aimed to strengthen 
its ties with other governments. In spite of its capacity to fight off the Soviets, China 
wanted strategic reassurance from countries like the United States. 
 
As a whole, the government of President Nixon had been very cautious in 
strategically creating a feasible environment for both parties to proceed with the 
creation and agreement of the One-China Policy. In the book written by Henry 
Kissinger White House Years the contents of the policy were not presented as being as 
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important as the details and incidents leading to the creation of the policy.   
 
The most significant talk besides the one that brought Henry Kissinger to Beijing was 
the 134th meeting between the American and Chinese ambassadors in Warsaw, 
Poland.  It was considered significant because it was where America tried to convince 
the envoys of the Chinese government, and in the long run, the Chinese government 
itself, to allow an emissary to Beijing. These efforts, although slightly dangerous for 
the envoys, should be treated as a sincere way of the American government to 
reassure the People’s Republic of China that at this point in time, they were willing to 
hear the side of China. President Nixon was initially trying to pamper the sense of 
security of the Chinese people that it was serious about maintaining peaceful relations 
with them and it was willing to even, internationally acknowledge China as the sole 
representative of the Chinese people in the international arena. However, the effort 
and commitment of both parties to maintain open communications were tested by the 
Cambodian war.  Although there had been disputes between them in the past, even 
during the time that talks between the two governments were talking place, both the 
United States and China tried holding on with a firmer grip on the possible benefits of 
maintaining diplomatic relations with each other. 
 
The government efforts were unquestionably well-thought of and carefully prepared.  
However, to date, the most significant event that promoted the hastening of the 
possibility of stronger relations with China was facilitated by the American table 
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tennis players.   
 
In a tournament of table tennis players, the players found friendship and significantly 
affected the interactions of both parties. A simple gesture of the giving of shirts by the 
American table tennis players and the sharing of the cultural articles paved way to the 
eventual invitation to the American table tennis team to play in China.  As remarked 
by Premier Zhou as he warmly welcomes the delegates of other countries, their efforts 
(American table tennis players) had been more effective, at least symbolically.       
 
The visit by the President of United States to China opened many doors for both 
countries. Although the government of the United States remained firm on their stand 
to facilitate possible reconciliation between the Soviets and China via the triangular 
relations it wanted to establish, China and America were able to little by little resolve 
their differences and step up to create a more lasting bond via the One-China Policy. 
 
Taiwan Issue 
Pessimists believe that war between Taiwan and China is inevitable. The tension 
between the two could escalate to the point of armed conflict. However, the hostile 
relationship across the Strait comes from misunderstandings and the ignorance of 
extremists who constantly push for Taiwan’s independence. President Chen’s real 
intention in promoting Taiwanese independence is the main factor that prolongs this 
dilemma at the expense of Taiwan’s economy and security. The political invention of 
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“Taiwanese-ness” prevents any possible peaceful resolution that would not only 
ensure the safety of the Taiwanese people, but also give them a brighter future. 
Judging from the economic development and stronger ties between Taiwan and 
China, a good relationship across the Strait can guarantee Taiwan’s economic growth 
and people’s stable lives.  
 
The question of whether Taiwan should distance itself from Chinese culture is 
irrational. Fundamentally, Taiwan shares the same culture, speaks the same language 
and shares the same writing system. Many who promote “de-mainlandisation” have 
created a discourse to indicate that Taiwan has a culture that is entirely different from 
that of China. The discourse suggests that being colonised by the Dutch, Japanese, the 
KMT and including influences from the West has made Taiwan different from China. 
Although Taiwan was colonised by the Dutch, one does not notice any influence of 
this on the island.  
 
The political reinforcement of Taiwanese-ness continues to be used against the 
mainland Chinese. This will only isolate Taiwan from the rest of the world. Since 
Europe achieved the unachievable in forming the EU, there is no reason why Taiwan 
and China should not resolve their disagreements peacefully. 
 
The One China Policy has not only proven to be a great achievement by Nixon and 
Kissinger in 1972, it should also work positively for Taiwan if they come to accept 
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the changes and see the reality. It does not suggest that Taiwan should reunify with 
the mainland in the near future. The reality is that, China has yet to meet the 
conditions to reunify with Taiwan. There are still many serious issues in China 
waiting to be resolved. Human Rights for instance: Falun Gong, Tibet, peasants 
protesting government land seizures and many other serious issues that are giving 
China a very bad image internationally. If any suggestions ever arose concerning 
reunification, then it would need to be viewed and implemented as a long-term goal. 
On the other hand, similar to China, Taiwan has yet to meet the requirements to 
declare independence. Taiwan cannot afford a negative relationship with the PRC as 
in so many circumstances Taiwan is relying on China’s booming economy. However, 
Taiwan should learn from the Nixon’s diplomacy with the Chinese as it has shaped 
the world and has kept the world peaceful even till today.  
 
With the current US president, George W. Bush saying in an interview that “I am 
convinced the cross-strait issue can be solved peacefully. It is just going to take some 
time to do. And we will continue to work to see to it that it [is resolved]”. The 
resolution of the One China enigma just might not happen in our lifetime.  
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<Appendix 1> 
1972 Shanghai Communiqué  
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s 
Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the Prople’s Republic of 
China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were 
Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of States William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. 
Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.  
 
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China 
on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino – 
U.S. relations and world affairs.  
 
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President 
Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalisation of relations between the United 
States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of 
interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Roger and Foreign 
Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.  
 
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and 
agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing 
with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.  
 
The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found 
it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present 
candidly to one another their views on variety of issues. They reviewed the 
international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking 
place and expounded their positions and attitudes.  
 
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and Peace in the world requires efforts both to 
reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United 
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States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfils the aspirations of 
peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger 
of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social 
progress for all people of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The 
United States believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving 
communication between countries that through accident, miscalculation or 
misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be 
willing to complete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country 
should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own 
attitude for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of 
Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; 
its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal 
put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 
represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated 
settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. force from 
the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. 
The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of 
Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a 
relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korea peninsula. The 
United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will 
continue to develop the exiting close bonds. Consistent with the United States favors 
the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all 
military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire 
line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of 
South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without 
having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.  
 
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries 
want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution – this has 
become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big 
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nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China 
will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. 
The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all oppressed people 
and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the 
right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and right to 
safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own 
countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All 
foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.  
 
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the people of Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the 
seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in 
the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the 
Indochinese people. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful 
unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “UN 
Commission for the Unification of Korea.” It firmly supports the Japanese people’s 
desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly 
maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations 
resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to 
their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and 
Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to 
preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in 
their struggle for the right of self-determination.   
 
There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social 
system and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed tat countries, regardless of 
their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, 
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non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on basis, without 
resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of 
China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.  
 
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that: 
progress toward the normalisation of relations between China and the United States is 
in the interests of all countries;  
both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;  
neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to 
efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and  
neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements 
or understandings with the other directed at other stats.  
 
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the 
world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for 
major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.  
 
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the 
United States. The Chinese reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial 
question obstructing the normalisation of relations between China and the United 
States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal 
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to 
the mainland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other 
country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be 
withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities 
which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two 
governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status 
of Taiwan remains to be determined.”  
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The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of 
China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by Chinese them-selves. With 
this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively 
reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area 
diminishes.  
 
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two 
peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such field as science, 
technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and 
exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further 
development of such contacts and exchanges.  
 
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be 
derived, and agree that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in 
the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive 
development of trade between their two countries.  
 
The two sides agreed that they will stay contact through various channels, including 
the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete 
consultations to further the normalisation of relations between the two countries and 
continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.  
 
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open 
up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the 
normalisation of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the 
Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to relaxation of tension in Asia 
and the World.  
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President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for 
the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and the people of the 
People’s Republic of China.  
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<Appendix 2> 
817 Joint Communiqué 
In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 
1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America recognised the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, 
and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is 
part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United 
States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations 
with the people in Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and 
China were normalised.     
The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of 
negotiation between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two 
sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue 
again following normalisation. Recognising that this issue would seriously hamper the 
development United States – China relations, they have held further discussion on it, 
during and since the meting between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao 
Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October 1981.  
Respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference each 
other’s internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States – 
China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué of 
February 28. 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations which came into effect in January 1, 1973. Both sides 
emphatically state tat these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.  
The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China’s internal 
affair. The Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 
1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the 
Motherland. The Nine – Point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 
represented a Further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for peaceful 
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solution to the Taiwan question.  
The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, 
and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 
“two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” The United States Government 
understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of 
the Taiwan question as indicated in China’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued 
on January 1, 1979 and the Nine – Point proposal put forward by China on September 
30, 1981. The situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also 
provides favourable conditions for the settlement of United States –China differences 
over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.  
Having in mind the forgoing statements of both sides, the United States Government 
states that it does not seek to carry out a long – term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, 
that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative 
terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually 
its saes of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so 
stating, the United States acknowledges China’s consistent position regarding the 
thorough settlement of this issue.  
In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of 
United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two 
governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions 
conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.  
The development of United States – China relations is not only in the interest of the 
two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are 
determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties to 
the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, and technological of relations between 
the governments and peoples of the United States and China.  
In order to bring about the healthy development of United States - China relations, 
maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two governments 
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reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and 
the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides 
will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international 
issues of common interest.        
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<Appendix 3> 
Anti Secession Law 
“Article 1 This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the 
purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in 
the name of "Taiwan independence", promoting peaceful national reunification, 
maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
nation.  
 
Article 2 There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong 
to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. 
Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of 
all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The 
state shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan 
secede from China under any name or by any means.  
 
Article 3 The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 
1940s. Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's 
internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.  
 
Article 4 Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty 
of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.  
 
Article 5 Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of 
the country. To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the 
fundamental interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state 
shall do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification. After 
the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those 
on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.  
Article 6 The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in 
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the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Straits relations:  
(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater 
mutual understanding and mutual trust;  
(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct 
links of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties 
between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;  
(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, 
technology, culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud 
Chinese cultural traditions;  
(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and  
(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability 
in the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations.  
The state protects the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance 
with law.  
 
Article 7 The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through 
consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Straits. These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and 
phases and with flexible and varied modalities.  
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following 
matters:  
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides;  
(2) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations;  
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification;  
(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities;  
(5) the Taiwan region's room of international operation that is compatible with its 
status; and  
(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national reunification.  
 
Article 8 In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act 
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under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, 
or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that 
possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state 
shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The State Council and the 
Central Military Commission shall decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and 
other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall 
promptly report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.  
 
Article 9 In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other 
necessary measures as provided for in this Law, the state shall exert its utmost to 
protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians 
and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time, the state 
shall protect the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China 
in accordance with law.  
 
Article 10 This Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.”  
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<Appendix 4>  
The “three acknowledgements” were: 
 
“The current state of cross strait affair is the result of the developments of history; 
 
The PRC and Taiwan neither mutually represent one another nor belong to each other; 
and 
 
Any change to the current cross strait situation should be approved by the people of 
Taiwan through democratic measures. People are the pillar on a nation and the 
purpose of a nation is to guarantee their security and benefits. Seeing that languages 
on both sides of the Strait are similar and the physical distance between the two is 
small, the people on both sides of the Strait should work to uphold and enhance this.” 
 
The “four suggestions” were: 
 
“To improve cross strait relations, to deal with cross strait disputes, and to deal with 
China’s “one China” principle according to the ROC Constitution. 
 
To create a new mechanism or adjust current measures to continually co-ordinate the 
different opinions on national development or cross strait relations, which would 
include all political parties as well as the public. 
 
To appeal to the PRC to respect both dignity and the “space” of Taiwan and to end 
military threats and work together with Taiwan to sign a peace agreement. In this 
way, confidence can be built and a win-win situation will be established. 
 
To declare to the world that the government and the people of Taiwan insist on peace, 
democracy and prosperity as cornerstones to co-operation with the international 
community. With this in mind, Taiwan will construct new cross strait relations with 
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sincerity and patience.” 
 
 
 
